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ABSTRACT

VOICES ON THE HORIZON: A THEORY OF LUDIC RHETORIC

By
Jeff Lohr
December 2019

Dissertation supervised by Ronald C. Arnett, Ph.D.
Voices on the horizon: A theory of ludic rhetoric begins with the assumption that
rhetoric and play offer hope for cooperation and community in a fragmented and divided
world. Rhetoric and play share an intellectual trajectory in the history of ideas. The
earliest use of the terms rhetor and rhetoric in the Western tradition encouraged playful
cooperation. The move toward reason and science during the Enlightenment relegated
rhetoric to mere techniques for persuasion and silenced alternative avenues for seeking
truth. Reclaiming traditional rhetoric as a meeting place for potential negotiation and
cooperation encourages constructive civic discourse. The conclusion of this dissertation
proposes that attention to the play of rhetoric in the history of ideas opens the possibility
for teaching rhetorical theory as an appreciative praxis for the enrichment of others in
discourse and encourages cooperation over consensus. This is ludic rhetoric.
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Chapter 1: Play in the History of ideas
Play concepts and rhetoric are at the center of collaboration, competition, and
cultural competency. In Gods and Games, David Miller interrogated Gadamer’s use of
play metaphors and concluded that in Gadamer, play is “a matter of creative imagination
and the creative artist is a player” (1636). Miller’s analysis of play according to Gadamer
is “Very American!” Gadamer’s comment is at the heart of the most general issue of
prejudice in research. It exposes how presuppositions work into the fabric of
understanding. The problem with Miller’s construction of play, Gadamer declared, is
“English” (Miller, “Forward” vii). The inadequacy of English to translate the German
term “speil” leads many Americans or English users to think of play narrowly as fun and
games. Speil in German is imbued with meanings not accessible in a single English word.
In English play is a verb and game is a noun. Gadamer explained that in German the term
speil means both. Gadamer described the tension of bolts on a bicycle wheel between
prohibiting and allowing it to spin, the “wheel has to have some play in it” (Miller,
“Forward” vii). Play/speil is an expansive term in German and can broadly express space
and the in-between, both literal and figurative. Play is “leeway…, as in a bicycle wheel, a
little space, some distance, in relationships, in ideas,…in life…so that the wheel will
turn” (vii). Play is the movement between ideas; play is space; play is ground; play is
wiggle room.
The in-between nature of play helps examine the movement of concepts and the
formation of knowledge. Play lives in the imagination where self-awareness ties to free
exercise of ideas. The first chapter of this dissertation details the pervasiveness of play in
the history of ideas from the earliest writings of Homer to the ancient Greeks. Miller
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showed how play concepts transitioned from physical to rhetorical. He drew on the work
of Huizinga and Caillois to support the seriousness of play (799). The collective notion of
play links to Kant’s free-play of ideas. Play is both internal and external; it forms our
awareness of and sense of self through engagement with others.
Play metaphors encourage new discoveries of self. Existential phenomenologists
“have become…fascinated” with the structuring properties of play. Miller explained that
this turn in philosophy draws from “the possibility that the ‘play’ metaphor could
contribute significantly to the human understanding of the structure and form of meaning
in the contemporary world” (1605-1607). He divided the contemporary approach to play
into two groups: Kantian “aesthetic-ontological” and a hermeneutic Gadamarian
“cosmic-ontological” approach. The former considers uses of the “concept of ‘play’ for
theorizing about the basic philosophical (i.e., ontological) nature of works of art and their
place in human meaning” and the latter theorize about play and the ontology “nature of
the world and man’s place in it” (1608-1613). Each approach unites around
communication and the turn toward language in philosophy.
1.1 Play in the history of ideas
Rhetoric and play establish a fertile ground for hope in a fragmented and divided
world. The interplay of rhetoric and play in Homer’s epics amplify the significance of
rhetorical theory in the ancient world. A key point in contemporary Homeric scholarship
is that the received text reveals a literate bias. The original stories survived orally over
generations as fragments used for specific purposes for specific occasions. The literate
bias grounded much of the work occurring at the same time in biblical hermeneutics. The
Iliad reveals a notion of rhetoric and competition that emphasize meeting and gathering;
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it was only later that the competition grew to mean contest over rather than contest with
others. This change affected the nature of rhetoric in scholarship and academia.
Reclaiming the originative meaning of playful competition opens new ways to
understand rhetoric and persuasion as standing together. Attending to rhetoric and play in
Homer’s text reveals competition as a meeting place of others in a competitive spirit for
and with each other.
Play and rhetoric converge at important moments in the history of ideas. The
opening section explores the history of rhetoric by considering fragments of theoretical
construction evident in The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer. A survey of play metaphors in
Homer adds a new way to understand rhetoric in history and contributes to strategies to
teach persuasion and argumentation. Communication technologies employed to protect
and promote collective memory and instruction reveal rhetorical theory in practice.
Attending to play can help bring to light a rhetorical theory and practice at the foreground
of Homer’s epics. What emerges is an expansive notion of both persuasion and rhetoric
not limited to competition and control but as a site of potential negotiation and
cooperation. I conclude that ludic rhetoric sustains culture and provides an additional way
to engage students in the classroom.
Rhetoric, hermeneutics, and play circulate through interrelated moments of
tension in Western thought. In early Western texts, when skill in battle defined the heroic
ideal, play was characterized as violent and combative; play metaphors drew on images
of war and conflict. As ideals of violence dissipated, play metaphors softened and
inclined toward intellect and pedagogy (Spariosu 6-10). Each of these moments of play
reveals rhetorical thinking. Play concepts in ancient thought followed the shift from
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physical prowess to rhetorical/intellectual skill. Initially, play metaphors described battles
and warfare; as Hellenism progressed toward democracy and relative stability, we see
play tied to education and children’s games (Miller 61; Spariosu 11). Homeric epics attest
to a transforming culture, from war to peace, couched in play metaphors. The bard shifts
from combat and “overtly martial” themes in The Iliad to a “more domestic” orientation
in The Odyssey (D’Angour 294). This section reviews the history of rhetoric in the
performance of the Homeric epics. The performance initially occurred in song.
The Iliad is the oldest extant text in the West and demonstrates the urgency of
rhetoric and hermeneutics as the bonding element of culture. The songs of Homer
demonstrated a communication technology employed to preserve, protect, and promote
values, attitudes, and beliefs. The long history of preservation of the epics themselves
from the pre-literate days, through the initially cumbersome process of writing, to the
advent of the printing press, and beyond demonstrates the significance of the texts.
Homer’s epics literally have survived the test of time.
Traditional scholarship places the origin of rhetorical theorizing in Sicily circa
476 BCE by the legendary Corax and Tisias. Others point to a much later date, but
attempts to date the origin of the field obscure meaningful fragments preserved before
prose (Enos xvii). The “process that leads to the development of rhetoric” is more
important than “pinpointing” a particular date (Enos xvii). Refiguring concepts of
preserving collective memory and instruction uncovers a rhetorical richness already
evident in Homer.
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1.2 A Rhetorical Companion to The Iliad
The Iliad is one of the two great epics of ancient Greece attributed to Homer.
Along with The Odyssey, it promoted, preserved, and protected culture and cultural
memory. The stories, motifs, and gods provided a touchstone and referent point for
community. Homer’s epics were history. The events described occurred in The Mycenae
Age approximately 1100 BCE. They provide a glimpse into a world before alphabetic
writing. Kept alive in an oral tradition, the first recordings appeared in approximately 800
to 600 BCE. Although Homer’s epics are the oldest surviving texts, they record a long
tradition of oral stories. The stories themselves begin en media res and much is presumed
to be already understood by the audience. The event of the performance mattered. The
action of the story is couched between visits by the Greek god Hermes, the god who gave
humanity the alphabet and interpreted the messages of the gods. Hermes both precedes
the initial action of the story and brings it to an end.
The epics record events from more than three thousand years ago, nearly half a
millennium before writing. They have much to tell us about the role of rhetoric and play
in the perpetuation of culture. Richard Enos in Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle contended
that these ancient texts are still important for rhetorical scholars today. The Homeric texts
maintain “unique status” in the Western world because they are “massive and
monumental” and they are the “first, the oldest, and the archetype” (Havelock, LR 150).
Frobish suggested that The Iliad served as the “cornerstone of Western philosophy” (16).
The rhetorical tradition in Western culture was born in the songs of Homer, but much of
the work interrogating the communicative issues originated in classics departments in
American universities (Havelock, Literate Revolution 151). Attention to rhetorical theory
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and communicative issues embedded in the Homeric epics is growing in the field (Beck
155; Knudson 38-77; Havelock, LR 150-153). Rhetorical theories from The Iliad may
then be seen as an important aspect of the Homeric “social encyclopedia” not just for
what they say about culture but what they tell us about the nature of rhetoric and
hermeneutics at the time the stories were recorded (Havelock Muse 58; Preface 61-86).
Scholars across disciplines claim academic lineage to Homer’s epics, “but their
contributions to the history and development of writing and rhetorical theory have
received far less attention” (Enos 21). Rhetorical thinking is evident throughout many
ancient Greek narratives. Frobish in Rhetoric Review contended that rhetoric scholars
have much work to do with Homer. Here I attempt to draw attention to the moments of
play in Homer to explore how the earliest sources of rhetoric may be an additional
resource to teach rhetoric and persuasion in the contemporary classroom. The next
section introduces touchstones of rhetorical significance in Homer’s epics beginning with
a brief summary of the epic tradition and important elements from the narrative.
1.3 An Epic Journey
The term “Epic” itself proves witness to the influence of Homer. The original
meaning of epic, as used by early Greeks, meant simply a narrative song sung to a
specific rhythm, dactylic hexameter. Sound, rhythm, and music played a central role in
ancient Greek thought. Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson suggested that music was “the
heart of Greek culture, and was often indeed synonymous with culture” (1). Epic
gatherings established, promoted, and preserved community. Music was the center of
cultural life and led to growth of temples, rituals, and cities. Epic performances were
communal activities that involved audiences and performers. Mousike, slightly broader
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than our sense of the word music, implied the union of song, dance, and word. It played a
vital role in every aspect of culture. From individual work and learning to structure and
development of the polis, mousike “may well have been the first Greek cultural practice
that produced systematic descriptive and explanatory accounts of itself” (Murray and
Wilson 12). Murray et al described the communal orientation of music that helps bring
together rhetoric, hermeneutics, and play. First, music exists as an ethereal connection
between all members of a community. People become united in music. The muses,
daughters of the goddess of memory, were the gods of music and knowledge. Epic
performances were social gatherings. The invocation of the muses was a call to a
communal memory; epics recreated and created shared memories. Audience and
performers experienced the epics in collectively and creatively. The performers and
audience experienced the music together in a playful and communal way (Murray 1-5).
The central feature was the coming together as community. So, the first communicative
issue broadens the scope beyond the lyrics to an aural indicator of sound and rhythm; the
music was a message. The medium mattered. Through the gatherings and performances,
culture developed, grew, and survived.
As the influence of Homer’s epics grew, heroic themes and long journeys
gradually evolved as defining characteristics of an epic. The cumulative meaning of epic
as used in classics and literature departments today draws from the significance and
persistence of Homer. A text that predates Homer, the Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh, is so
named because the archeologist who uncovered the fragments found it similar to the
stories of Homer (George 1-3). It is called an epic because “it is a long narrative poem of
heroic content and has seriousness…and pathos…” (George 1). The Sumerians did not
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have a term for epic or make any distinction between various narratives (Nagarajan 108).
The Western tradition is so influenced by Homer that an epic came to mean a long poem
with similar content to Homer.
Homer’s epics are a glimpse into history before the introduction of writing. They
are the oldest literate recordings of the fullness of oral collective memory and point to
fragments of philosophy and rhetorical theory under construction. Epics functioned as
primary sources of culture for the early Greeks and continue to influence thinking today
(Ford, Epic Traditions 33). The songs provided examples of how to act; they were a
unifying structure of knowledge and teaching (Frobish 16-19). Homer’s work supported
the longevity of culture as it endured from one generation to the next.
Homer demonstrated multiple levels of rhetorical theory and practice. Ideas that
later become codified appear fluid in the presentation of The Iliad. We can identify
fragments and concepts that underscore Richard Enos’ contention that “[r]hetoric did not
originate at a single moment in history” (xvii). Homer’s epics attest to a growing theory
of rhetoric; attending to moments of rhetorical theory helps uncover “an evolving,
developing consciousness about the relationship between thought and expression” that
locates the origin of rhetorical theory in the mists of prehistory (Enos xvii). Our distance
from the originative expressions of the epics obscures our view.
That The Iliad still exists is a feat of rhetorical survival. Rhetorical practices
employed to maintain the narrative indicate a pre-historic birth of our discipline;
communication technologies engaged to perpetuate knowledge through the epic
narratives involved imaginative capabilities linked to multiple academic disciplines from
Art History (Snodgrass 12-31) to Zoology(Sachs 17-23). The medium participates in the
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meaning. Ong pointed to significant distinctions between sound and visual
communication when he famously wrote, “[s]ound exists only when it is going out of
existence” (Ong, Orality 31). Sound is ethereal. Much of Ong’s work helps identify
slippages and transmutations of meanings during the “slow drift” from orality to literacy.
He unpacked interior effects of words on a page and showed how writing disengages
from “dynamic” meanings in sound. An important configuring aspect imported to
narrative meaning through writing are the quantifying and limiting implications of letters
and words. Ong explained how the introduction of the alphabet isolated meaning, the
adaptable “phonetic alphabet…” reduces “sound to visible form” (Ong, Orality 90).
Considering how language use becomes distorted by writing, he explained that
interpreting words orally restricts “words to sound” which in turn actually “determines
not only modes of expression” but “thought processes” (Ong, Orality, 33). Extending
Ong’s aural construct to broader reaches of music brings multiple important rhetorical
concepts to the foreground. A simple shift in inquiry from oral culture to song culture
elevates the importance of music.
Songs utilize a variety of rhetorical techniques to preserve content. The oral
nature of the originative songs ties to a variety of rhetorical issues. Murray et al (11-12)
explained performance encouraged interaction; engaged audiences and performers helps
establish the ground for a cooperative rhetorical theory based on mutual respect (Meyer
390-391). Walter Ong pointed to a distinction between oral and literate cultures that
sheds light on a playful gathering of people in oral traditions lost in literacy, “Writing
fosters abstractions that disengage knowledge from the arena where human beings
struggle with one another. It separates the knower from the known” (44). The struggle
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yields engagement. Oral communication personalizes messages and heightens the
relationship between performer and audience. Importantly, the role of the epic singer is
not only performative but interpretive. Attending to the experience of epic as an engaged
musical performance highlights the cooperative aspects of rhetoric.
Oral performance of the epics stressed experience. The oral nature of the epics
before literacy is an important theme to understand the points of contact between the oral
tradition, hermeneutics, and play. Epic singers invented, interpreted, and performed with,
to, and for audiences. The performance brought together singers and audiences in the act
of interpretation and invention. “By keeping knowledge embedded in the human
lifeworld, orality situates knowledge within a context of struggle” (Ong, Orality 43). The
struggle, Ong contended, appears “agonistic” to literate audiences (44). Communicative
ground overwhelms agon/contest as the event of epic. The competitive orientation thrived
not attached to winning, but to gathering. As literacy crept into the Greek world, the type
of contest shifted, but a playful agonistic orientation remained. The oral nature of the
Iliad in pre-literate society adds layers of complexity to the meaning and composition of
the text and the relationship between performer(s) and the audience. Epic singers both
challenged and collaborated with their audiences in the generation of meaning during
performance. Ong explained that “Proverbs and riddles are not used simply to store
knowledge but to engage others in verbal and intellectual combat” (Ong, Orality 44-46).
The event of an epic performance then, is much more participatory and less stable than a
single recorded event with the audience muted. Attending to the relational variations
involved in epic performance uncovers multiple connections between rhetoric,
hermeneutics, and play.
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The oral nature of the transmission of epics ties rhetoric and hermeneutics to play
in at least two distinct ways. First, the interactive experience between audience and
performer establishes an “agonistic tone” that was “central to the development of
Western culture” where “they were institutionalized by the ‘art’ of rhetoric” (Ong 44-46).
Contests between rhapsodes came to highlight the games at festivals (West, “Rhapsodes”
3-10; Nagy, Plato’s Rhapsody 8). Rhapsodes sought “audiences at events where crowds
were gathered for other purposes, such as public festivals” (West 1). The competitive
gathering of epic performance preserved the community. Rhapsodic competition
underscores the first building block of a ludic theory. The second block is added by
Gregory Nagy, a classics scholar from Harvard University. He showed how the
rhapsodes, even though competitive, worked together. The epics were a community effort
emphasizing the gathering of performers. Nagy’s work was built on the theories
developed at Harvard University by Milman Parry. He detailed a variety of intersections
relevant to this study. Importantly, he explained the significance of understanding the oral
nature of composition tied to a community of imaginative rhapsodes composing while
performing (Plato’s Rhapsody 8-21). The competitive spirit and the cooperative spirit are
not at odds, “But if the performance as a whole was a collaborative effort that does not
exclude…” competition (West 3-5). Rhapsodes, playfully promoting and preserving
culture, provide layers of textual evidence of ludic rhetoric attested to in The Iliad.
Multiple levels of play theory converge with rhetoric in performance. The text of
The Iliad was fluid and the singers both recited and composed in performance (Knox 14).
The performers played together; they composed together and they competed. Nagy
pointed to Plato’s account of rhapsodes competing in the Ion and suggested that oral skill
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is a sign of cultivated arête, “we see here the virtuosity of making mental connections in a
competitive situation,…an agon” (Plato’s Rhapsody 25). Ford added subjective
experience and rhetorical agency. He pointed to Plato’s account as evidence of the
significance of the role of the rhapsode not only as performer but interpreters
(“Performing Interpretation” 35). Ford uncovered a broader agonistic sphere where the
rhapsode is empowered and creative. Rhapsodes engaged in creative and imaginative
work cooperatively in performance, attested to in Plato’s Ion, bolsters the evidence for a
ludic rhetoric in the Homeric corpus, at least until Plato.
Attention to the experience of an epic performance introduces a host of
substantive communicative issues. The nature of song and music in ancient Greece
uncovers multiple arenas of play and new ways to understand rhetoric in the history of
the humanities. Greek civilization was recorded in epics, “It is only thanks to writing that
we can study what we call, in a significant divergence from the Greeks, their early
‘literature.’” They are valuable texts, but the classification of these early songs as
literature eschews much of the meaning (Ford “Letters” 22). Important substantive ideas
are lost when songs are reconceived as poems and “almost certainly omit music, and it
certainly lacked dance or gesture, to say nothing of costume, and such potent intangibles
as the tenor of a maiden’s or a boy’s voice” (Ford, “Letters” 23-24). The meaning of the
songs moved beyond the words to include the moment of expression and the reaction of
the audience. Simply reading words essentially vacates meaning, “Thus, when songs
were reduced to words on a page…they sacrificed a wealth of appeal and significance”
(Ford “Letters” 24). The original performance of the songs implied a playful connection
with the audience (Ong 44). The singers collaborated with the audience as the music
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progressed. The response of the audience was not a distinct separate action but the
completion of the meaning. Emphasizing song tradition moves performance into a ludic
rhetorical space. Performative issues highlight the connections between rhetoric and play
by bringing the relational connections together as both a gathering and a competition.
Although persuasion is not the only element of rhetoric in The Iliad, important ideas are
drawn from a persuasive perspective.
1.4 Persuasion, Arête, and the Epic Hero
Homer’s epics indicate a playful and collaborative potential for persuasion.
Persuasion exhibits multiple characteristics in The Iliad. The first is competitive, a battle
of wits. Homer shows that persuasive force is an important aspect of arête, even for
warriors. Achilles, the greatest warrior and the ultimate hero of The Iliad, achieves the
fullness of hero only through rhetorical skill. He cannot be persuaded; he is a rhetor; he is
a rhapsode. Intellectual dominance is a heroic trait; a measure of dominance revolves
around theories of rhetoric and persuasion. Alles (175) explained how the chief hero of
The Iliad boasts of his inability to be moved by persuasion, “‘you will not persuade me!’
appears so frequently on Achilles' lips that the reader is tempted simply to skip it.” Not
only does Homer rhetorically construct a hero unmovable by the force of persuasion, but
he shows a battle between two great warriors rests not solely on the battlefield but on the
role of persuasion. “The dying Hektor breathes out, “I know you well as I look upon you,
I know that I could not persuade you,’” (Alles 175-176). Hektor is defeated not only on
the battlefield but in a battle of wits. Even in battle, victory and survival are tied to
rhetoric.
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Homer used the term rhetor only one time in the entire epic corpus and it was
employed to describe Achilles as “a rhetor of speech and a doer of deeds” (Iliad 9.443).
Homer’s use of the term is “provocative.” The earliest recorded use of the term
“is…clearly associated with the god-blessed hero Achilles” (Enos 29). The rhetorical act
we witness immediately following this description is Achilles playing the lyre and
singing an epic. The context of the scene adds to a distinctly quasi-divine nature of
Achilles and rhetoric. Homer described Achilles as a rhetor and the very next time we see
him he is a rhapsode playing a lyre “as he sang the songs glories of heroes in war” (Iliad
9.193-194). Minimally, we can expand our understanding of what the term rhetor implied
in this period; rhetoric is not only persuasion; a rhetor is a rhapsode, a singer of epics.
Additionally, that he is singing of heroic virtue accelerates the connection to divinity to
both Achilles and rhetoric. Singing songs of heroes was the grasp of immortality that
heroic death allows. Homer attested to at least an emerging rhetorical theory, one that
points to multiple meanings of rhetoric not limited to persuasion.
1.5 Rhetoric as Gathering
The playfulness of oral performance in The Iliad points to an expansive
understanding of rhetoric not tethered merely to persuasion. Frobish in Rhetoric Review
explained the significance of Homer for Western civilization and suggested that “is
widely accepted that the Homeric epics were valued as guides for future writers,
rhapsodes, and thinkers” (16). Frobish contended that The Iliad reveals rhetorically
significant information that deserves attention. The presupposition that ancient rhetoric
was inherently and only persuasive prevents scholars from identifying rhetorically
significant themes. The “focus on persuasion in ancient Greek” skews the direction of
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research (Frobish 16). The textured ethos in many speeches contained The Iliad are an
opportunity to uncover rhetorical theory (Beck 155-158). For Aristotle, ethos emerges in
action and performance “when one portrays himself or herself as having practical wisdom
(phronesis), good moral character (arête) and concern for the audience…” (Frobish 19).
Moments in The Iliad where ethos is rhetorically constructed uncover a bounty of
rhetorical information preserved by Homer. Much more rhetorically important concepts
can be brought to light by attending to play concepts.
The literate bias that confines The Iliad to a textual examination of one specific
example recorded in writing after many generations of oral performances was challenged
by Gregory Nagy in much of his work. Nagy considered how scholars approach the
Homeric epics crucial to understanding the contribution to Hellenic thought and culture.
Understanding Homeric songs as performances sung by groups of rhapsodes reveals an
authentic character of the narratives (Preclassic 90). In Homer the Preclassic
(2010/2012), he drew attention to the communal activity of singing in the Homeric
tradition. Not only was the singing of The Iliad a group effort, rhapsodes “taking turns”
was mandated at important festivals (68). Nagy contended that the performances of
Homer’s epics were communicative encounters. The participatory nature of the epics is
attested to in Plato. Susan Meyer explained that the choral performance in The Laws
“falls into the category of mousike,” the full context of singers and audience experience
the performance together (391). Meyer’s work also confirmed the oral residue in the
literate world of Plato. Performers/rhapsodes work with other performers in extended
events. Though competitive, the essential feature of agon is the gathering. The
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communicative ground is essential to explore nuances in the coming togetherness of
epics.
1.6 Performance and Oral Composition
Homer’s epics represent a rhetorical history of encounters between rhapsodes in
performance and composition. West explained the name Homer itself may even “relate to
gathering or assembly” (1-2). He contended that the rhapsodes in The Iliad show an
already accepted competitive understanding of oral performance that may predate even
received text by centuries. “Thamyris…a competitive singer…boasted that he would be
victorious even against the muses themselves” (West 1-2). Homer’s epics confirm both
the competitive nature of oral communication in the ancient world and the creative
encounter of subjective rhetorical agents. Epic performance included participation
between an audience and multiple rhapsodes. The central feature of the ancient
Panathenaic Games was rhapsodic performance of The Iliad and the Odyssey.
Homeric scholarship deals with a variety of communicative issues, both
procedural and substantive. Time and distance cause multiple problems associated with
the Homeric Questions and transmission of the text. Because of the distance from the
original performance, many unknown issues abound in Homeric scholarship (Knox 3-11).
Homeric Questions are a broad set of research questions related to authorship,
composition and date of the The Iliad and The Odyssey (Nagy, Homeric Questions 1).
Nagy expanded the original line of scholarship from the Homeric Question to Homeric
Questions, expressing the varied themes tied to his research. The questions are
communicatively grounded and still ripe for constructive inquiry by rhetorical scholars.
Specifically, Nagy challenged the prevailing assumption that the received Homeric texts
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“as reconstituted in various editions…are a single synchronic reality” (3). His attention to
a fluid consideration of both diachronic and synchronic issues in the received text pointed
to rhapsodic rhetorical agency that a purely synchronic lens obscures. Diachronic
questions consider how the ideas accumulate over time; synchronic inquiry examines a
snapshot of language and available cultural texts and artifacts at a given point in time.
Nagy revealed problems associated with distance “as an outsider thinking about a given
system…” and not as one from “within that system” (4). His analysis was based on an
“evolutionary model” that presumes Saussure’s diachrony but allows for “the potential
for evolution within a structure” (4). Nagy emphasized Saussure’s diachronic notion of
evolution. The center of his argument was a distinction between the texts of Homer as
received and “Homeric Poetry” that only a textured use of diachrony brings to the
surface. His approach opened new ways to “confront the general phenomenon of
meaning in the media of oral poetics” (4-5). Adding to Nagy’s work to ludic theory
uncovers community and rhetorical agency. He pointed to a collaborative rhetorical
practice in performance which uncovers the constructive potential of both agon and
rhetoric in Homeric composition. Both Homeric rhetoric and Greek culture survived
through playful rhetorical engagement.
Homeric songs were a collaborative process that emphasized a fluid oral culture
and responsive rhetors composing songs within a given structure. Nagy pointed to varied
examples that support an oral composition theory of authorship. The received Homeric
texts are but a single recording of a single instance of epics in performance. More
importantly, the recording of The Iliad is only one telling of the events. Every story or
depiction of the Trojan War and Mycenaean life is not necessarily related to Homer’s
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telling. Scholars often conflate proof with evidence found in the material remnants of the
past (Snodgrass 6). A vase depicting a man with a lyre may represent a rhapsode, but not
necessarily Homer. Suggesting this same rhapsode is connected to the specific telling of
the Homeric Iliad we know today overstates the evidence (Snodgrass 5-9). The Iliad is
the result of generations of rhapsodes repeating and reconstituting the epics. (Homeric
Questions 17-27). We cannot know what pre-dates the received texts, but through a close
textual read, Nagy showed how a literate bias affected meaning. He emphasized the event
of the epics; the performance binds audience and performers who stand together on
common ground. The coming together of rhapsodes composing Homeric poems
eventually became the recorded Homeric texts (Homeric Questions 18-19). Nagy’s light
on the flexibility of composition illustrated the connection between rhetoric and play. As
we understand the importance of the epics as performances, we can center on the
gathering, the standing together, as central.
The meeting of the rhapsodes during the pre-literate period ties Nagy’s work to
rhetoric and play. If we think of The Iliad and The Odyssey as a collection of fragments
arranged for a particular occasion but driven by a loose structure of concepts, the
rhapsodes are “the very embodiment of an evolving medium” (Nagy, Homeric Questions
82). Nagy unpacked an evolutionary model of Homer through five stages. From a
rhetorical perspective, we can see that rhetorical agency ebbs and flows during the
transition from orality to literacy. From the pre-literate “mostly fluid period” the epic
singers both recited and composed the songs in performance. Textual stability followed
the introduction of writing in the second stage where Athens claimed ownership and
moved toward standardization; epics singers did not have a rigid script but a general
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category of ideas from which to draw. Athens championed itself as arbiter of the text and
the Panathenaic Festivals contributed to their “gradual shaping” (Nagy, Plato’s Rhapsody
6-7). The next three stages extend the most stable text of The Iliad growing from
“transcripts” to “scripture” (6). As literate culture expanded, the standardization of the
text solidified until it took on a near divine state. For many years after Homeric Greek
lost is place as the common spoken language, the language of The Iliad remained fixed in
performance. The experience of rhapsodic transmission is distinct from the received
poems. The oral composition of the epics shines light on how play and rhetoric emerged
early in Western culture; each were tied to the Greek notion of agon as both contest and
gathering.
1.7 Agon–izing History
The history of The Iliad is driven by the concept of agon. Theories and use of play
in ancient thought inch from domination and to education. Dutch historian Johan
Huizinga characterized play concepts as agons, or contests that “manifest themselves in
sacred rituals, heroic feats, sports etc” (Miller 19). Spariosu extended Huizinga’s analysis
of Homer and showed how terms used to describe playful activities evolved from
Homeric Greek, through pre-Socratics, to Plato. Violent constructs waned while the
external contest orientation endured. Agon in Homeric and classical Greek meant both
competition and a meeting of competitors. Each of the implied meanings ties to rhetoric.
Conceptions of agon demonstrate the primary importance of communicative
practices in early culture. Walter Ong explained that oral cultures are “agonistically
programmed” (44). He described “enthusiastic” descriptions “of physical violence”
contained in oral narratives (44). The oral medium, tied to an agonistic frame,

19

emphasized violence. The distinction between oral transmission and writing is an
underlying element of cultural agonism. As literacy spread the “[p]ortrayal of physical
violence, central to much…oral genres…, gradually wanes or becomes peripheral in later
literary narrative” (Orality and Literacy 44). Ong’s point brought together rhetoric and
play in The Iliad and the “development of Western culture.” The agonistic content of
epics ties to rhetorical theory. The “agonistic dynamics of oral thought processes and
expression…were institutionalized by the ‘art’ of rhetoric.” The process unfolded in the
dialogues of Plato “which furnished agonistic oral verbalization with a scientific base
worked out with the help of writing” (Ong, Orality and Literacy 45). Ong pointed to an
understanding of agon as a contest, but additional meanings of agon have been explored
by contemporary communication scholars.
The ancient Greek world thrived in competition. Nearly every aspect of culture,
from war and ritual to “the emergence of philosophy,” was tied to notions of agon
(Hawee 15). Deborah Hawhee’s book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient
Greece (2004) unpacked agon and the connection to rhetoric. She described the
overwhelming status of agon or contest/struggle concepts in the ancient Greek world. The
term agon does not translate easily in to English. Hawhee noted that limiting the term to
“merely a synonym for competing” misses much of the rich meaning and history of the
concept. The Greeks used a more specific word for “outcome-driven competition”
concerned with a “struggle for a prize.” Agon stresses the “event of the gathering” and
“the contestive encounter” and not the “division between opposing sides” (Hawhee16).
She explained that an anachronistic connection between rhetoric and contest “figures
prominently in the shape of rhetoric’s agonism” in the history of rhetoric (16). Hawhee
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brought to light agon as a meeting place of others in a competitive spirit for and with each
other not against each other. She tied this to the contest orientation of rhetoric. The term
is much more open to others and a constructive spirit of dialogue than a narrowly
construed to mean domination and control. Rhetorical theorists have ample ground to
explore rhetoric in the history of ideas as a gathering with and for others. Rhetoric can be
construed as meeting places for discussion and civil dialogue rather than the end of
dominating persuasion and competition.
The connection between oral communication and competition continued to grow
in the ancient world. Playful rhetoric was used in ancient times for education (Walker 13;
Poulakos 32-33). The Pre-Socratics used play and competition pedagogically and
“sophistry emerged in a culture of competition” (Poulakos 33). Notions of ludic
pedagogy framed much of the early teaching of rhetoric. The Roman term for school is
linked to play and continued to be incorporated in rhetorical education until at least
Quintilian’s time in the first century CE. (Walker, Genuine Teachers, 13-25). The
massive influence of the Olympic Games “normalized and institutionalized” an agonistic
mindset. The Sophist’s approached rhetoric as a ‘‘competitive enterprise’’ (Poulakos 35).
Sophists carried the competitive urgency of oral competition in the games into other areas
of life. The sophists directed the attention to language. Language is potent; words can do
more than “announce the world.” Rhetoric and play are complimentary. Playful
competition has long been a crucial aspect of rhetorical education and in the earliest
traditions it did not imply domination or manipulation but cooperation and meeting.
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1.8 Heroic Wit
Homeric epics can be understood as contest between physical and rhetorical
power (Zeruneith 1-9). Intellect and wit break the ten-year stalemate to end the war
described in The Iliad. Zeruneith’s survey of primary sources from ancient Greece traced
this “liberation,” wit over strength, from Homer to Plato. The Homeric epics show a shift
in heroic ideals that Zeruneith helps unpack. He identified the use of the ‘Wooden Horse’
as the moment of “divide in the history of European civilization and consciousness” one
in which we “witness a human being thinking discursively” (15). The discursive thinking
is an attitudinal shift in the cultural approach to honor and the heroic ideal. He
distinguished heroic construction between The Iliad and The Odyssey. The “center of
gravity” shifts from The Iliad to The Odyssey. Achilles personified “the codex of
heroism” in The Iliad (22). He was a “backward-looking hero, personifying the
aristocratic-heroic culture” (35). Not all commentators agree that Achilles is necessarily
as backward thinking as Zeruneith implies. William Sales argued for a more nuanced
approach to Achilles.
Achilles’ heroic nature is fluid in The Iliad. He is depicted as the greatest warrior,
but he challenged heroic culture. He was a warrior and rhapsode. He chose peace over
war yet when enraged, he slaughtered his enemy. This multiplicity enhances the
perspective and possibilities of the heroic ideal that emerge in Homer. Sales argued that
the epics show Achilles “transform” from “a rather simple person” to a complex “man
who is driven to question, and eventually reject” heroic culture (86). Sales uncovered a
complexity in the Iliad that may minimize the distinction Zeruneith makes between
Achilles and Odysseus. The Iliad remains critical of war and the heroic ideal. Sales
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pointed out that Homer frequently “weaves” the horror of war “into the poem's fabric”
(91). He contended that Homer challenged the nature of the Greek warfare mentality. The
tradition tested in The Iliad elevated the status of warriors and was “devoted to heroism”
(91). Glory and honor could be earned on the battlefield, and heroic culture “embraced or
at least accepted war as the necessary means for its display.” Homer’s transformation is
rooted in his Ionian “pluralistic value systems of the Asia Minor Coast” preferring
“love…and the sensual life” (Sales 91). Achilles condemned the uselessness of warfare
and critiqued the fabric of Heroic culture (9). Zeruneith suggested that a close read of
Homer shows that The Iliad forecasted the trickery of the Trojan horse thereby
undermining “the heroic world of war” (21). Homer’s heroes challenged physical
prowess and supplanted oral skill and rhetoric as the fullest expression of honor.
Odysseus was a skillful rhetor who used intellect and rhetorical skill to overcome the
physical power of the enemy; his arête, rhetoric.
In contrast to Achillies, Odysseus “becomes the embodiment” of a new rhetorical
consciousness; he earned glory in heroic culture, yet personified the shift in heroic
complexity and “distinguishes himself with his forward-looking, rational choices and
tenacity” ( Zeruneith 35). Odysseus was depicted throughout the epics as “possessing
classic heroic virtues.” His honor was attached to his intelligence (Zeruneith 25). On the
surface, the text supplies anecdotal evidence of Odysseus’s role as part of the Embassy to
Achilles in Book IX. He was a great warrior and deceptively wise. Odysseus sacked Troy
with intellect and the trickery of the Trojan horse. The primary epithet used to describe
Odysseus, even in his own description is “sacker of cities.” He drew some fame/kleos
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from his metis/cunning not the traditional heroic code. Mind over brute force; Western
consciousness pivots on this shift.
The rise of the intellect over physical violence connects rhetoric and play to the
shift in consciousness. Zeruneith (20-31) called attention to the various negative
descriptions of intellect in Homer. Odysseus is “often mocked” because of his
intelligence. As later Greek writers distrust rhetoric’s potential, Odysseus is “considered
suspect because of his disquieting intelligence” (22). Akin to the distrust of rhetoric that
continues to develop in the Western tradition, cunning and intellect is often framed
negatively. The ability to sway others through words is imbued with magic and distrust.
The tradition continued in Plato. The tension between truth and deception is ever-present
in Socrates.
1.9 Plato at Play
Plato’s aesthetics were rhetorically grounded. The oral and performative context
was central to understanding Plato’s critique of poets, poetry, and rhaspodes. Meyer
pointed to various ways that Plato uncovered performative issues. Considering Plato’s
later work The Laws, she tied poetry, performance, and play together in context (391).
Throughout Plato’s corpus, when he referenced rhapsodes and poets, the public oral
performance was a key element of his critique. Plato loathes the potential of a rhetor to
sway an audience. We miss much of the significance of Plato’s critique if we dismiss the
context of a performer and audience. His inquiry exposed power relationships between
rhetors and audiences and “our natural affinity for rhythm and melody” that makes music
and the performance of the epics such an “effective medium to drive home a message”
(Meyer 391). Plato provided literate inquiries into oral practices.
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The influence of epic as codifier of cultural values and education did not
disappear with the invasion of literacy; literacy may have accelerated the influence
(Havelock, Preface 127-129). Plato is case and point of this claim. Nagy and others point
to the significance of Homer in Plato’s writings. He explained that the Homeric epics are
a standard referent in much later Greek writing in the classical period to support legal
issues, philosophical questions, and pedagogy (Snodgrass 23-24; Nagy, Plato’s Rhapsody
9-36). Classics scholars point to Plato as a key source for understanding the role of
Homer’s epics in the advancement of Greek culture and thought (Snodgrass 1-11; Nagy,
Plato’s Rhapsody 8-36). Plato’s comments on Homer and the rhapsodes attested to the
continued significance of Homer until at least 300 BCE. Plato, even in his critique of
writing, provides important textual makers for understanding the role of the epic
performance for the promotion and perpetuation of culture.
Platonic dialogues indicate a current of play concepts flowing through the Greek
intellectual tradition. Either in critique or support, Homer’s epics loomed largely in much
of Plato’s work. Plato’s “intellectual play” connected to his philosophy of art and
education (D’Angour 294). Plato’s inquiry into performative nature of Homer’s epics
underscored the importance of rhetoric and play. First, he considered the significance of
the performer. In The Ion, one of Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates matched wits with
Ephesian, a professional rhapsode. Rhapsodes played an important role in the survival of
Greek culture. Homer was a rhapsode. Achilles was a rhapsode. Rhapsodes were the first
rhetors in The Iliad. Rhapsodes were first and foremost performers, if for no other reason
than nature of communication in pre-literate society.
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Plato’s work demonstrated the changing emphasis in performative agency.
Rhapsodes in the oral tradition expressed creativity lost to the pen. Ford explained that
the history of the term is rife with difficulties. Much of what scholars point to “[d]espite
numerous investigations into the origin and semantic history” of the term, extend from
Plato’s use in the Ion (“Classical Definition” 300). In Plato’s Ion, rhapsodes were
“professionals who give dramatic performances of memorized epic” (Ford “Classical
Definition” 300). Plato used the term many centuries after the initial singing of the songs
and he excluded some rhetorical agency found in early texts. Ford detailed a history of
the term and suggested much more creativity ought to be implied than we receive from
Plato (“Classical Definition” 300-304). He pointed to moments in history where the term
implied both composition and recitation. The bias toward textual stability does not allow
for the fluid nature present in the term. The rhapsodic role as composer diminished to
reciter with the onslaught of literacy. By the time the term is commonly used by Plato, it
may well have designated a reciter of Homeric verse, but the historic ludic and
imaginative sense ought not to be forgotten (Ford 304). Plato’s rhapsodes demonstrated a
continuing current of play from Homer to Plato. Play theories continued to develop with
the spread of Greek culture.
1.10 Rhetoric and Play in the Humanities
The Hellenistic influence in the Western tradition led toward narratives of power
and competition that continue to affect theorizing about rhetoric and play. During the first
two world wars, play moved closer to “the center” of both natural and human sciences
(Spariosu 1-2). Play concepts engage rhetoric at the center of collaboration, competition
and cultural competency. The vast connections of meanings flowing from the horizon of
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play open new spaces for understanding the relationship between disciplines in the
human sciences. The intellectual trajectory of play and aesthetics, since the
Enlightenment, ebbed and flowed between what Spariosu referred to as reason and
“prereason” (7). The doubt of intuition, imagination, and tradition promoted by the
Enlightenment shined a suspicious light on rhetoric, aesthetics, and play (Claxton 32;
Porter 1-3). Connected to the shift in the understanding of aesthetics, play was
“condemned” by Enlightenment thinkers as “frivolous, devoid of cognitive value and
conducive to error” (Spariosu 31). The turn toward objective science, methods, and
standards during the Enlightenment mitigated the truth value of experience that is
fundamental to play.
Philosophical studies of play brought the subjective experience to the center of the
conversation and uncovered a rhetorical agency. This approach to play, according to
Spariosu, considered an “ontological status” where play has to “reveal its intention.” The
“double nature of play” exposes a phenomenological perspective as a “confluence of
phenomenon and subjectivity” (1-3). Attention to play magnifies agency bringing the self
to a subjective center, as Henricks explained, “[p]lay is fundamentally a sense-making
activity.” He described the “broader goal” in the construction of “subjectively inhabited
sphere of operations and understandings called the Self” (209). Spariosu’s attention to the
shared linguistic and semantic history of play and power showed how these concepts
function together in culture.
1.11 Play at Play
Play theories span the academic universe. The term is used to convey such a
breadth of ideas that no single definition suits all scholars. Gwen Gordon examined the
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description of play concepts from various disciplines and likened it to the story of blind
men attempting to describe an elephant: “[E]ach discipline has come to a different
conclusion about the nature of play” (1). Her study revealed problems in the search for a
universal definition of play and contended that the “ambiguous, variable, and paradoxical
nature of the play concept is so widely accepted, that most play theorists consider the
search for a universal definition to be pure folly”(1). Gordon tied much of the
contemporary theorizing about play to the philosophical privileging of rationality and
suggested that the “mechanistic rational worldview” impacts the study of play (3).
Gordon argued that a limited rational view obscures the study of play and does not
“tolerate the notion of playfulness, nor consciousness” (3). She explained that the
division between rational and “pre-rational” play concepts is a “2500 year battle.” For
Gordon, a tension exists between “…play as the random…and a rational, orderly”
concept “…that leads to beauty and progress” (3). Aesthetics and play are tied to real
experience in the world with others.
German idealists provide a good starting point to explore contemporary theories
of play. Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) expanded Kant’s
transcendental idealism and connected the conditions necessary to know about objects in
the world with our primal drives. Known in the German Literature tradition as “the
German Shakespeare” his philosophy introduced a new sense of self only the aesthetic
experience allows (Hinderer 47-48). Schiller extended Kant and the aesthetic experience
as the only hope for moral community. Schiller reframed Kant’s aesthetics not as type of
philosophy but as a way of being. Hinderer (48) explained that Schiller’s “new
ontological insight into play” helped explain that “we are only truly ourselves when we
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play....” Schiller’s fifteenth letter “On the Aesthetic Education of Man” pushed play to
the center of being “…man only plays when in the full meaning of the word he is a man,
and he is only completely a man when he plays.” Schiller worked out an “aesthetic state”
that brings attention to being. He did not simply restate Kant’s aesthetics as particular
type of philosophy; he “recast[ed] philosophy as aesthetics” (Wertz 81). He opened new
ways to understand self and a subjective experience of art emphasizing communicative
issues at the center.
Play is a serious endeavor with no specific goal. Schiller’s aesthetic grounded the
seriousness of play. His premise that “[i]n the aesthetic condition” we experience
ourselves “in the fullness” of our “possibilities” underscored the broad categories of
thought involved in play and aesthetics. He positioned aesthetics at the center of being
and self-understanding where aesthetic subsumes philosophy such that “a truly
philosophical mind is an aesthetic state of mind” (Wertz 81-83). His primary work on
aesthetics and play On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794) sought to bring beauty
back to the soul of culture (Wertz 82). Schiller, while remaining true to the “tenor” of
Kant’s aesthetics, brought a new sensibility to public life (Reis 12). The alienating effect
of culture and the failed promise of civilized society can be offset only through an
experience with beauty (Wessel 192; Wertz 82). His letters, directed toward a utopian
future, reframed the drive of philosophy. The “subject” of philosophy must work from a
perspective of beauty and art. Aesthetics and beauty are the ground of deliberation. Wertz
explains that Schiller’s letters describe the root of philosophical deliberation as aesthetic
such that the “subject matter of philosophy must proceed from…” an “understanding of
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beauty” (82). Aesthetics is a way of being and encountering others. The seriousness of
play unfolds in moment with no end in mind. Play is an end in itself.
Schiller understood being to be composed of two distinct drives existing in
discord: The drive to live and the drive to organize how we live. These drives are in
perpetual conflict and the “play drive” is the in-between of the “divided powers of the
soul” (Hinderer 27). Being seeks harmony and play mediates between competing drives.
Play does not replace or exclude, but rather is “the harmonious, reciprocal combination of
the sensuous and formal drives” (Wertz 83-84). The play drive for Schiller centers on
experience as “union of love and creative reason” (Wertz 84). The tension between our
pull toward desires and our moral order are worked out in play. The aesthetic mind
connects to hermeneutic experience.
Schiller’s breakdown of the individual into “the self and its determining
attributes” underscores communicative embeddedness. Tension of the self in experience
brings the dynamic relationship between rhetoric and hermeneutics to the heart of the
conversation (Herder 34). Reason and sense struggle toward harmony in experience and
“the externalization of everything internal and the formal elaboration of everything
external” points to a communicatively rooted agent in the play between reason and sense
(Hinderer 36). The tension in Schiller’s “dualistic structure of human nature” explores
how self internalizes other (Hinderer 34). Play is at the center of the contest between
reason and nature in the expression of self in the world. Hinderer explained that Schiller
brought these two distinct aspects of being together in play, “The point of unity, the
synthesis, is created by a kind of aesthetic condition” (Hinderer 36). Our two drives exist
in a constant state of internalizing and externalizing interpretive experiences.
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Schiller was the first to “explicitly” consider the “heuristic functions” of
philosophy at “play.” He tied art and aesthetics to the rational Platonic construct
(Spariosu 30). The first contemporary generation influenced by Schiller moved away
from the power narratives underlying play in the Hellenistic tradition and subordinated
the studies of aesthetics and play to “morality, seriousness, and rationality” (Spariosu 3033). Spariosu characterized the philosophical conversation regarding play as an
“authority contest” between the “rational play group” and the “prerational play group”
that began with Kant and Schiller and continued in Gadamer and Derrida (31-33).
Schiller’s physicality was extended by the first wave of work of Evolution theorists.
Darwin brought a new sort of game to academic thinking (Mayr 80). His
“evolutionary biology” was “largely based on…competition, female choice, selection,
succession and dominance” (Mayr 81). Theories of evolution connected play to
instinctive behavior and pre-civil life in human history. Proto-humans needed to expend
significant sources of energy by hunting, gathering, and escaping from prey. As humans
dominated nature and the physical needs of our ancestors slowly diminished, the latent
“surplus energy” emerged as play. Herbert Spencer outlined this theory. The surplus
theory of play can only go so far and, as Groos suggested, is not adequate to connect to
all of the ideas on the horizon of play. Needs direct our energy towards seriousness;
animals are “impelled to serious work by an external want but to play” by a “superfluity
of energy” (Groos 3). Groos continued the study of the physical work of play, but he
reversed the orientation. He construed play as a training ground for other serious activity.
Play can help us perfect the demands of life. Miller deemed this way of thinking the
“Coca-Cola philosophy of play.” Play in this sense is a “pause” from the toils of work–
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drink more coke, become more refreshed so you can go work more. Importantly, the
pause to play exists “so that” work can excel (Miller 106). The momentum to extend play
beyond instinct and physicality carried in to art and aesthetics.
1.12 Play and the Aesthetic Experience
Play and aesthetics exist in tension with the scientific push toward objectivity and
certainty. Spariosu detailed the to-and-fro of play in the natural sciences and suggested
“play and art are intimately related activities” (168). He contended that both are
subjugated to mere categories of knowing where neither serves a greater end beyond the
experience. The ends of art and play are not concerned with “conduct of life” or any
“ulterior benefits” (Spariosu 168-200). Aesthetics works its way into how we consider art
beyond “bare exposure” (Noe 186). Noe added an additional layer to understanding the
experience of play. He centered on how appreciation is driven by experience. Initial
contact with art is unfamiliar, as we continue to experience and internalize it, our
understanding and appreciation increases. An “[a]esthetic experience is achieved by
interrogating what is before you” (186). Noe asserted that we meet a work of art armed
with “the resources the world provides” to experience art in the real world. These
resources relate to the universal appreciation described by Kant that will be developed at
length in the next chapter. The lived experience of aesthetics sheds light on the
communicative ground of play.
Play is being. Scholars attend to play both a “state of being” and “behavior.” The
latter are performed and studied as events (Miracle 60). Miracle explained that play is a
“voluntary and pleasurable” behavior “with a genetic basis” that “results in an altered
state of consciousness” yet one remains “in control” (60). Scholars often suggest that play
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is best, or can only be, understood through a negative. Play is compared to not play
(Miracle 60; Bateson 69; Csikszentmihalyi and Bennet 45). Play requires understanding
that one is playing (Bateson 66-70; Miracle 61; Spariosu 199). Attention to
communicative aspects of play points to awareness of different and freely engaged in
activities in a community with shared rules. The relegation of seriousness overwhelmed
much of the intellectual development of play in the years leading up to the first world
war. The second half of the twentieth century saw a turn toward a phenomenology of
aesthetics and play.
Contemporary academic study of play stands on the shoulders of Dutch historian
Johan Huizinga's “groundbreaking” Homo Ludens: The Play-element of culture
(Rodriguez 1604, Miller 55). Miller traced the direction of the contemporary attention of
play to the 1934 The Care and Feeding of a Hobby Horse and Huizinga’s Homo Ludens
published a year earlier. He suggested that nearly all theorizing about play is tied to
Huizinga’s turn toward play at the center of culture and self. Huizinga described an
intrinsic nature of play, play for the sake of play. As in the Greek understanding
described above, play is defined by the gathering, not the contest or victory. First
published in 1938, Huizinga challenged not only the traditional understanding of play but
of the ground of culture. Play is not an effect of civilization for Huizinga; play is
civilizing. The elements of play that bring people together precede culture.
Homo Ludens is a keystone in the scholarly study of play. Huizinga examines the
sense of play as “a free activity…consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life as being ‘not
serious,’ but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly” (Caillious, Man
13). Huizinga attends to the importance of confronting others in play as the center of
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human community. The earliest communities of humans worked through problems of
civilizing in play. Play demands communication; working together precedes play. As
agreement emerges for play, the ground for a communicatively grounded community is
established. Huizinga’s groundbreaking and still reverberating claim that “civilization
arises and unfolds in and as play” and “play brings meaning to action” carried
communication to the center of culture (1). His understanding of a civilization at play
underscored the necessity of rhetoric and play for self and culture.
Huizinga outlined an archeology of play as a cultural phenomenon coursing
through a wide variety of interrelated concepts. “In reading this book” Caillois (1959)
explained, “one suddenly sees law, science, poetry, wisdom, war, philosophy and arts
enriched….and always profiting from the spirit of play” (Man, Play and Games 152).
Huizinga traced the history of play through culture and examined multiple of
characteristics of play, yielding not a “study of games, but an inquiry into the creative
duality of the play principle in the domain of culture” (Caillios, Man 4). Play is distinct; it
“transcends immediate needs of life and imparts meaning to the action” (Huizinga 1).
Although play has lasting effects, the playing - the meeting with others, is primary.
Caillois added that play is “pure form, activity that is an end in itself, rules that are
respected for their own sake” (Caillios, Man and the Sacred 158). The meaningfulness of
play is a key point scholars continue to develop. We can see that play has an intentional
character different from everyday life that “avoids various biological and psychological
explanations of play” that preceded his work (Caillios, Sacred 152). Caillois lauded
Huizinga’s move away from the base understandings of play relegated to physical
prowess, biological need, and simple competition. In Man, Play and Games (1961),
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Caillois detailed the significance of Huizinga’s work for exposing a rich world of play as
a set of distinct intentional acts that takes place within specified location but finds absent
the “diversified forms of play and the many needs served by play activity in various
cultural contexts” (ix). Caillois remarked that, though most of the “premises are
debatable,” the book opens many “fruitful avenues of research” (Man 3). Play produces
culture and provides a textured lens to reexamine the wide varieties of socialization,
discourse, and communication.
Play is distinct from the ordinary. Caillois added an additional layer to play that
emerges when we understand that in play we are “removed from reality.” Play happens in
a “privileged space” (Caillois, Sacred 157-158). When we engage in play, we leave the
ordinary behind and step “out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a
disposition all of its own” (Huizinga 8). Within our “carefully demarcated play area” we
are free to act without consequences in the world. The arbitrary rules of play insulate us
from outside and our actions only “have meaning only within that context.” Outside the
world of play, life is uncertain and is “kind of a jungle in which a thousand perils await”
(Caillois, Sacred 158). Huizinga untangled important play concepts related to
performance, space, and time that underscore communication issues inherent in the
history of play.
Rhetoric and play are a living expression of the sacred. Play is the way in which
culture constituted and perpetuated. Vital moments instituting myth, community, and
citizenry are bound to play. Huizinga tied play to ritual. The “most daring thesis” of the
work, according to Caillois, is Huizinga’s “identification of play and the sacred” (Sacred
154). A performance is a “stepping out of common reality into a higher order” and sacred
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performances, rites, rituals and the like involve a mystical, symbolic reality (Huizinga
14). Religious rituals have all of the “formal characteristics” of play. A distinct out-ofthe-ordinary experience, in a specific place, at a specific time, moves us out of the now
into a mystical. Caillois added that for Huizinga from a play perspective religious rituals
provide a real experience, not a “merely imitative” one (15). The seriousness of play
expressed in mythic and sacred ritual overwhelms claims of whimsy. If we connect this
idea to the communal orientation of epics at the center of ritual, rhetoric animates ritual
life. Rituals do more than symbolize action; they are action. Essentially, sacred space is a
playground, a location made to be distinctly separate from ordinary, “the sanctuary,
church, and liturgy fulfill an analogous function” to play that transcends the ordinary
(Caillios, Sacred 126). In play, we are in a different reality and temporarily distinct space.
Rhetoric and play are the living vitality of the sacred.
As the communication discipline developed, new theories of play and playing
emerged. Communication scholars work with multiple concepts of play that are not
limited to a single definition but a broad category of ideas. “Playing is always
communication” (Ohler 1). Whether we speak of the play of a loose bolt, children’s
games, or a Broadway production, the horizon of play is a rhetoric rich environment.
1.13 The Emergence of Play in Communication Studies
In this section I survey how play concepts emerged in communication scholarship
from the inception of our flagship journal in 1919 until the play-themed national
convention of 2018. This dissertation will show how rhetoric and play share a similar
trajectory in Western thought that uncover centers of thinking dislodged by the change in
values brought on by the Enlightenment. The concept of “mere rhetoric” complicates the
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academic understanding of rhetoric and is akin to the relegation of play to what in
German is “tacit knowledge…involving intuition rather than the rational faculty”
(Spariosu 1). Play surfaces as a co-creative aspect of communication that ties to classical
theories of invention and rhetoric.
Since the initial publication of the Quarterly Journal of Speech Education in
1919, communication scholars have explored play as general performance (Hyde and
Sargent 122), a staged production (Allen 58), face to face communication (Glenn Knapp
48), games and gaming (Brummett; Kearnes 152), mass communication (Monaghanand
Glancy 399; Stephenson 367), a cultural process (Conquergood 83-84) collaborative
rhetoric (Baumlin 37) metaphor for engagement (Kuusisto 51), and linguistic semiotic
ground for culture (Simpkins). Common to all theories discussed is the entwinement of
play and communication.
1.14 Play and Drama
The term play first occurred in contemporary communication scholarship in 1919
in The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education where the discussion concerned one-act
plays in high school drama programs (Bullowa 351). The ideas developed in the early
essays interrogating drama, provide an interesting intersection of ideas within broader
philosophies of play. Rhetorical scholars targeted pedagogy in the first wave of play
theory and examined the implications for educators (Stivers 434; Whitmire 139;
Drummond 216; Crafton 336), the history and craft of drama (Stivers 434; Eich 230),
theater production and management (Hicks 199; Allen 58; Eich 229; Williamson 17),
religious plays (Carney 138; ) and actors, roles and acting (Pratt 64). Although the notion
of play as a distinct theoretical concept was not the intention of these early writings,
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multiple common characteristics remain consistent. Play is intentional; play is distinct
from the everyday life; individuals must know they are playing; actors take on a
temporary identity; play has lasting implications.
Practical pedagogical questions plague both play theory and drama courses.
Ambiguity and questions of function often conceal the lasting benefits of play. As
scholars attempt to answer the questions of purpose and function, educators are haunted
by prejudices of seriousness and purpose. Education and development are key metaphors
used in the discussion of theater and play production. Theater education is an effective
tool for teaching speech (Pearson 660; Allensworth 270; Smiley 148; Crafton 336) and
more specifically a tool for uncovering rhetorical techniques (Scanlan 637). Studying
historical or religious drama provides social insight for contemporary students (Hubbard
and Fink 632-634; Postel 69). Akin to later questions regarding the function or purpose of
play, educators sought to justify drama courses by pointing to educational outcomes
(Postel 69-72; Crafton 337). The apologetic emphasis on practical outcomes ties to the
academic justification of rhetoric and play.
The intellectual development of studying drama and performance implicates the
self and others in the process of learning. Stepping outside of oneself and taking on a new
role allows students to see the world differently. As an actor imagines the scripted
character, empathy for the experience is formative and educational. This “imaginative
sympathy” allows new ways to experience the world that continues long after the
production (Blanshard 376). The study of plays and the study of play share many similar
concepts that point to agency, intellectual growth, and community. Closely related to
Drama and Theater Studies is Performance Studies.
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1.15 Play in Performance
Performance is tied to the uncertainty. Performance scholars added a new
dimension to the connection between communication scholarship and play by attending
to the interaction between the text, performer, and audience. Even in scripted and staged
plays the events “manifest an emergent dimension” because “performances are never
exactly the same” (Bauman 42). Hyde and Sargent expanded notions of performance to
cover all of human communicative activity (123). Scholars in performance studies attend
to unfolding moments of play. Play as commonly conceived in communication and
performance studies, is defined through its use in the action of actors. In the broadest
terms, performance is “the actual execution of an action” and more specifically a
“presentational rendition” (Bauman 41). Much of the scholarship attends to scripted
events “framed in a certain way” that foster a “heightened mode of communication”
occurs at a limited and specific time “for an audience” (Bauman 40). The center of
importance is the moment of engagement with both audience and text. Performance
highlights the intentional and emergent world experienced in the expression of each
renewed instance.
Generally distinguished from chance and competition, performance attends to the
moments of presentation. In the inaugural issue of Text and Performance Quarterly,
Wallace Bacon explained how a “word spoken, embodied” carries distinct meaning.
Utterance is key. Whether or not for an audience, all speaking for Wallace, is
performance, “othering” and communicative (1). Wallace attended to the voice of the
text. The text remains constant yet affects the performer. He explained that the performer
brings the text into the “flesh” in an “interpretive event” that is a “creative act” and
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carriers with it the reflections of pre-existing acts” (2). This relates to the understanding
of the ancient Greeks that the audience participates in the meaning as the epics unfold. In
performance of a poem for example, the text emerges as poem (2). The next chapter
connects this emergence to Kant’s structuring notion of the conditions necessary for
judgement. Wallace and the tradition that followed attended to important features in
communication theory that adds to our understanding of play. Locating the performance
of a text on a different horizon from the text adds layers of thinking to rhetorical theory
that will be developed in the following chapters. Wallace left room to consider a
spectrum of human experience as both a behavior and occurrence that highlighted “the
social, cultural, and aesthetic dimensions of the communicative process” (Bauman 41).
All communication can be understood as an element of performance.
1.16 The Play of Metaphor
The use of play language demonstrates how metaphors help share understanding.
As a metaphor, play is employed as a contest (Brummet; Kuusisto 50) or loosely tied to
rhetorical technique (Nofsinger 102; Giappa 281). Giappa described Martin Luther
King’s rhetorical techniques as a “play of difference” (281). What Giappa emphasized
was consistent with much of the metaphorical use of play in language, a purposeful
juxtaposition of ideas for rhetorical effect. Similar to Kant’s use of play language, play
metaphors move back and forth for a planned intent. As an abstract theoretical concept
the various meanings are tied to an awareness of play activity. Kuusisto in his 2002
article in The Quarterly Journal of Speech magnified the metaphorical use of play and
game. The contest orientation of play continues in the contemporary use of
communication scholarship. Kuusisto extended the work on metaphors initiated by
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Lakoff and Johnson and examined the implications of competitive metaphors in war
messages.
Lakoff and Johnson described the potency of ideas for the reality of our daily life
in the world with others through concepts. In two articles published in 1980, they
outlined important contributions to how language use affects the meaning structures of
our lives. Basic units of meaning become shared by relating to others. Concepts make up
the variables for meaning to progress, develop, and ultimately be shared in
communication. Metaphors structure experience. The attention to metaphor showed how
we can overcome ambiguities inherent in all communication where abstract ideas can be
brought together and function with concrete ideas (Lakoff and Johnson , “Conceptual
metaphor” 454). Allowing metaphor to structure our experience yields coherence (Lakoff
and Johnson, “Metaphorical structure” 203). The term “concept” describes internal
compartmentalizing of ideas to navigate the world; “concepts that govern our thought are
not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the
most mundane details” (“Conceptual metaphor” 454). In the following chapter we will
see that it is these concepts that Kant’s “free play of imagination” brings to life. We use
concepts to understand the world and make up the full extent of our interpretive
experiences.
Concrete understanding of ideas and concepts “are defined by clusters of
metaphors” (Lakoff and Johnson, “Metaphorical structure” 200). Akin to Wittgenstein’s
family resemblances of terms, metaphors for Lakoff and Johnson bring together loosely
organized ideas, parts of the whole. “Each metaphor gives a partial definition.” Lakoff
and Johnson explained that concepts “overlap in certain ways, but in general they are
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inconsistent, and typically have inconsistent ontologies” (“Metaphorical structure” 200).
When we understand a new concept, we reject the things it does not mean, “metaphorical
organizing…always hides” difference and “plays down features that make it more
difficult to incorporate into a particular explanation” (Kuuisisto 53). Concepts relate to
each other in complex and often incommensurate ways. Metaphors gain traction in the
similarities among difference.
Metaphors are a uniting factor in human relationships. They depend on an already
agreed understanding, a common bond of knowing. Communicating accelerates this
bond. The bond is brought to the center of the introduction of a new metaphor. The
reliance on already fertile ground of common belief allows the introduction of a new
concept, a metaphor where we have the dialogic opportunity to, “one thing in terms of
another” (Lakoff and Johnson, “Conceptual Metaphor” 455). The original metaphor is
reified, extended, and added to a new horizon of meaning and the relationship of common
understanding grows. Choices of metaphor provide not only the information for how we
know things but the very structure of our knowing. The way we know through language
works out in experience through metaphor. “Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence,
we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature”
(Lakoff and Johnson, “Conceptual Metaphor” 454). In this study, they outline the use of
metaphor in argument as war. The use of play as a metaphor accelerates our attitude of
play and structures our world through language with our understanding of play.
What we keep intellectually as concepts fuels how we experience. Importantly for
this study, the collaboration necessary for a metaphor to mean is driven by how we
arrange our thoughts (Lakoff and Johnson, “Metaphorical structure” 124). The structures
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we build through the experience with others accumulate and “play a central role in
defining our everyday realities.” They explained that the implication of a conceptual
system constructed with metaphors and conteded that “the way we think, what we
experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor” (“Conceptual
metaphor” 454). The accumulated concepts and structures of everyday experience
emerge in play. Play is a metaphor for the real. Where Lakoff and Johnson’s work tied
general theories of metaphor to the discussion of play, other scholars demonstrate the
importance of the function of play employed as a metaphor.
The use of play metaphors shapes perception and how we encode experience.
Riikka Kuusisto in the 2002 Quarterly Journal of Speech article, “Heroic Tale, Game,
and Business Deal? Western Metaphors in Action in Kosovo,” examined the use of play
metaphors to shape public perception. Western leader’s use of war metaphors align to the
study of play in two ways. First, “the meta level” looked at the way ideas are crafted and
challenged for public consumption leading to a structuring of thought. Second, war
metaphors utilize a broader construct of game and competition that falls under the general
category of play concepts. Kuusisto did not consider a theory of play proper, but her
article demonstrated the structuring power of metaphor. Play with and in metaphor
structures our experience with others.
The subtle power of a metaphor to structure understanding is demonstrated in the
“justify the NATO operation” (Kuusisto 50). In a context of “competing explanations”
Western play/war metaphors brought coherence (50-51). War and the justification of war
expressed in game metaphors helped obscure inconvenient truths, bolster Western ideals,
and navigate unfamiliar terrain. Play is a framework for understanding. The premise that
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we understand play metaphors well enough to understand other activities shaped the
central point of the work. Western leaders shape the reaction to world events strategically
with game metaphors to increase coherence and establish a common understanding. She
extended Lakoff and Johnson and attended to “the general power of metaphors as
cognitive tools” and “metaphorical logic” (51). Kuusisto contended that “brute facts…the
missiles and mass graves” were made coherent to a worldwide audience through Western
metaphors of war (51-52). Where the facts had no immediate meaning, metaphor
provided a “coherent way to understand” (51). Play then is the mediating role between
concepts and understanding. Multiple types of play emerge in Kuusisto’s article. The
attention to the power of game metaphors to conceal and promote various ideas is
balanced by the meeting of difference. Attention to the type of metaphor utilized helps
uncover a game of competing truths where opposing metaphors help “recognize and
accept that different accounts of the same incident can be compellingly defended” (64).
Using play metaphors establishes intellectual gathering place for difference and
cooperation.
1.7 Play in Language and Culture
Communication scholars also point to the playful nature of rhetoric. Hyde and
Sargent (125) lamented the lack of serious consideration of play as an independent
communication theory. When not directly related to play as a noun, play concepts refer to
rhetorical techniques “for managing and manipulating interactive episodes” (Hyde and
Sargent 125). Hyde and Sargent showed how communication scholars can attend to play
as a system of communication related to multiple categories of thinking. Ohler described
play as a “communicative behavior system” that is not unique to human relationships.
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Animals play too but not with the same sophistication (Ohler 1). Play and communication
are entwined at the most basic, pre-human level of existence.
The discursive turn in philosophy is tied to the function of language within a
specified system. Play grounds engagement as a “co-constructed communicative
phenomenon” that is also an “integral aspect of learning” (Eicher-Catt 259). Scott
Simpkins (1988) in the Encyclopedia of Semiotics tied play to semiotics and
communication theories through rules, “[l]ike social‐semiotic conventions that bind sign
users, rules produce communicable continuity in” play. Simpkins suggested that play is
like “any other sign system” and ties to many semiotic elements “in terms of social
engagements with encoders, decoders, codes, contexts, media, chronology, domains, and
so on.” A key point connecting play and semiotics is consistency and awareness. Subjects
agree to follow rules and the semiotic principle that explores the “constraints on sign use”
point to an awareness of the experience. What is exposed in the semiotic interpretation of
play in language is a moment of agreement; the positive dialogic implication of play is
the coming together of subjective rhetorical agents.
1.18 Play in Mass Communication
Play is a respite from reality. The ease of playful distraction with media can
overwhelm our experience in the world. William Stephenson’s 1967 Play Theory of Mass
Communication attended to the basic everyday moments of choice that goes unnoticed by
scholars (1-13). He explained that mass communication theory research fails to
adequately acknowledge what mass communication achieves (1). This in-between status
of discernment hidden under a vale of insignificance is fertile ground to understand the
influence of the play of mass media. Mass media may not affect change of hearts and

45

minds, but in the minutia of daily lives we incline toward play. As an escape from the
toils of reality, mass communication “at its best…allows people to become absorbed in
subjective play” (1). Stephenson’s theory is ripe for revisiting in the era of cell phones
and the twenty four hour news cycle. These ideas provide an intellectual framework to
consider how progressive communication technology continually verifies Stephenson’s
thesis. Stephenson’s work attended to many issues revolving around the increasing
prevalence of social media and the expression of the minutia. He underscored the attitude
of play as real within a blurry world of real and imagined.
1.19 Play and Human Flourishing
When we play, we play together. The attention to subjective experience of playing
announces an awareness of self and others. Contemporary communication scholars attend
to multiple functions of play in human society. Attending to the loss of narrative ground
and the “liberating power in creative rhetorical play” is a hopeful additive in an uncertain
world (Giappa 281). Miguel Sicart’s study of play and gaming explained a relational
function of play both in language and lived experience. Play concepts are “the dominate
way of expression” and engrained in our communication and thinking strategies (Sicart
2). When confronted with others, we think and act in terms of play. Play is a “mode of
being” and grounds experience (Sicart 7). Sicart expanded the ontological implications of
play and highlighted the underlying hermeneutical experience in a “tangled world of
people, things, spaces and cultures.” Sicart provided a way to understand play as the
ground of relationships with others. James Baumlin suggested that rhetoric thrives in
relationships as a form of “imaginative play” that helps us navigate a confusing world of
clashing value structures (37). As a rhetoric of play unfolds in this dissertation we see
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how mutual understanding uncovers rhetoric and persuasion as a site of negotiation and
collaboration.
The following chapters detail how ludic rhetoric, from Kant through Bultmann’s
theology to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, expands collaboration and promotes
cooperation and community. In the next chapter, I extend the history of rhetoric and play
to the Enlightenment and show how the move toward scientific thinking affected the
nature rhetoric in the liberal arts. A diminished conception of rhetoric that occurred
during the Enlightenment was carried into the development of contemporary rhetoric in
American universities. I review recent scholarship that challenged the limited view of
“mere rhetoric” in Kant and explore the wealth of communicative issues promoted in his
critical work. Kant’s free play of imagination added rhetorical texture to reason in the
context of others. In Kant, a rhetoric of play emerged as thought seeking understanding
that fertilized ground for future research into the communicative nature of Kant’s project.
The coordination of the ideas can be a helpful way to understand Kant’s philosophy and
expand his contributions to rhetorical theory.
Kant’s rhetoric of reason explained how we encode experience and framed
cognition and judgement within the context of discourse and scholarship. Kant’s
“Transcendental Idealism” re-conceived the role of the self in production of meaning
(CPR A369). Transcendental idealism established the self as a “knowing subject”
actively producing knowledge in experience and reversed the subject-object construction
of experience. Cognition organizes experience (Bloom 56). Reason does not constitute
the natural world. Reason is the regulative and interpretive construct of our own internal
active cognition. Reason is how we organize experience. Kant explained how temporal
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and spatial aspects of cognition frame layers of knowing. Cognition actively sorts and
organizes experience. Causality is an apparatus of the encoding capacity of our cognition.
When scholars in the natural sciences apply these presuppositions about the natural world
to organize research, outcomes and possibilities are limited. Kant’s move helped clarify
art and artist but falls short of allowing art to speak for itself. Kant’s aesthetic
consciousness stands over the experience of art as the subject. Gadamer agreed that art is
significant but not as the subject of our experience. Gadamer showed how art structures
experience. Art changes us.
Demythologizing is a “hermeneutical procedure” applied to mythic language in
discourse and texts (Bultmann, “Problem” 95). We no longer understand the world
through a mythic paradigm. Scientific thinking “eliminates the idea of miracle as an event
that interrupts the causal continuum of the world process” (Bultmann, “Problem” 96).
Gadamer extended from Bultmann a respect for the text. Gadamer’s constructive
approach to conversation promoted the value of others. A text interacts with us as we
interact with a text. Gadamer’s metaphor of play unpacked the subjective role of a text.
He shifted the subject object distinction between interpreters and works of art. Gadamer
emphasized the work of art as active. Art is not isolated as an object but becomes alive;
the work of art is active; art works on us. What emerges in Gadamer’s reclamation of the
classical tradition of rhetoric is a constructive openness to the other grounded in respect.
Conversation is a key metaphor underlying Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He
explained in a series of interviews that “conversation is the essence of what I have been
working on for the past thirty years” (Conversations 56). Conversation is always a fusion
of horizons. Forcing scientific methods into the discourse of the humanities fails to
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capture the essence of scholarship. The humanities and the natural science have a
different orientation towards truth. There is an inherent problem in scholarship that seeks
to justify the “validity of the human sciences over and against the paradigm of the natural
sciences” (“Universality” 4). Our experience within a tradition grounds our access to
meaning and is our path to understanding. The attitude of respect for others grounds the
ludic rhetoric expanded in the conclusion of this dissertation
Gadamer’s theory of play unfolded in conversation. Understanding is achieved
not in agreement but in the to and fro of ideas with others. Gadamer’s attention to the
process of understanding elevated the interaction, the event of communication. Gadamer
tied play and persuasion to subjectivity and respect for the ‘other.’ The conclusion brings
together ludic rhetoric as an approach to teaching persuasion as cooperation that engages
Calvin Schrag’s rhetorical theory and promotes communicative praxis and the revelatory
nature of conversation.
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Chapter 2:
Immanuel Kant and the Rhetoric of Reason
A good starting point to trace the intellectual entwinement of rhetoric,
hermeneutics, and play is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). This chapter concludes that
Kant’s free play of imagination imbued his critical work with rhetorical vitality and his
rhetoric of reason exposed a communicative urgency tied encountering others. Exploring
Kant’s rhetoric and rhetorical theorizing demonstrates an appreciative style of persuasion
that begins by standing together with others in conversation. Kant’s ludic theory of
imagination helps explore a collaborative model of communication.
2.1 Kant and the German Enlightenment
Kant’s life was rhetoric rich. Born in Prussia into Lutheran family in 1724, he
studied theology and physics at the University of Königsberg until he left for financial
reasons. He then earned money as a private tutor for nearly a decade. He returned to
academia and completed his work in Philosophy. His rhetorical prowess as a public
intellectual increased his profile in the academic community. He engaged in scholarly
debates both in public and publication (Zamoto 102; Gulyga 52). By the time he
published his most influential work, The Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Kant had been
actively teaching for more than three decades. He began his teaching career as an unpaid
Magister: A fulltime University professor but with no salary. He derived income solely
from students (Burnham 2). At forty years old, during his second decade of unpaid
teaching, Kant turned down a desirable salaried rofessorship in Rhetoric and Poetics at
the University of Königsberg. He explained that he would wait for a position Logic and
Metaphysics. He waited six years.
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Kant’s collected lectures in logic and metaphysics revealed his engagement with
the presuppositions of knowledge. His students described an affable attentive instructor
who was passionate and focused. His early scholarship is playful and poetic. We have
preserved lecture notes from his students that allow us to get a glimpse of Kant as “his
students and colleagues saw” him (Beck xi). Scruton’s brief survey of Kant’s student’s
notes reveals a gifted instructor and a “spirited orator” that engaged students both
emotionally and intellectually (4). The influence of Kant’s critiques obscures much of his
intellectual life. His teaching and public life provide additional insight into Kant’s playful
rhetoric. Rhetoric in Kant’s time was in transition.
2.2 Rhetoric Received by Kant
Rhetoric before the Enlightenment enjoyed an elevated status within the liberal
arts. The Enlightenment was a period of revival of classical education and the
“Ciceronian conception of rhetoric…became once again the foundation of rhetorical
study and remained so through the seventeenth and well into the eighteenth century”
(Bizzell and Herzberg 792). Rhetoric during the Middle Ages declined and fragmented.
Classical “Roman” rhetoric such as “Quintillian described it, never flourished in the
Middle Ages” (D’Andeli 24). Exploring the nature of rhetoric during this transitional
period is important because “the rhetorical theories of the Enlightenment are intimately
linked to the intellectual and social developments that shaped the modern world” (Bizzell
and Herzberg 792).What is now often referred to as “mere rhetoric” or rhetorical
technique encompassed only a small category rhetoric in the classical tradition. PreEnlightenment education was built on a foundation of rhetoric (Foss et al 8-9). Rhetoric
proper included rhetorical techniques but was not limited to persuasion or manipulation.
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The subjective experience of sharing information and learning in the classroom required a
productive engagement. Rhetoric was “fundamental” to education and grounded the
relationship between pupil and instructor (Joseph 2-10). The conclusion of this
dissertation will tie this conception of pre-Enlightenment rhetoric to teaching persuasion
and argumentation in the contemporary classroom. The pre-Enlightenment position
highlighted constructive engagement and rhetoric was the foundation of the liberal arts.
The method centric use of the term rhetoric during the Enlightenment relegated it to mere
techniques of persuasion, manipulation, and control (Enos 2-3; Good and Roberts 1-21).
The boundaries of rhetoric continued to shrink during the Enlightenment. Rhetorical
theory inherited by German scholars “became a victim of romantic aestheticism and the
idealization of poetry” influenced primarily by Kant (Kennedy 275). The rhetoric
received by Enlightenment highlighted technique and pragmatism, but recently scholars
have discovered a more fundamental role of rhetoric in the Middle Ages. Lingering
authority of tradition and classical Greek philosophy pervaded Kant’s European
education.
Kant’s academic career and philosophy took rise within the cultural schism
between reason and tradition. Tradition lost its hold on authority and scientific thinking
elevated reason. He thrived in the burgeoning world of the Enlightenment and contended
with the problems of freewill and reason. His early academic experience located
“theology at the center of his philosophy” (Burnham 3). He confronted the seeming
contradiction between philosophy and theology and suggested that “one must limit
knowledge to make room for faith.” He expressed both steadfast Christian belief and “the
courage to use reason” (Kant, “Response” 1). Kant’s philosophy never eclipsed his faith.
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His commitment to ethics and morality is attested to not only by scholars but his students,
“If Jesus would have heard your lectures on ethics, I think he would have said, ‘That is
what I meant…’” (Beck x). Kant’s “life work” concerned “ethical duties to ourselves and
others” (Guyer, “Introduction” 3-5). His pursuit of reason does not contradict theology
but underscores the importance of morality in the context of others. Kant’s rhetoric of
reason implicates morality.
The German education system in the eighteenth century bridged scholasticism and
the Enlightenment. German Universities taught both classical and contemporary
rhetorical theory (Erconlini, Kant’s 198-199; Vickers 281-283). Kant’s commitment to
free exercise of reason is deeply embedded within a political philosophy of engagement
(Ercolini, Kant’s 198-199). Much of Kant’s work belies his attacks on rhetoric. His
teaching and writing demonstrate expertise in rhetoric and “combined formidable
intellectual resources with great powers of expression” (Vickers 201). Camilla SerckHanssen’s review of contemporary commentators on Kant and his relationship to rhetoric
suggests that although scholars disagree on the role or status of rhetoric in Kant, classical
and contemporary rhetoric were part of his education (241). Germany proved to be an
important intellectual force during the Enlightenment and “many of the concepts that
were to prove pivotal to European intellectual history” took shape in Germany (Boyer
196-197). Many of these “great ideas…empiricism, rationalism, and psychology… found
a place within rhetoric” (Bizzell and Herzberg 812). German and the broader European
university education still embraced a basic classic trivium and quadrivium foundation but
in flux; new subjects like anthropology and geography were added and classical subjects
grew more specialized.
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Philosophy during this transitional period narrowed its scope from the “general
tableaux of the liberal arts for the higher faculties to a more focused attention on
logic/metaphysics and science” (Ercolini, Kant’s 49). Scholars in multiple academic
disciplines continue debate Kant’s work for good reason; even his straightforward
seemingly clear arguments are embedded within context and controversy. His language
both propels and disparages rhetoric. Why? The Enlightenment tradition. Kant’s radical
re-assessment of reason and freedom both nourished and challenged the German
Enlightenment.
Scholars continue to extend and develop the “contested territory of the
Enlightenment (Ercolini, Kant’s 1). Kant’s derisive attitude toward rhetoric, especially in
his Third Critique, needs to be understood within a broader context of German education
(Kant’s 48-57; Stroud “Kant, Rhetoric” 181-184). One problem confronting scholars is
Kant’s use of the term varied throughout his work. As a result Stroud contended that his
use of the term is “inherently unstable and ambiguous” (Stroud, Kant 15). Kant did not
disparage the sort of rhetoric implied in the classical tradition; he critiqued the negative
use of rhetorical techniques. If we open the theory of rhetoric to the pre-Enlightenment
use, Kant’s relation to rhetoric is vastly different. Rhetorical theory and practice in the
German Enlightenment can help show not only Kant’s peculiar relationship to rhetoric
but “how rhetoric adapted and endured in a period often associated with its decline”
(Ercolini, Kant’s 49). Because the term rhetoric in popular and academic use had
narrowed to a technique for manipulative arguing, contemporary inquiry runs toward
anachronism. The German Enlightenment was marked by transitions in education,
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culture, and philosophy. The transitional nature of scholarship and education complicates
the way we understand the history of rhetoric during this period.
Much of the history of rhetoric teaches that Enlightenment scholars narrowly
construed the meaning and practice of rhetoric, but new research reveals a deeper theory
at the center of much of the philosophy (Ercolini, “Pantheism” 3-9). Ercolini (6)
challenged the “conventional wisdom” that rhetorical theory diminished during the
Enlightenment and uncovered a dynamic rhetoric. Her research suggested that rhetoric
“flourished” both in theory and practice during the German Enlightenment; rhetoric
handbooks and courses survived and thrived in German education (5). Bizzell and
Herzberg (812) add that as rhetoric changed emphasis, the “influence of classical
rhetoric”…“diminished,” but it “did not disappear.” Demonstration of rhetorical training
and skill can help us tease out nuanced rhetorical theories (Ercolini, “Pantheism” 6).
Ultimately, attending to the use of rhetoric “provides a way to reevaluate the practices
that constitutes rhetoric in accounts of its history” and brings together rhetoric and the
Enlightenment in new ways. We can “operationally define” rhetorical concepts in the
lively practices of scholarly debate and publication (Ercolini, “Pantheism” 5-7). Kant’s
rhetoric plays a central role in his theories about reason and knowledge. “Thus not only
does Kant have something to say about rhetoric and The Enlightenment, but his own
rhetorical approaches provide opportunities for examining rhetoric’s Enlightenment
legacy” (Ercolini, Kant’s 5). Kant’s toiling through the implications of the Enlightenment
“itself performs a particular rhetoric.” He unpacked a practical aesthetics grounding
“political and communicative positions” (Kant’s 4). Kant’s rhetorical practice binds his
theory of reason to communicative engagement.
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The ground of rhetorical scholarship includes both theory and practice. We gain
insights for promoting rhetorical theory by studying rhetorical practices in the wild.
Communicative action exposes rich areas for rhetorical insight beyond discussions of
rhetorical theorizing; the “public practices of lively exchange” and published academic
scholarship are important areas of research (Ercolini, Kant’s 5). Attending to the rhetoric
of scholars adds a practical dimension to rhetorical scholarship. Much of the traditional
work in the history of rhetoric stands on the received textual evidence or “treatise” about
rhetoric rather than rhetorical theory demonstrated in the treatise (Ercolini, Kant’s 6).
Studying the rhetoric within artifacts from the German Enlightenment may prove that
rhetoric “flourished” not only as a “field of pedagogy” but is demonstrated in public and
academic discourse (Ercolini, Kant’s 5). The attention to the rhetorical training and
practices of scholars contributes to rhetorical theory by providing new ways to
understand and unpack the distinctive nature of rhetoric embedded in texts from various
time periods.
2.3 Kant the Rhetor
The life and work of Kant can help explore the deeper possibilities of
Enlightenment rhetoric (Kennedy, Classical 274-276; Ercolini, Kant’s 5-7; Frierson and
Guyer vii-x). Attention to Kant’s employment of rhetoric offers new insights into Kant’s
corpus. Kant’s rhetorical skill is evident in all aspects of his academic life, but Kant’s
role in the history of rhetoric has been overshadowed by his direct references to
techniques of manipulation. Kant’s philosophical impact overwhelms his rhetorical
proficiency. Ercolini explained that “Kant’s legacy in the Western intellectual history” is
documented “ad infinitum…,” but “his the legacy as it relates to the history of rhetoric
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has received scant attention” (Ercolini, Kant’s 5). Kant’s weaves theories of rhetoric and
play throughout his work, but because of inconsistent and “ambiguous” use of the term,
scholars disagree on its role in his work. Many scholars emphasize Kant’s explicit
negation of rhetoric (Ercolini, Kant’s 5). Dostal suggested that Kant “forthrightly
castigates rhetoric” (225). Dostal reviewed Kant’s rhetorical concepts from a “classical
perspective.” He suggested that Kant’s reduced rhetoric to a “matter of style” (235). Kant
often used the terms oratory, “arts of speech,” poetry, and rhetoric to refer to similar, but
unexplained, ideas. Translation issues point to disagreement or at least confusion over
Kant’s theory of rhetoric and oratory. A key phrase brought to the center of the Kant’s
rhetorical theory is from the Critique of Judgement. Part I Section 321 illustrates the
tension. Pluhar translated the key phrase in the passage as “oratory and poetry”; Guyer
translated the same phrase as “arts of speech are rhetoric and poetry.” In either case, we
see that communication is important in Kant. The difficulty in clarifying Kant’s rhetoric
stems not only from Kant’s confusion of terms but the presuppositions of the translator.
Kant’s uses thick layers of rhetorical analysis through communicative metaphors
(Pluhar xxiii-xxiv). Pluhar’s analysis of Kant’s theory of judgement uncovers Kant’s
concern for discursive rules of engagement. Pluhar described judgement using discourse
metaphors. “When we call something ‘beautiful’ we seem to do so on the basis …of
pleasure… And yet it seems…in such a judgment we say more than ‘I like the thing.’”
Pluhar’s remarks note the operative understanding of speech in Kant’s theory of
judgement. The implication of using the term beauty in discourse implies a universal
understanding that precedes the experience of any representation of a given object. “For
in using the adjective ‘beautiful’ we talk as if beauty were some sort of property of the
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thing.” Kant attended to how we discuss what we know. Kant’s analysis exposed how
language use implicates us in discourse, “hence we imply that other people, too, should
see that ‘property’ and hence should agree with judgment.” Judgements then are not
unique to the particular “judging subject” but are universal (Pluhar xxiv). Universal
communicability is the driving force of Kant’s critical project.
Kant’s critical work stressed not how we reason or judge but how we discuss
reasoned ideas and judgement. Kant brought engagement to the foreground. True to
Kant’s rhetoric, Pluhar described Kant’s philosophy in terms of what we “call” concepts
and what we can “say” about reason and beauty. Kant’s inquiry into reason and taste
explored what we can “say” to others (CJ 194). In each case regarding judgement and
reason, Kant circled back to the expression of the ideas and the implications of promoting
academic discourse. The binding feature of taste is an echo of others represented by Kant
in communicative terms, “nothing is postulated in a judgment of taste except such a
universal voice about a liking unmediated by concepts” (CJ 216). Kant expanded his
emphasis on communication and reason by attending to the public use of reason.
Rhetorical theory hides in plain sight in much of Kant’s work. The attention to
Kant’s rhetoric of reason uncovers multiple textured layers of communication theory. The
first contends with how we account for what we can say we know about experience. His
position shows how the pursuit of objectivity in the natural sciences is a farce; the
methods we place upon research in the discourses of science presume conditions that are
not necessarily inherent in nature “but rather critical and regulative of thought” (Bloom
56). Kant’s rhetoric of reason explored how we encode experience. He attended to the
conversation that takes place in the process of reason.
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Reason, for Kant, was a rhetorical act. He framed cognition and judgement
within the context of discourse and scholarship. Kant’s “Transcendental Idealism” reconceived the role of the self in production of meaning (CPR A369). He established the
self as a “knowing subject” actively producing knowledge in experience. He turned the
subject-object construction of experience on its head. Cognition organizes experience
(Bloom 56). Reason does not constitute the natural world. Reason is the regulative and
interpretive construct of our own internal active cognition. Experience is organized in the
act of reason. Kant explained how temporal and spatial aspects of cognition frame layers
of understanding. Cognition actively sorts and organizes experience. We shape
experience through concepts of causality, time, and space. Causality is an apparatus of
the encoding capacity of our cognition.
Scholars in the natural sciences organize research around reason and limit the
possible outcome to pre-supposed possibilities. “When scientists use reason to organize
the data of experience” they “look for causes and assume that they are there” (Bloom 56).
Kant contended that cognition organizes experience. Space, time, and “causality…did not
describe the world of nature” rather these are the forms and concepts or “rules according
to which” we must reason to organize the “experience of nature” (Bloom 56). Kant
explained that “[s]pace is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor an
accident, nor a relation; it is rather, subjective and ideal; it issues from the nature of the
mind” (CPR 43). For Kant our mind is not simply a passive receiver of things around us;
we actively encode our experience. Kant showed that “the knowing subject played an
active and creative role in the production of his world picture, rather than the static and
passive role” assigned by the Enlightenment scholars the preceded him (Bloom 56-57).
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The implication of reversing the self to an active “knowing subject” will be hashed out
further in the Neo-Kantian tradition adding historical components that affect how we
organize and understand culture.
Kant also addressed “combat” of academic scholarship. Real world engagement,
even among scholars, implicates the communicative agent with the responsibility of the
public use of reason (CPF A423, Bxv). He explicitly drew attention to communicative
thinking as he announced the connection to ongoing public academic discourse (A21). He
established an explicitly rhetorical enterprise; he problematized reason, ethics, and
judgement on the basis of engagement. His inquiry used metaphors of engagement and
discourse; he tied the foundations of his critique directly to speech and language. In the
first Critique while unpacking the meaning of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” Kant
announced the importance of communication and discourse. This “revolutionary thesis”
established the framework for his entire critical project and much of the academic
discourse to follow (Guyer and Wood 7). A rhetorical lens applied to Kant’s critical
work brings attention to his commitment to communicative action. Throughout each of
his Critiques an interlocutor is assumed. He established the problems of knowing within a
conversational framework. His critiques established ground for moving forward in
conversation with others. He asked not simply what can be known but what can be said to
others about what can be known (A2-A53). The fact that others are involved accelerates
the urgency of his inquiry.
Discourse is an important metaphor in Kant’s work. The subject of his analyses in
the first Critique is what we can say to others about judgements we make and what “one
is able to say…about …objects that appear to the senses” (A2). The first Critique
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developed rhetoric of reason that explored the limits of knowing. His inquiry centered on
procedural issues of academic conversation by exploring where interlocutors necessarily
meet in knowing. From a rhetorical perspective, his position aligns with persuasive
appeals of ethos, pathos, and logos. The first Critique can be helpful way to explore logos
and consider how we support and justify arguments. The Critique of Practical Reason
implicates our faulty of reason with ethics and duty. The Critique of Judgement connects
emotions, feelings, and presuppositions to inquiry, engagement, and judgement.
Kant’s sense of community and the distinction between public and private reason
established a broad range of communicative ground. Enlightenment thinking for Kant is
public use of reason “underwritten by an underlying persistence, vigilance” (Ercolini,
Kant’s 3). Community and public communicative action formed the center of concern for
Kant’s inquiry into reason. Kant’s Lectures on Ethics revealed ideas and practices that are
not accessible to us through his later manuscripts (Beck ix). Kant’s language use was
laced with rhetoric and communicative metaphors. A barrier to understanding rhetorical
theory in Kant is that there “is no coherent or consistent terminology employed” (Stroud,
Kant 26). One key concept pointed to in Beck’s “Foreword” ties to rhetoric and
translation. Much of the philosophy Kant contended with was written in Latin. Kant
wrote in German and virtually invented the “German philosophical vocabulary” (x). The
invention of new terms demonstrates a keen awareness of the importance of language
from the onset of his critical work and attests to savvy application of rhetorical
techniques throughout his critical enterprise.
From his engaging teaching style, to his public speaking skills and academic
publications, Kant demonstrated multiple levels of rhetorical proficiency. In the opening
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section of Scott Stroud’s Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric (2014) he identified Kant’s
rhetorical skill in a eulogistic letter for a friend. The letter is not only well written and
heartfelt but meets the specific and proper standards of eulogistic epistle (1-5). Stroud
sought to rehabilitate rhetorical reception of Kant and dug further into complexity of
Kant’s communicative categories. He decried the “dismissal” Kant’s rhetorical theory
and re-framed the discussion. Scholarly attention to rhetoric in Kant is important, even
the attempts to negate, because they “take Kant’s comments on rhetoric seriously” (6).
Stroud explained that scholars who read Kant as an “oppositional figure” or a “modern
defender of Plato’s” critique of rhetoric “fall short of the sympathy and sensitivity
necessary to mine” the complexity of Kant (5-6). Stroud expanded rhetoric from a
“simple term” to a “complex concept” (7). Stroud and Ercolini exposed new and fertile
ground to explore a deeper context of rhetoric and rhetorical theorizing present in Kant’s
work.
A more positive spin on the nature of rhetoric in Kant helps understand his role as
a public intellectual and scholar. Kant’s notion of public reason both affirms and critiques
rhetoric (Ercolini, Kant’s 1-6). Kant described academic work as a “battleground” where
scholar-combatants never gain even an inch of ground (CPR, Bvx). The metaphor
hyperbolizes the engagement, but the center of his concern is the discourse. He
considered the implications of public reason in a variety of ways. In his response to the
questions about enlightenment thinking, he described a scholar in context of public
reason. A scholar is not an “occupation” or necessarily an expert but an “attitude or
orientation toward others” that involves “submitting ones ideas” in plain and
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understandable language for “consideration and engagement” (Ercolini, Kant’s 3-5).
Broadly speaking, a scholar is one who engages the public on their own terms.
His early Logic Lectures underscored the importance of proper rhetorical
education for students as “citizens of the world” (Kant, Logic 29). Scruton suggested that
these lectures were a “reshearsal” of the themes he worked out decades later in his critical
work (3). A consistent thread binding Kant’s work was not only how we know but the
implications of knowledge within the reality of a shared existence with others. In these
early lectures, he demonstrated the primary importance of interrogation and inquiry tied
to duty and truth. Burnham (2-3) explained that morality is the “highest purpose” in
Kant’s lectures and the highest end of all philosophy. The lectures contended with how
we discern judgement and morals and why these issues are important. Kant’s
communicative urgency exaggerated the connection between self and others. Duty and
ethics are fueled by the self in community. His lectures on logic explained the importance
not only of knowledge and philosophical ideas, but life’s conduct implicated by this
knowledge. Play underscored his Logic. Setting the stage for his later description of free
play of imagination, knowledge is the “purposeful joining of all cognitions and skills into
unity and insight into their agreement with the highest ends of human reason” (Kant
Logic 29). The “joining” is action of the mind is further developed in his third Critique.
Kant’s critical work demonstrated a playful theory of engagement. His ideas,
always in a state of play, continued to develop and progress from publication to
publication. The “A edition” of his first Critique, originally published in 1781, was
followed six years later by the revised “B edition” with a detailed introduction and notes
for clarification. Kant left us with a bounty of margin notes ripe for scholarly attention
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(Guyer and Wood vii). Guyer and Wood in the Cambridge edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason (1998) reconstructed a comprehensive English translation that brings together
both editions to show where Kant added new insights and clarifications. His excessively
organized “Contents” demonstrate layers of detail and a deep internal consistency; they
are in themselves a helpful tool to understand the relation of ideas in his Critiques. After
publication of each of his major works, Kant continued to edit and revise. Guyer
explained that “with all its appearance of systematicity, Kant’s thought was in a state of
constant evolution throughout his life” (Guyer, “Introduction” 11-12). This evolution
emerged as a consistent current of thought growing and clarifying through his critical
work; engagement with others was always a primary concern. Kant considered his
Critique of Judgement to be a “completion of unification of his work as a philosopher”
(Burnham 6). Kant worked out an aesthetic judgement of taste in his free play of
imagination.
Kant implicated freedom as the intellectual tension wedged between science and
ethics. He “ultimately came to see” that science and ethics “had to be sought in the
legislative power of human intellect itself” (Guyer, “Introduction” 2). The legislative
activity is Kant’s ludic theory of rhetoric. Kant’s Copernican Revolution’s reframed the
nature of knowledge and experience through exploring structuring capacity of the mind.
He rebounded off of the empiricists and added cognitive activity. Rather than a passive
repository of experience, cognition in Kant’s formation is active. His philosophy
“radically and irreversibly transformed the nature of Western thought” (Guyer,
“Introduction” 3). He worked with empiricism to show that experience does not account
for all knowing. He established a new way of understanding the consequences of
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cognition. Schrag explained the “peculiar task” of Kant’s first Critique “was to show how
the manifold of atomized sensory experience, itself chaotic and disarrayed, required the
conceptualization of an active transcendental ego to set it in order and thus determine it
with respect to its proper objects of knowledge” (8). Imagination in the first Critique
“serves understanding in the constitution of experience” (Makkreel 1). Kant accepted that
“knowledge begins with perceptual experience” but does not “arise from perceptual
experience” (Schrag, Experience 8). Just as the pitcher determines the shape of water,
cognition affects how we know. Cognitive faculties precede experience. “Percepts
without concepts are empty or devoid of meaning” (Schrag, Experience 8). Guyer
explained that Kant’s exploration of reason changed how philosophers contended with
experience and knowledge, “After he wrote, no one could ever again think of either
science or morality as a matter of the passive reception of entirely external truth or
reality” (Guyer, “Introduction” 3). Kant drew on ideas from the German tradition and the
Enlightenment.
2.4 The Rhetoric of Reason
The fundamental importance of rhetoric and play emerged as the vital moment of
knowing in the Critique of Judgement. Translation issues can complicate Kant’s rhetoric
on rhetoric as the terms “rhetoric,” “oratory,” “art of speech,” and “persuasion” are
employed for similar concepts in various translations. For this reason, exploring Kant’s
rhetorical theorizing rather than solely his use of the term rhetoric adds important insight
to Kant’s philosophy. Kant described rhetoric as both a fine art and a dangerous tool of
manipulation. In a footnote he explained that “rhetorical power and excellence of speech”
together constitute rhetoric and “belong to fine art.” He then explained that oral

65

persuasion is manipulative “oratory (ars oratoria), the art of using people's weaknesses
for one's own aims” (CJ 328). Kant represented the Enlightenment view of rhetoric as a
tool of manipulation and “machinery of persuasion” (327), but he also exposed the beauty
of eloquence and rhetoric as a fine art (CJ 328). Fine art, for Kant, was embedded within
a communicatively structured world tied to beauty, judgement, and aesthetics. “Fine art”
Kant contended, “is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers,
even though without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to [facilitate] social
communication” (CJ 306). Kant’s theory of art points to an acknowledgement of others
as the ground for discriminating beauty. Although our experience of beauty is immediate
and subjective, our judgement of the beautiful is universal.
Until recently, rhetorical scholars have generally ignored Kant’s “derisive”
framing of rhetoric (Viada 373, Danish 194-196; Abbott 273). Communication scholars
traditionally held Kant’s “disdain for Rhetoric… extraordinary” and tended to dismiss or
negate much of his work (Abbot 274; Vaida 373). Scholars have generally agreed that
Kant distrusted the power of rhetoric (Danish 195, Vaida 373; Kennedy, “Interest” 55;
Stroud, Promise 40). George Kennedy suggested that because Kant described “oratory as
exploiting the weakness of hearers” that he “dismisses the art of rhetoric as worthy of no
respect (275). Even though Kant engaged in rhetoric in multiple arenas, much of his
specific comments on the subject are negative. This seeming contradiction is a barrier to
understanding the full significance of rhetoric in his work. Kant’s description of the
“public exercise of reason” is so clearly linked to rhetoric it is hard to reconcile with his
rejection of rhetoric (Ercolini, Kant’s 4). Kant clearly was distrustful of a type of
rhetorical technique or a specific intent of rhetoric, but not all rhetoric.
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Rhetorical proficiency belies attacks on Rhetoric as an academic discipline. Both
Kant and Plato formulate rhetorically proficient arguments against rhetoric (Vickers 201).
Beyond the elevation of rhetoric at least through illustration, Vickers considered
substantive issues in Kant’s apparent attack on rhetoric and praise of poetry. He
contended that the “animosity” Kant “openly expresses… without proper argument”
toward rhetoric reflects “the prejudices of Plato.” Kant, as Plato, exploded the violent
depiction of rhetoric tied to “deception, imprisonment” and “exploitation” (Vickers 201204). The limitless character of reason places scholars on a “dialectical battlefield” where
the back and forth banter of public intellectuals gains and loses ground. The confusing
and often contradictory implications of the term rhetoric obfuscate the fruitful categories
of communicative action described in Kant’s work.
Kant’s critical work is embedded in discourse at every stage of development. He
framed his initial inquiry in to Pure Reason through metaphors of discourse by testing the
limits of what “can be said” (Axix); what we are “able to say” about what and “how we
come to know things” (CPR A24/B39). He explicitly drew attention to the
communication of ideas in reason, “Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general
concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition” (A25/B39). It is no mistake
that he used discourse as the metaphor. Attention to the communicative implications of
reason adds levels of rich rhetorical theorizing to Kant’s first Critique. Kant’s selfreflexive task of addressing the “combat” of academia established a real world
engagement and attaches to the responsibility of the public use of reason (CPR
A4223/B451). Kant’s use of discourse metaphors point to an underlying importance of
engagement and implicate a rhetorical theory at the center of his philosophy. He elevated
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rhetoric and communicative thinking when he announced the connection to ongoing
public academic discourse (A21). Although he did not announce his Critique of Pure
Reason as an inquiry into communication, a general premise of his writing attended to
rhetorical agents and the limits of reason in discourse. His first Critique established the
limits of what public intellectuals can say, “One would therefore only be able to say that
as far as has been observed to date, no space has been found that has more than three
dimensions” (CPR A24/B39). He used metaphors of competition, engagement, and
discourse to uncover the problematic nature of objective inquiry. He tied the foundations
of his Critique directly to communication and language. As his inquiry into reason
unfolded, theories of communication lingered and grew.
Kant delineated his rhetorical theory in a footnote first by comparing rhetoric to
poetry (327 fn). He emphasized a utility of rhetoric versus the beauty of a poem that can
give “pure enjoyment.” A poem can inspire, but even the “best speech” fails to stir us
with beauty and raises the ire of suspicion. The potential of abuse and manipulation from
the pulpit to parliament “has always been mixed with the disagreeable feeling of
disapproval of a deceitful art.” The problem Kant exposed is rhetorical. Those imbued
with rhetorical skill can manipulate others “like machines” in ways that hinder “calm
reflection.” Effective public engagement potentially obscures the truth, confuses
individuals, and affects decision making. In this footnote Kant clarified his use of rhetoric
in this particular application as a combination of eloquence and knowledge. When
employed properly, rhetoric then is a “beautiful art.” It is the potential for orators to
manipulate the intellectual “weakness of people for one’s one purpose” that rhetoric is
dangerous. The conceit of good intentions does not justify manipulative rhetorical
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strategies, that “however well-intentioned or even really good these may be” deceitful
strategies are not “worthy of any respect at all.” Rhetoric is both beautiful and dangerous
in this passage. Speakers with a “lively imagination” who “feel a lively sympathy for the
good,” have at their “command,…clear insight…” and use “pure and righteous
language” demonstrate beautiful rhetoric (327 fn). The potential of manipulation looms
behind moments of beauty. When considering the full range of Kant’s rhetoric on
rhetoric, it is insufficient to collapse Kant’s rhetorical theory to purely negative. Kant is
wary of the negative potential of rhetoric yet affirms the possibility of beauty. It is the
potential of oppressing others in the public use of reason that Kant denounces. Exploring
the beauty of rhetoric in Kant’s work may be helpful to navigate the public and political
discourse in contemporary culture. He exposed the dangers and limits of unchecked
public rhetoric.
Much of what Kant explained as threats to freedom and autonomy are bound to
communicative agency. The famous opening lines to his “Answer to the Question ‘What
is Enlightenment?’” derived their vitality from rhetorical power and expression. The
footnotes to the English translation explained that Kant’s opening line “Enlightenment is
mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity” ties to the movement away from
authoritarian rule toward freedom of expression (Schmidt 64-65). Kant underscored a
rhetorically crafted state of understanding; how we understand has been directed by
another. Immaturity, sometimes translated as tutelage, implied the legacy of the top down
knowledge. Rhetoric materialized in Kant’s description of the Enlightenment as a
“release from…self-incurred tutelage/immaturity.” The movement of the Enlightenment,
for Kant, was the ability to freely use one’s own reason “without the direction of
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another.” Immaturity/tutelage was the direct result of engagement. Reason signaled
release the shackles of ignorance. The ability to think for oneself allows one to be free
(Kant, “An Answer” 58). The freedom to use reason is a necessary condition of
enlightenment. Rhetorical techniques can threaten this freedom. The use of reason is a
problematic feature of freedom for Kant. The nature and power of rhetoric weighs heavy
on our ability to think for ourselves and Kant is wary of techniques that can mislead.
Kant tied enlightenment thinking to the “free us of reason” (Ercoloini, Kant’s 3).
Erconlini connected Kant’s answer to “What is the Enlightenment?” to his broader theory
and practice of rhetoric and revealed a “nexus of philosophy and articulation” (Kant’s 2).
Multiple layers of communicative urgency emerged in Kant’s answer. The freedom in
Kant’s reply is “explicitly connected to both writing and speech” (3). One of the various
uses of the term rhetoric in the Critiques was driven by the manipulation of others
through the use of rhetorical techniques. Scholars in the Middle Ages distrusted tradition
and intuition. The turn toward reason led to a primacy of objective claims. Science and
reason countered the “inability to make use of… understanding without direction from
another” that causes the oppression (Kant, “An Answer” 54). A rhetorical approach to
Kant’s concept of play and his movement in the philosophy of knowing underscored the

Enlightenment’s goal to free minds from the yoke of dependence for the rational
autonomy and self-determination.
For Kant, rhetoric functioned in a variety of ways. “The standard take” according
to Ercolini, is that when Kant used the term rhetoric “he dismisses it as pernicious,
deserving no respect.” Kant depicted rhetoric as a usurper of autonomy and “deceitful in
its use of others as a means to the strategic and predetermined end of persuasion” (Kant’s
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5). Even though each time Kant announced the subject, it is pejorative, “there is still
room for positive employments” (Stroud, Promise 41). Ercolini agrees, beyond the
limited negative references to the subject, “Kant’s legacy still looms large” in rhetoric
(Kant’s 5). Though Kant was wary of the power rhetorical techniques enable, rhetoric
used properly is the ground of hope. In the third Critique, when Kant described rhetoric
as a fine art, it means more than speaking well (321). In this instance, he emphasized a
union of “[r]hetorical power and excellence of speech” which “constitute rhetoric” (Kant,
Judgement 328). Stroud suggested that the depiction of rhetoric as the “deceitful art” is
not “the whole of rhetoric in Kant” (Promise of Rhetoric 41). Kant disparages rhetoric
that manipulates and misleads, but he also constructs of more positive fine art of rhetoric.
Rhetoric bound to eloquence is a “beautiful art” (Stroud, Promise of Rhetoric 41).
Rhetoric emerged through Kant’s work as a powerful technical skill and a beautiful art.
Productive work challenging the traditional view of Kant on rhetoric provides avenues
for much fruitful further inquiry. His connection between rhetoric and aesthetics is a
snapshot of his wider connection to communicative action.
Kant’s rhetorical theorizing echoed ancient Greek and Roman thinkers. He drew
attention to the power of rhetorical choices and the art of rhetoric. Kant’s critical project
paralleled the broad concept of Greek logos and the dynamic relationship between reason
and language. The Critique of Pure Reason examined the role of reason in understanding
and stressed “what can be said” regarding knowledge. The Critique of Judgement
frequently attended to language, oratory and poetics. In a footnote to his discussion of the
“The Ideal of Beauty,” he detailed why language choice is an art (232). He pointed to the
unique role of language and explained that “[m]odels of taste in the arts of speech must
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be composed in a language both dead and scholarly.” He indicated the instability of
language. He explained that it is important to be carefully consider word choice and
include both contemporary academic language and “dead” language so the ideas “will not
have to undergo the changes that inevitably affect living ones.” His attention to the
flexible nature language is insightful. He cautioned that words change meaning over time.
The accumulated meaning of terms in discourse can lead to misunderstanding. Language
is contextual and permeable, even “noble expressions become fiat; familiar ones archaic,
and newly created ones enter into circulation” (“Ideal of Beauty” 232). Discourse was at
the center of his concern. Lack of precision is inherent in language and instability
negatively effects discourse.
2.5 Play in Kant
Kant was the first “idealist” thinker to revitalize theories of play tied to the
classical Greek tradition (Spariosu 33). Play converges with rhetoric in each of Kant’s
three Critiques. Kant’s concept of imagination is the basis for understanding his ludic
theory of rhetoric. The “free play of imagination” introduced a new way to understand
cognition tied to purpose (CPR A53). In this section I examine connection between
Kant’s theories of play and imagination by considering his essays and lecture notes. Next,
I unpack his ludic theory as it blossomed in his three Critiques into the rhetorically
sophisticated notion of the free-play of imagination.
Although Kant did not develop a specific “concept” of play, it is an “anticoncept”
that “resists conceptualization” and provides negative counter examples to his scientific
approach (Spariosu 33-35). Analogous to Kant’s incongruous use of the term rhetoric, his
use of the term “speil/play” was inconsistent throughout his work. Spariosu’s analysis of
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Kant’s work showed that he understood “mere play” as a barrier to understanding driven
by intuition and imagination. Kant aligned intuition to our use of the term perception.
Knowledge and understanding are products of reason. Kant problematized scholars using
‘pseudo-rational’ claims within serious scientific work (Spariosu 31-36). Kant provided
various connections to play theory: He directly discussed play and the imagination in
each critique; he frequently used the German term ‘speil’ and play/contest metaphors; his
described an agonistic stance in the “mock combat” of scholars (CPR Bxv). The playful
metaphors used to describe scholarship tie aesthetics and judgement to his larger
description of imagination and public reason.
In the decades preceding the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s
“playful” and “elegant” essays showed a more “romantic” scholar and entertainer whose
wit and style earned him fame and income (Frierson vii). The meaning and function of
imagination in Kant changed from text to text, but the basic sense of a “storehouse of our
representations” remained consistent (Makkreel 17). Kant added to the storehouse
metaphor an active sense similar to an operating system on a computer. The mind does
not only store the information, but as we will see, the organizing activity precedes the
experience of representations in the world. In Kant’s “Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings” imagination is the creative space for a “world
of fables” which only “understanding” can bring us back to the real world (2:14). The
imagination is a respite from the toils of life and our “true fate.” It allows us to consider
possibilities beyond the real. Our lot in life rarely turns out the way we plan “nevertheless
the imagination goes about its business and does not tire from drawing up new plans”
(2:14). Although undeveloped in the early essays, Kant established a connection between
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imagination and aesthetic experience (20:125), a “lover…intoxicated by imagination”
(20:133), amusement (20:188); and illusion and conjecture (2:265). Kant did not develop
a theory of imagination in his pre-critical work, but he forecasted the active role of
cognition, reason, and interpretation.
Ludic rhetoric began to take shape in Kant’s earliest essays. He employed the
term “Speil” conventionally as a nonserious activity or game, as a drama or staged
production, as a metaphor to represent people, as ideas or objects interacting, and as a
broad referent for internal and external modes of communication (Nagel 51). Nagel’s
(51-60) analysis of Kant’s “Observations about the feeling of the beautiful and the
sublime” suggested that even though he used the term sparingly, only five times in the
entire text, his use uncovered numerous important communicative ideas. Play is “the
means used” to communicate. The convergence of play and rhetoric in his earliest writing
demonstrated the significance of communicative action in his framework. In the context
of the Kant’s essay, play described socially appropriate reaches of communication.
Kant left behind notes that point to a rhetorically sophisticated research agenda
tied to playful engagement. His “Notes on Anthropology prior to 1770” showed the
growing understanding of play, rhetoric, and the mental activity of the mind. He
announced the significance of communication and argued that “Poetic art is an artificial
play of thoughts” (15:266). The movement away from pure experience to artifice of play
continued to develop rhetorical significance in Kant’s writing. Kant set out a program of
scholarship that emphasized communication, reason, and engagement with others. Free
play requires open engagement. “We play with thoughts if we do not labor with them,
that is, are [not] necessitated by an end” (15:266-269). Ludic imagination must be free

74

and not coerced, even by our own presuppositions. Although fragmented in the notes, he
pointed to a set rhetorically significant of ideas that he continued to promote and develop
throughout his career.
Kant’s notes expressed the importance of communication in his theory of
imagination where “all the powers of mind are set into an harmonious play” (15:266). It
is here where the rhetoric of reason germinates. The powers of the mind, imagination,
and understanding, work together. He explained that “powers of the mind” should not
hinder or promote reason. Reason engages the world; it is how we observe and interpret
experience the world in “[t]he play of images, of ideas, of affects and inclinations, finally
of mere impressions in the division of time, of rhythm (versification) and unison
(rhyme)” (15:266). For Kant “the structure of meaning resides a priori in the mind and is
supplied through the activity of pure understanding” (Schrag, Experience 34). That we
organize pre-supposes what we organize. We share common structures of meaning that
enable understanding.
The structures of meaning hinted at in these notes become the center of his first
Critique. The shared capacity for understanding binds us to community. Play and the
ludic imagination connect rhetorical agency and the existentialism that will be picked up
by the Neo-Kantians in the Marburg School. “The sensible play of thoughts consists in
the play of speech (versification) and of words (rhyme)... It awakens the mind” (CPR
15:266). He unpacked the significance of encoding and decoding as the active process of
reason where our ideas come to have sharable meaning in speech. He brought oral
communication to the foreground and described “[o]ratory” as the “harmony of thoughts
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and the imagination” (15:266). Free play of our imagination helps us navigate our shared
existence with others.
Play enriched Kant’s commitment to others in communicative action. Play served
as a sort of “social valorization” that characterizes moments of dialogue (Nagel 60).
Social interaction and the limits for appropriate avenues of communication are contained
within a game governed by taste. Play provides the opportunity to demonstrate wisdom
and wit but within community approved standards (Nagel 60-61). Meaning is an ongoing
active process. Play is the mediating vitality binding imagination and understanding
(Gjesdal 352). The mediating function of play sheds light on the implicit communicative
ground in Kant’s theories of reason.
In his more poetic early essays much of his work described “formative powers” of
imagination. Our “formative faculty” or “power to coordinate representations” organizes
information based on representations of objects in experience. We experience objects and
cognitively classify and organize. Our imagination draws on this “storehouse” to aid in
the interpretation of experience. Imaginative processes begin when we draw from
previous experiences and add to this organizing process objects not given to us in
immediate experience (Makkreel 9-14). Imagination works with our understanding when
confronted with an unknown. Much like an optical illusion, the insatiable activity of
reason relies on the imagination to create ideas when empirical evidence lacks. In the
third Critique, Kant expanded the meaning of aesthetic judgement by parsing “three new
concepts…taste, pleasure, and beauty” (Burnham 41-42). Kant tied imagination to “an
aesthetic idea” that is both contained within a specific presentation of an object and
“prompts so much thought” that it transcends instantiation (Burnham 115). Kant used
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imagination to explain how our cognitive capacity precedes our experience. The structure
of imagination allows for re-considering and learning.
The ambiguity of Kant’s play shrinks and swells through his three Critiques in
both space and import. Akin to the scholarly reception of rhetoric, much of the research
suggests Kant negates play theories (Nagel 62-64). The seeds of play are planted in his
pre-critical work, grew and developed in the first two Critiques and blossomed in the
final Critique of Judgement. He was consistently critical of methods for knowing derived
from experience and challenged scholars who muddle knowledge in “competitive play”
(Spariosu 34). Ultimately, play unifies rhetoric and aesthetics. Kant’s and Schiller’s
“divergence” from the Greek play/serious opposition fueled by the rise of the middle
class and the Enlightenment’s “compartmentalization” of philosophy expressed a
rekindled sense of “playful leisure” (Nagel 59). Although outside the scope of this
dissertation, the connection between Kantian play and leisure is an avenue for exploring
additional aspects of Kant’s philosophy of communication ethics. Play concepts offered
fertile ground for the development of his theory of imagination.
Kant’s ludic imagination was tied to cognition and understanding. His three
critiques showed that reason is the a priori structure of experience in natural sciences,
ethics, and taste. Reason, much like a mirage, is beyond our immediate control. Reason is
an active cognitive capacity that structures how we know. For Kant, reason forces us to
“consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but
which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind” (CPR “Preface” 1).
That we “cannot decline” to consider questions stirs the activity of the imagination. Play
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and rhetoric lost status to the bourgeoning of science yet remained integrally tied to
understanding. The conditions necessary to know must pre-exist anything we can know.
The first Critique challenged the inherited privilege of tradition and sought to
“replace ‘mere play’ of imagination and thought (Spariosu 38). Kant hinted at nuanced
notion of play as our capacity to reckon or consider new ideas as we “play with the
cobwebs of the brain” (B196). In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant described
more than one meaning of play. Kant employed the term ‘speil’/play to represent “mere
play of representations” (A102), playing and the play of games (B115), opposition to
work (Bxxxvii), rhetorical manipulation as a “sophistical play” (A352) metaphor (A369),
the mediating role of imagination (A376), “dialectical play of the cosmological ideas”
(A462) and as a drama. In each of these uses, rhetorical concepts surface in argument,
collaboration, and discernment. Kant’s disdain for the corruptibility of ideas through
language and rhetorical techniques overwhelmed his affirmations of rhetorical theory.
Kant’s incongruent use of the term speil/play adds barriers to study his ludic
rhetoric, but we can see both negative constricting discussions and additive expositions of
play flow throughout his work. His use of the speil/play metaphors demonstrates the ludic
nature of reason. Play grows with and toward aesthetics, from a “negative activity” that
“yields no knowledge” to the mediator between judgement and reason in The Critique of
Judgement (Spariosu 37-39; Nagel 61-67). His negative use of the term play and “mere
play” in his early work underscored his attention to classical Greek thinking. Spariosu
pointed to the similarities between Kant’s negative use of play and the “Platonic and
Aristotelian dismissal of agonistic intellectual play of the Sophist” (37). Nagel (61-65)
helps us see the wide varieties play concepts emergent in Kant. In Kant’s first Critique
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we are left with a contradictory and ambivalent notion of play. In the third, we see play
flourish as the ground of reason. Importantly for this project is the convergence, at every
step, between play and rhetoric.
2.6 Voices on the Horizon
Play and rhetorical theory in Kant’s work underly the connection to others in the
world of ideas. Judgements of beauty remind us we are not alone. A defining
characteristic of beauty is “communicability.” He framed even our own internal
unmediated reaction to art and beauty within discourse (CJ 217). Rhetorical thinking was
a priori in Kant’s ludic imagination, his explanation of beauty, and in his conditions for
judgement. Camilla Serck-Hanssen argued that “rhetoric has a positive and indeed
indispensable function in Kant’s practical philosophy” (241). The Critique of Judgement
elevated play and underscored the connection to rhetoric. He does this by describing
Rhetoric proper and by highlighting rhetorical features involved in aesthetic judgement.
Experience in community grounds the standards of taste. We can relate to each other only
because we share similar cognitive capacity to reason (Pluhar lv). Understanding is
driven by ideas outside of experience. In the third Critique Kant explored “aesthetics not
for its own sake, but to investigate knowledge claims about principles that cannot be
justified by experience alone” (Kennedy, “Interest” 61n). Aesthetics emerged as a
particular aspect of judgement. Rhetorically, Kant developed aesthetic philosophy as a
practical example to explore a larger more general theory of judgement. Judgements then
are a priori. Judgements are the result of the functioning of the structures of thought. Kant
both clarified and confused his use of the rhetoric and play in the Third Critique. He
explored beauty as an “expression of aesthetic ideas” (164). The capacity to judge
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structures our experience; reasoning activates the ground of our decision making and
understanding.
Beauty is the subjective experience of pleasure, not a feature of an object. Beauty
has no objective logical or necessary referent. Kant bases this direct experience of beauty
on a “special kind of feeling involved in judgments of taste” (Pluhar xxiv). Where one
can describe an others eyes a blue objectively, their beauty is not so simply stated. The
play of imagination is a key to Kant’s unraveling of aesthetic judgement. We experience
beauty directly, not through reason. We do not examine an object, consider what makes
an ideal, and then compare the object to an ideal. Kant explained that our imagination is
the direct conduit of aesthetic beauty (204). “Hence a judgment of taste is not a cognitive
judgment and so is not a logical judgment but an aesthetic one.” An aesthetic judgement
is driven by subjectivity not tied to reason; “a judgment whose determining basis cannot
be other than subjective” (204). Kant explained in the first introduction of the Critique of
Judgement that aesthetic judgment is not a “cognitive power” observed as a characteristic
of a specific object, but beauty is “based on the power of judgment's own principles” as
experienced “through sense-directly to the feeling of pleasure” (226). Kant eliminated the
object from the determination of beauty and emphasized a community of taste, not a
characteristic of an object. Judgements are an a priori capacity of cognition. In our
judgements the voices of others always loom.
2.7 Rhetoric of Judgement
The Third Critique underscored communicative center of Kant’s theory of
judgement. Even if we disagree on particular judgement, a common ground of
communication must exist for even the disagreement to make sense (Burnham 32).
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Kant’s “communication of judgements” relied on a transcendental principle of
judgement. Our capacity to judge is innate. We may judge beauty or pleasure differently,
but we share an understanding of the idea of beauty and pleasure. Structures of
judgement are a priori. The conditions possible for judgement and the understanding of
the implications of judgement provide room for a community of taste. An aesthetic
judgment extends from an innate capacity to judge tied to our experience within a
community. When multiple interpretations exist, we are forced to think rhetorically.
When we interpret we justify, explain, or persuade. Kant contended that “[i]f we wish to
decide whether something is beautiful or not, we do not use understanding to refer the
presentation to the object so as to give rise to cognition; rather, we use imagination” (CJ
204). Mediation is the play of ideas that establishes the conditions necessary for
judgement. Judgement is the center of aesthetics and the “mediating link” between
understanding and reason” (Barnham 34). The experience of art “reflects our sense of
what a work demands” and how one ought to respond” (Noe 187). The to and fro of
discourse grounds reason and judgement. Understanding and judgement are joined in the
action of discernment, play.
Communication was crucial for Kant. Communication and “universal
communicability” are necessary conditions for aesthetics. Kant emphasized the nature of
judgement and described the activity of thought as it moved toward knowing. Beauty is
discerned and “we use our imagination” in “connection with understanding” (CJ 204).
As the third Critique unfolds this connection between imagination and understanding is
play. At the center of rhetoric and play in Kant is thought seeking understanding. Play is
the mental to and fro of ideas. Our imagination, not bogged by the same sort of
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intellectual restraints as reason based understanding, is free to wander and “no
determinate concept restricts” it “to a particular rule of cognition” (CJ 217). This
intellectual wandering of the imagination is guided by a loose collection of harmonizing
rules, akin to the defining characteristic of play. Similar to the difference between writing
fiction and nonfiction, we have a model of thinking that we apply to both imagination and
understanding. In both fiction and nonfiction we seek clarity of ideas, organization and
coherence. Our imagination applies the same basic procedures to ideas, but without the
same constraints. Ginsborg (1) explained that “concepts are…rules by which imagination
synthesizes or organizes the data of sense-perception.” The rules for the imagination are
not structured in the same way as reason and have a freedom to function without limit of
precognition, “imagination functions in a rule-governed way, but without being governed
by any rule in particular” (Ginsborg 1-4). Kant’s rhetoric of reason underscored the
tension between seriousness and rationality and continues to drive play concepts in
contemporary theorizing. Experience with others in community tied to the pre-existing
conditions for judgement exposed the rhetorical nature of aesthetics. Aesthetic ideas are
communicatively tied to community. The structuring role of play and rhetoric come to
fruition as the conditions necessary to make judgements.
Imagination grounds experience. In Kant’s first Critique imagination is
originative; it is a “faculty of the soul” that “cannot be derived from any other faculty”
(A94/B126). Kant emphasized the “free of play of imagination” as the cornerstone of
judgement and how we know. In the first Critique, our ability to work a concept into
perception happened in the imaginative powers of cognition. Imagination played a vital
role for understanding the nature of cognition and understanding. Kant explained that it is
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one of the “original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the
conditions of the possibility of all experience” (A94/B126). Kant’s attention to
imagination in the first Critique underscored the significance for theories of play and
rhetoric in his philosophy by demonstrating growth and consistency from a young
professor to an acclaimed philosopher. The emphasis and development of reason helps
uncover the rhetorical space created in Kant’s work.
Kant’s aesthetic judgment underscores the significance of rhetoric and play in
community. Burnham described the “first approximation” of judgement in Kant as driven
from a “feeling of pleasure…predicated of…or connected to…our ‘merely judging’
something.” Judgement is a rhetorical act that emerges in the “universal communicability
of the mental state, in the given presentation, which underlies the judgment of taste as its
subjective condition, and the pleasure in the object must be its consequence” (CJ 217).
Pluhar (lviii) explained that in aesthetic reflexive judgements “we judge the subjective
purposiveness that nature displays in the empirical intuition (of something apprehended
by the imagination) and that we judge this purposiveness without a determinate concept.”
Schrag described the “constituting activity of the transcendental ego” in the perception
process. As we perceive objects or “fragments received form the sensory manifold” our
transcendental ego organizes through “ready-made categories” (8). We look beyond a
specific purpose of an object limited by our pre-conceived notions. Kant made room for a
sort of judgement that is not influenced by properties of an object or our predisposition
toward a specific object. The judgement of beauty is tied only to the object itself not what
we expect. “Hence in such judgments, imagination and understanding harmonize without
the constraint that a determinate concept would introduce and thus are in ‘free play’”
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(Pluhar lviii). Kant explained that “[i]f the pleasure in the given object came first, and our
judgment of taste were to attribute only the pleasure's universal communicability to the
presentation of the object, then this procedure would be self-contradictory” (217). The
freeness of the imagination is crucial. The driving metaphor in Kant’s theory of
judgement and taste is “universal communicability” (217). Kant contended that when our
pleasure, enjoyment, or judgement is not dependent on our desires or interests then it
follows that the object will be mutually enjoyable for all.
Pluhar in the “Translator’s Introduction” to the Critique of Judgement underscores
the communicative nature embedded in the philosophical framework. The “main
concern” of the third Critique is judgements of taste or “beautiful in art and nature”
(Pluhar xxiii). Kant was concerned with agreement and the possibility of universal
agreement at the root of beauty. Judgement’s of beauty “demand the agreement of others”
(Burnham 47). In section 8 of Critique of Judgement he declared that “universality” is a
“remarkable” and “special characteristic… found in judgements of taste” that reveals “a
property of cognitive powers” that understanding Kant’s explanation of the cognitive
powers of judgement reveal communicative urgency (214). Kant’s universal validity tied
reason and judgement to a larger framework of community and communication. He often
used engagement and communication as points of departure to explain his key concepts.
2.8 Ludic Rhetoric
Kant’s critical work unpacked a ludic rhetoric of reason. Reason presumes
community and a precognitive ability to organize concepts. He framed cognition and
judgement within the context of discourse and debate. His “Transcendental Idealism”
promoted the autonomous self the production of meaning (CPR A369). Transcendental

84

idealism established the self as a “knowing subject” actively producing knowledge in
experience. Transcendental Idealism reversed the subject-object construction of
experience. Cognition organizes experience (Bloom 56). Reason does not constitute the
natural world. Reason is the regulative and interpretive construct of our own internal
active cognition. Reason is how we organize experience. Kant explained how temporal
and spatial aspects of cognition frame layers of cognition. Cognition actively sorts and
organizes experience. We shape our experiences in time and space. Causality is an
apparatus of the encoding capacity of our cognition. When scholars in the natural
sciences apply presuppositions about the natural world to organize research, outcomes
and possibilities are limited. Kant’s move helped clarify distinctions between art and
artist, but fell short of allowing art to speak for itself. Kant’s aesthetic consciousness
stands over the experience of art as the subject. Neo-Kantian’s at will pick up Kant’s
aesthetics and move it new directions.
This chapter explored Kant’s rhetoric of reason in both theory and practice. The
work of academics is a repository of rhetorical practice. Enlightenment thinkers saw
reason and rationality as weapons to combat the intellectual tyranny of tradition,
superstition, and religion. The ability to usurp freedom with oral skill limited the frame of
rhetoric in during the Enlightenment and continued to until the project to reclaim rhetoric
in the early 20th century. Reframing Kant’s rhetoric within a context of play can help
uncover valuable rhetorical theory from the beginning of the German Enlightenment. The
rhetoric of scholars offers models for exploring rhetorical theory and training. The next
two chapters extend the reverberations of the German Enlightenment and the ludic
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imagination present in the hermeneutic turn in Rudolf Bultmann and Hans-Georg
Gadamer.
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Chapter 3:
Rudolf Bultmann’s Rhetoric of Theology and Self-Disclosure
Rudolf Bultmann approached theology and biblical scholarship as a discourse
between interpreter and text. Although he did not set out to contribute to rhetorical
theory, communication formed the center of his two key metaphors: Form Criticism and
Demythologizing. He connects to this project on multiple levels. His existentialist
theology attended to the interplay between interpreter and text. The existential framework
he established announced hope for religious communication in this age. Bultmann’s
existentialism is essential for demythologizing because it moves out of the universal and
makes the text relevant. His hermeneutics and Form Criticism contribute to rhetorical
theory in creative ways. He developed and applied rhetorical concepts to promote his new
approach to biblical exegesis and his commitment to religious communication nurtures
theological ground in an age of science and reason.
3.1 Situating Bultmann within the History of Rhetoric
The association of rhetoric with mere technique and manipulation plagued our
discipline from before Kant until the emergence of communication studies in American
Colleges and Universities a century ago. The study of rhetoric, once dominant among the
liberal arts as the center of the Trivium, had slowly fragmented and dissolved into mere
technique by the time Kant began writing, but the practice of rhetoric remained “lively”
(Ercolini “Pantheism”; Foss et al. 9). This section reviews a brief history of contemporary
rhetoric attending to the implications of the negative connotations of the term itself. I
uncover rich rhetorical theory in Bultmann’s scholarship, ripe for communication
scholars to explore and extend. I review scholars that show how contemporary
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communication studies emerged out of a wide variety of related disciplines that
privileged social scientific perspectives and rhetorical technique.
Using the term “rhetoric” can obfuscate scholarship because of the continued
negative implication of mere rhetoric as a tool for manipulation. Scholars in various
disciplines resist identifying with rhetoric or rhetorical theory (Good and Roberts 1). The
popular and academic denigration of rhetoric is driven by a failure to realize its “full
potential…” and “facilitates the contemporary trivialization in the ‘mere rhetoric’ of
media discourse” (Good and Roberts 3). Rhetoric “by its very nature…attracts
interdisciplinary interests,” yet employing the term, even among communication scholars,
amounts to a “Faux Paux.” Scholars prefer to use the terms “communication” or the
“safest of all, discourse” (Enos 3). The negative perception of rhetorical techniques
distorts much of the history of rhetoric and leaves significant rhetorical theory
unexamined by rhetoricians.
In 1923, at about the time Butlmann published his first major work, Richards and
Ogden noted the weight of communication theory presented by scholars from multiple
disciplines. They suggested that communication scholars should look outside of the
discipline to enrich and expand rhetoric. Rhetorical theory hides within multiple forms
associated with “the literature of meaning” (Ogden and Richards 419). Rhetorical
scholars can gain fruitful insight by attending to “strange and conflicting…languages”
employed by “the most distinguished thinkers…in their attempts to deal with Signs,
Symbols, Thoughts, and Things” (Ogden and Richards 419). Scholars have ignored or
dismissed many fruitful rhetorical theories because of narrow interpretation of the term
(Jost 52). The problem cuts both ways: Communication scholars often ignore significant
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rhetorical insights from outside the discipline and scholars attending to communicative
issues tend to overlook helpful rhetorical theory. Richard Enos in Greek Rhetoric before
Aristotle (2007) explained that the terms “rhetoric” and “oratory” are not “politically
correct” (3-5). Dismissing rhetoric as mere technique overlooks productive theory
developed by scholars in multiple academic disciplines. It should not be surprising that
we can find a wealth of research concerning rhetorical principles that does not explicitly
align with rhetoric.
Scholars can gain valuable insights into rhetorical theory developed by scholars
from other disciplines by attending to substantive communication theory not marked by
the term. Bracketing the term ‘rhetoric’ can uncover a bounty of scholarship that
contributes to communication theory and explores “creative possibilities” for the future
of rhetoric (Jost 54). A productive first step for scholars is to consider broad categories of
rhetoric embedded in research from scholars across the academy. As the previous chapter
demonstrated, Gina Ercolini (Kant’s 235) and Scott Stroud (7) gained valuable insight
into the rhetoric of Immanuel Kant by stepping around the distraction of the term.
Scholars can “open up spaces (topoi) of meaningfulness and judgment, to indicate the
gaps or absences into which new interpretations might enter” (Jost 55). Identifying and
bringing to the foreground communication theory developed by scholars from outside the
discipline is an important contribution to the history and future of rhetoric (Jost 54-56).
Implications of mere of rhetoric in both popular and academic use chilled the use of the
term in research. Communication scholars can find new space to build rhetorical theory
by attending to communicative issues addressed in scholarship throughout the liberal arts
and sciences.
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Interdisciplinary dialogue led to the establishment of Communication Studies and
rhetoric in the contemporary era. Rhetoric played a role in both constituting and
promoting individual academic disciplines. The contemporary communication discipline
resurfaced in the early part of last century, forged by the work of scholars from a wide
variety of academic departments. Good and Roberts’ (1-21) review of the rise of
disciplinarity in the last century showed how social scientists from multiple areas of
specialization brought attention to the significance of communication and slowly defined
the field. Because of this broad mixture of scholars, contemporary communication and
rhetorical theories are fluid and continue to expand. Pat Gehrke (1-2) contended that
“[t]he continuous development of the discipline is described by change and growth.” He
pointed to the constructive nature of rhetoric and explained that as we learn from our
partners in other fields, we often rediscover principles “already present in the history of
discipline” (2). Observing rhetorical theorizing in other departments exposes the
significance of communication in the human sciences, helps preserve our discipline, and
may help rhetoric reclaim is prominence in the liberal arts.
3.2 Rhetoric: The Discourse of the Humanities
As unique characteristics of individual disciplines evolved, the resulting
fragmentation exposed a crisis in the humanities (Good and Roberts 4-7). Scholars who
contributed to Good and Roberts’ project to “recover” rhetoric revealed the
communicative ground in the “formation, development, and legitimation” of the distinct
disciplines in the human sciences (Good and Roberts 4).They showed that rhetoric and
“persuasive discourse” are essential features of “disciplining” and remain embedded in
academic practices (Good and Roberts 5-9). Along with the increased fragmentation in
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academia the “disabling consequences of disciplinary boundaries” can isolate scholars
and lead to missed opportunities for collaboration. They explained that the “history of the
field starts from a history of the academic departments that were the precursors to the
departments” (Keith 345). Keith attended to those departments that merged with or
became Communication Studies. Exploring the broad reach of rhetoric in history, beyond
manipulation and technique, may encourage interdisciplinary scholarship and promote
the growth of the discipline. Potential for future growth in our field exists in the wide
variety of ways and rhetoric can provide complimentary theory to advance other
disciplines.
Rhetorical theory is the ground on which the human sciences constitute and
perpetuate themselves. Scholars can gain valuable insight into rhetoric by attending to
“public practices” of rhetoric in the work of scholars across the humanities (Ercolini,
“Pantheism” 5; Jost 54). Ercolini examined the work of Immanuel Kant and academic
debates during the German Enlightenment. She noted that the academic discourse of
public intellectuals provides a key indicator that rhetoric can “flourish” even in times
when rhetorical theory appears to be in decline or transition (“Pantheism” 5-6). Scholars
in all disciplines utilize rhetoric in a wide variety of ways including public engagement
and publication. Developing and promoting new theories, in any discipline, are rhetorical
acts; attending to the rhetoric of scholars promotes the vitality of rhetoric in the
contemporary academic setting.
A key issue in the history of rhetoric uncovered by Enos is the reliance on
customary sources. Even when scholars develop new methods to study the history of
rhetoric, Enos contended, the methods are generally applied to the same traditional
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sources (xix-xx). New ground is rarely broken. Institutional and disciplinary boundaries
direct and limit what accounts for research into the history of rhetoric (Keith 345-349;
Good and Roderts 1-9; Enos xx). As the discipline established individual identity and
broader approaches to rhetoric increased, the elevated role of scientific thinking
continued to affect the direction of communication scholarship.
3.3 Rhetoric in Play
A review and revision of the contemporary history of rhetoric and communication
is currently in play and “any honest history will be messy” (Keith 345). As the National
Communication Association approached its centennial year, the first contemporary
journal of the discipline addressed the problematic nature of scholarship in the history of
rhetoric. In the article “Forum: On the History of Communication Studies” in The
Quarterly Journal of Speech (2007) William Keith surveyed the current discipline to
consider “what we know, what we do not know, and what we ought to know about the
institutional history of the communication as a field of study and why it matters” (345).
He suggested that institutional and linguistic barriers limit scholarship at the most basic
level. Keith hoped to open the door to a new dialogue between the past, present, and
future. As we reconsider the emergence of the discipline we have an opportunity to look
outside the disciplinary confines and welcome voices of scholars who attended to rhetoric
and communication.
The negative connotation of the term rhetoric impacts scholarship in multiple
disciplines. Scholars who dismissed rhetoric as mere technique contributed to the lack of
attention to much rhetorically rich theory developed by scholars throughout the academy.
Rhetoricians often miss significant rhetorical insights made by scholars who do not use
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the same terminology and scholars in various disciplines attending to communicative
issues often dismiss rhetoric. Jost’s article in Rhetoric Society Quarterly contended that
Kierkegaard and John Henry Newman have been generally “overlooked or ignored” by
the rhetoricians, in part because they do not use the term “rhetoric” (51-52). Jost’s review
of contemporary rhetorical theorists demonstrated that Kierkegaard and John Henry
Newman have been left out of the history of rhetoric. He suggested “that the influence of
romanticism… separated…” them both “from the realm of civic discourse historically
and academically” (52). Jost revealed how a constructive approach toward rhetoric in the
liberal arts family of scholars can sustain and nourish rhetorical theory and promote the
full sense of rhetoric had during the pre-Enlightenment tradition.
Rhetoric is alive and well in academic research, but much of it remains outside of
our discipline and eschews the term. The negative connotation discourages scholars from
within Communication departments and the entire academy to identify with rhetorical
theory. The rise and segregation of distinct academic disciplines inclines scholars toward
myopic theory building (Good and Roberts 2-10). There is much rhetorical theory
promoted using different terminology. Gehrke contended that communication scholars
offer unique insight to a broad application of ideas. A constructive engagement with other
disciplines is a promising avenue for growth in the field. We can engage other disciplines
without “simply importing ways of thinking” (Gehrke 67). We can add new dimensions
to scholarship in other disciplines and allow existing scholarship to add texture to our
own. The above review of the contemporary emergence of rhetoric helps explain why
theologian Rudolf Bultmann’s explicitly communicative theories have not been
associated with rhetorical theory.
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Bultmann’s scholarship appeared at a time when communication scholars
privileged scientific methods and perpetuated the denigration of ‘mere rhetoric.’
Rhetoric, as a distinct academic discipline, was in its infancy in America when Bultmann
entered academic life. He published his first book in 1921, two years before I.A. Richards
and Charles Ogden published The Meaning of Meaning (1923). Rudolf Bultmann’s turn
toward language and meaning paralleled many of the ideas being worked about in the
emerging departments of rhetoric at the time. The next section attends to Bultmann’s
attention to the importance of communication in the interpretation of Scripture.
3.4 Butlmann the Rhetor
Butlmann demonstrated rhetorical skill as a speaker-minister, as a teacher, and as
a theologian. He was first and foremost an evangelist. By all accounts he was a “master
preacher.” He was a model of skillful delivery and “knew the importance of presenting a
sermon in such a manner that the recipient was compelled to make a decision” (Richards
201). Not only was he admired for his eloquent delivery, but the sermons themselves
were often recorded and preserved. He identified layers of communication problems
associated with contemporary religious communication and the interpretation of scripture
(FC 1-21). He demonstrated a keen awareness that the central problem associated with
interpreting ancient texts ties to communication. He problematized the conclusions
contemporary audiences drew from the New Testament and pointed a communication
framework to support his theory (“History of the Synoptic Tradition” 26-32). His
collected sermons from Marburg were published in 1960. Much of his theories are drawn
from his published sermons. His scholarship demonstrated a deep commitment to the
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importance of interpreting and communicating the New Testament for contemporary
audiences.
Bultmann exhibited rhetorical proficiency in both his theology and the
articulation of his theory. In the Journal of Communication and Religion Mark Williams
attended to Bultmann’s rhetorical technique and his use of “the common metaphor” as
“stylistic device is adapted to function as both a hermeneutical tool and an argumentative
trope” (170-171). His analysis is tied to general idea that “style and persuasion are
interwoven within some religious rhetoric” and incorporates a “sense of hermeneutics
into the discussion” (170). He contended that the use of the “common metaphor” in
Bultmann’s demythologizing functioned “as both a hermeneutical tool and an
argumentative trope” (171). Williams uncovered the rhetorical prowess of Bultmann and
argued that he employed rhetorical techniques as “both an interpretive framework and an
argument for the validity of that framework” (171-172). A key point identified by
Williams is that Bultmann was concerned with religious communication on multiple
levels. It is important to note that Bultmann was a minister. He questioned the
interpretive framework of contemporary audiences engaging Scripture. He did this first
by exploring the notion of Sitz im leben. Sitz im Leben is a German phrase that loosely
translates as situation in life. It was coined by Bultmann’s teacher and mentor Hermann
Gunkel. Bultmann appropriated the term in his Form Criticism to bring awareness to the
sense of meaning within the text and the presuppositions of interpreters. He
problematized not simply theology, but the transmission of theology (FC 8-21).
Throughout his career and retirement Bultmann engaged scholars in public debates and
publication.
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3.5 Bultmann’s Sitz im Leben
Rudolf Karl Bultmann (1884-1976) was a Protestant New Testament Theologian
and minister. Born in Northern Germany into a long line of Lutheran leaders that
parallels the gradual shift in philosophy and theology over generations; Butlmann saw
theological reflection as service to the Church (Johnson, “The Formation” 9). His
grandfather was a missionary, his father a pastor, and Bultmann an academic and
theologian. Two of his brothers died in war, the first in World War I and the second in a
Nazi concentration camp. Bultmann’s academic and professional life brought him into
contact with some of the most important thinkers of his day. In his youth, he studied with
Karl Jaspers at Oldenburg’s Gymnasia with whom he would later write the influential
Myth and Christianity (1958). While at University of Marburg, he co-taught with
Heidegger, mentored Gadamer, and debated Barth. Bultmann studied theology at both the
University of Tübingen and the University of Berlin before completing his dissertation at
Marburg. He spent nearly his entire professional life at Marburg until he retired in 1951.
Martin Heidegger arrived at Marburg in early 1923. He and Bultmann found a
mutually rewarding intellectual relationship. Heidegger helped Bultmann develop new
philosophical insights and Bultmann’s “expertise” in theology was a “valuable resource”
for Heidegger’s work on Paul and Luther (Johnson 21). The two worked and taught
together in the five years leading up to Heidegger’s publication of Being in Time (1927).
By the time Heidegger left Marburg in 1928, Bultmann had already incorporated
existentialism into his writing.
Just two years after meeting Heidegger, Bultmann’s lecture “The Problem of a
Theological Exegesis of the New Testament” brought together the dialectical theology of
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Barth and the philosophical existentialism of Heidegger (Johnson 21). Bultmann freely
drew from Heidegger’s existentialism to augment his own way of understanding and
interpreting the New Testament, but he did not simply extend Heidegger’s ideas. Johnson
(22) explained that Bultmann “adapted Heidegger’s philosophy to fit his own theological
purposes” and “assimilated it” into Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Bultmann’s theological
expansion of Heidegger’s existentialism incorporated much of Heidegger’s philosophy,
but as a new theological expression “distinctive” and “all his own” (Johnson 22).
Bultmann brought existential philosophy into theology and exposed fertile
communicative ground.
Bultmann drew on the wealth of genius gathered at Marburg. An important aspect
of Bultmann’s legacy was his connection to the Church; Bultmann was a teacher and a
minister. His theological work sought to help effectively interpret and communicate an
authentic “Proclamation” of the Gospel. Much of his theological reflection survives in his
published sermons. He was “first of all, a theologian of the church” (Johnson 44).
Underneath his abstract existentialism was a practical goal of promoting the Gospel. He
questioned the interpretive framework of contemporary audiences engaging Scripture.
His work stretched into a wide variety of academic disciplines “whose reflections
constantly circled the methodological problems of theology and their relationship to
philosophy” (Gadamer, PA 57). Over the span of fifty years he established two distinct,
yet overlapping, theological movements. He is best known for his hermeneutical project
to demythologize the New Testament, but his first major contribution to theological study
was in Form Criticism. Three interrelated theological movements in Germany help
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understand the context of Bultmann’s work: Marburg Neo-Kantianism, Liberal Theology
and the History of Religions School.
3.6 The Marburg School
The Marburg School extended and redirected Kant’s theories of public knowledge
in new directions. Gadamer in his Philosophical Apprenticeships (1985) explained the
significance of Bultmann to the Marburg School. He recounted a farewell speech by a
Marburg Professor who posed the question “What is Marburg?” followed by a list of
names and institutions. Each scholar on the list was present and insulted by his answer,
“this is not Marburg.” The speaker then stated a short list of names ending with Rudolf
Butlmann and proclaimed “This is Marburg” (7). The relationship was mutual.
Bultmann’s scholarship extended and promoted pieces of Marburg and Marburg scholars
embraced elements of Bultmann’s ingenuity.
The Neo-Kantian logician Hermann Cohen founded the Marburg School. Ernst
Cassirer’s “battle cry” that “the critique of reason becomes the critique of culture” framed
Marburg Neo-Kantianism (Luft 222). The German philosophical movement endeavored
to restore Kant’s philosophy and “find a solid basis for their own systematic efforts”
(Hortsmann 127). The initial slogan in 1860 “back to Kant” intentionally confronted
Hegel’s overpowering philosophical shadow (Gadamer, PA 49). They acknowledged the
“limitations” of Kant’s work but “hoped that by standing on his shoulders, they would be
able to see much further than he did” (Chignell 112). Neo-Kantians represented a broad
range of related and sometimes incongruent ideas. Scholars consider it to be significant as
a “transitional” philosophical movement between “nineteenth century Kantian philosophy
and the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger” (Johnson, Philosophical 38). They
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extended and expanded the reach of Kant’s critical work. The primary ambition of the
school was to broaden Kant’s critical work in both application and subject matter
(Chignell 113-114). Beyond the attention to the Kant’s theoretical philosophy, some
Marburg scholars promoted aesthetics and a “synthesis of the ‘aesthetics of play’ and the
‘aesthetics of truth” (Chignell 114). Neo-Kantianism and the new hermeneutic that
emerged at Marburg extended through Bultmann to one of his most prominent students
Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer “was born and raised in the Neo-Kantian ambiance of
Marburg” (Chignell 119). Gadamer’s extension of hermeneutics will be developed in the
next chapter. Neo-Kantianism faded as the German intellectual and cultural crisis
“promised the possibility of moving a step beyond Kant” (Grondin, Hans-Georg 81).
Kant’s attention to practical reason and duty remained a consistent theme in the
philosophical and theological discourse at Marburg.
Neo-Kantianism was a crucial component of Bultmann’s scholarship and
evangelizing. He sought to bring authentic meaning of the New Testament to
contemporary audiences. The implications of Enlightenment thinking problematized the
religious discourse. “Neo-Kantianism inherently excludes the possibility of the
miraculous” (Richards 9). The result is an intellectual conflict between contemporary
readers of the Gospel and the audience of the original proclamation. The scientific
revolution changed how people understood the relationship between humanity and the
world. “In any case, modern science does not believe that the course of nature can be
interrupted or, so to speak, perforated by supernatural power”(Bultmann, Jesus and the
Word 15). Bultmann’s commitment to both philosophy and theology did not distract him
from seeking an authentic interpretation of the New Testament. In existentialism,
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Bultmann found a way to bring the two worlds together. Neo-Kantianism remained active
in much of Bultmann’s work. Tied to the scientific theological outlook of the Marburg
School was the quest for the historical Jesus known as Liberal Theology.
Liberal Theology was the “dominant Protestant theological movement of the
nineteenth century” (Johnson, “The Formation” 11). It aimed to interpret Christianity for
contemporary audiences. A core of the research problematized the role Jesus in history
(Bornhausen191-204). The reliability of scripture and knowledge of the life of Jesus
brought the “focus on the historical Jesus as God’s decisive revelation to humanity.” The
attention to scripture and moral theology included “an identification of God with moral
goodness, and confidence in humanity as God’s fit partner for the building of the
Kingdom” (Johnson, “The Formation” 332fn). Johnson (332) added that the emphasis on
determining an authentic history of Christianity led to a “historical-critical study of the
Bible.” Bornhausen (191-204) extended Kant’s ethical implications tied to scholarly
discourse and underscored the responsibilities of public intellectuals. He connected
liberal theology to general ideas of interpretation, rhetoric, and history. The historical
approach attempted to explain biblical narratives for contemporary audiences.
Marburg was a center for new theological inquiry during Bultmann’s lifetime.
Neo-Kantianism, Liberal Theology, and The History of Religions School informed
Marburg scholars. The History of Religions School promoted “religious feeling” and
discussed the “supernatural Christological and cosmological manifestation, in terms of
the later Jewish and pagan religions.” It emphasized the multiplicity of proto-Christian
communities (Ribberdos 11). Bultmann became “immersed in the… history-of-religion
school” and attended to the plurality of religious expression in the cultural context of first
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generation Christians (Johnson, “The Formation” 11). Theologian Ernst Troeltsch
explained that the History of Religions School “designates a certain conception of the
task of religious and theological thinking” (1). The History of Religions School took the
task of history seriously. They sought to understand the relationship between the received
Christian tradition and other cultic practices occurring at the time. Troeltsch explained
that there is not a good English “equivalent” for the term, but the “method of
investigation” is closest to “comparative religion” (1fn). Troelstch contended that “as
soon as one's horizon is theoretically enlarged to include the totality of human religions,”
claims of exclusivity become impossible (2). He suggested that from the “scientific point
of view” our “attitude toward the religious life” can no longer be an exclusive defense of
“one's own religion” but must be an attitude of openness and “of a comparative, historical
study of religions everywhere,” (2). The challenge to traditional religious thinking of
history of religions school impacted Christian scholarship and theology in multiple ways.
What emerged was a transcultural religious communication employing similar rhetorical
strategies to express the unknown. They identified interpretive problems associated with
the human transmission of the Gospel in a multi-religious world and pointed to the
importance of mythic thinking during the time of the proto-Christian church. It is
important for this study because it is a backdrop to the intellectual theorizing taking place
where Bultmann both earned his doctorate and taught. Bultmann both embraced and
critiqued the liberal theology he inherited.
3.7 Form Criticism
Bultmann outlined his Form Criticism in three key works, A History of the
Synoptic Tradition (1921/English 1954), Jesus (1926), and Form Criticism (1934). He
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examined the smallest bits of New Testament narratives in play “during the oral, preliterary period” (Bultmann, A history 153). His attention to the medium as an important
factor in the meaning of the message remained a consistent theme through much of his
scholarship. Rhetorical processes enabled the New Testament to survive from generation
to generation. Bultmann emphasized practical communicative problems associated with
the initial evangelic event, the limits of public speaking before writing, and interpretive
problems associated with the survival of the text. The primary area of interest in the Form
Criticism is the gradual development of the Gospel narratives, “that the Gospel traditions
circulated orally within the church, whose religious needs they served, and were only
gradually gathered together” in the form of the Gospels (Grant ix). Bultmann explored
the “history of the oral tradition behind the Gospels.” Interpreting the New Testament
“begins with the realization” that the Gospel narratives survived originally as separate
units, which were joined together editorially by the evangelists” (Bultmann, “The
Study”1-3). The rhetorical choices that allowed the Gospel to survive orally affected the
form of the received text and the rhetorical techniques employed by the Gospel writers
ought to affect how the stories should be understood by contemporary audiences.
Communication issues are at the root of Bultmann’s project. Bultmann’s Form
Criticism brought the oral nature of the New Testament world to the foreground of
research. Form Criticism assumes that the written Gospels record events that were
handed down orally over many generations. It was compiled and edited by people in very
different life situations from the original evangelists. Bultmann’s Form Criticism
contended that the received text represents the ideas of the Palestinian church of the third
century. The original stories were limited by the nature of oral communication and
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comprised many small stories. Individual stories about Jesus spread long before they
were developed and took the shape of the Gospels as received (FC 31-33). Form
Criticism seeks to get to the authentic story behind the literate tradition by studying the
“oral tradition at a stage prior to its crystallization in Gospels” (FC vii). The oral nature
of the text lacks stability.
Form Criticism examines the history between the time of Jesus and the compilers
who recorded the stories for the first time in writing. Each individual synoptic is made up
of many little stories or pericopes that at one time existed as a separate and distinct units
of information. The “central principle” guiding Form Criticism was that before the
Gospels as we know them today were record, they originally existed as fragments and
“the earliest Gospel traditions circulated orally within the church.” These fragmented
stories served the religious needs of the early church and were “only gradually gathered
into groups, blocks, or sequences –and finally Gospels” (Grant ix). Form Criticism, then,
investigates the “history of the oral tradition behind the Gospels” (FC 1). That the
Gospels are edited and redacted piecemeal compilations of much older stories casts doubt
on any positive claims we can make about the authentic sayings or life of Jesus. The
“whole framework of the history of Jesus” Bultmann contended, “must be viewed as
creations of the evangelists” (FC 28). He established a new way to approach the Gospels
centering on the communication of the texts over and through the small window of time
“between the death of Jesus and the earliest written accounts of his life” (Grant vii).
Bultmann explored the Gospels in three general categories of thought, the stories or
narratives within the text, the words attributed to Jesus, and transition from oral sayings
to the written text.
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Bultmann pointed to other generally accepted New Testament scholarship that
dated the formation of the Gospel narratives. Mark is the oldest of the three Synoptics, all
of which are tied to at least one older “collection of Sayings” known as the Q-Source
(Bultmann, FC 20-21). Theologians were already building an argument that the Gospels
are a cumulative work compiled over time. The compilers brought their own
presuppositions to the task. Form Criticism acknowledged this and was “a discipline of
historians designed to uncover from written traditions underlying oral traditions”
(McKnight 72). Bultmann added a specifically communicative implication. He stressed
the importance of understanding the medium and the message. He identified differences
in communication strategies between oral and literate cultures. The Gospels were
originally spoken, thus, limited by the challenges of orality. The theories and
explanations he devised in Form Criticism drew from a rhetorical well. He approached
the Gospel from the medium of the message toward its theological reflection. He asked
how the transmission affected the meaning. He also questioned agency in the narratives
and the limits of oral composition. He brought the narrative situation out of the scripture
for analysis and considered the process of telling the story. When attending to
communication concerns, the “first thing we observe is that the narrators do not give us
long accounts.” Limited by the reality of oral communication, the narratives unfold in
“single pictures, individual scenes narrated with utmost simplicity” (FC 32). Bultmann
attended to the wide variety of literary forms, the limits of oral communication, the
stability of meaning over time, and the needs of the evangelists. Each of these inquiries is
tied to the communication and context of the New Testament.
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Context and Sitz im Leben are important for understanding the meaning of a text.
In Bultmann’s use the ‘situation in life’ carries two different meanings. The first is
“sociological” exposing a “function of the community’s life (e.g., worship, or
preaching).” Bultmann also used the term to indicate how a specific context or “historical
situation…gave rise to a story or saying” (Travis 154). In this framework the situation in
life expands beyond the surface level of a contemporary reader attempting to understand
a foreign text. He explored various stories within the Gospels. The time lag between the
originative expressions of the Gospel until it was written down generations later is an
important opening to question meaning. Form Criticism addressed the difference between
“situation in life” of the proto-Christian church during the time of Jesus and the historical
moment of the Christian Church in Palestine when the Gospel was first written.
The first textual evidence of the New Testament, recorded in Palestine, included
edited stories handed down for many generations. Bultmann contended that the received
text represented the needs and concerns of the Church in Palestine not the first Christian
communities. The compiled text retained the original proclamation of the New
Testament, but he doubted the historical accuracy. He extended the work of scholars who
contended that “Mark…cannot be accepted as an exact account of the history of Jesus”
and hence Mark “revised” the narratives “in accordance with his own ideas” (FC 22).
The compiled and edited stories included the prejudice and agenda of the editor. From
this point, Bultmann examined the culture of the first Christians against the culture of the
time of compiling. The received biblical narratives emerged as document of the early
Christian church not the people depicted in the text or the original audience of the
Gospel.
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Bultmann analyzed how the medium of communication impacted New Testament
narratives. The orality-literacy transition, he contended, problematized the reliability of
the New Testament as a historical document. His second book Jesus (1926) was
translated fourteen years later to English with an edited title Jesus and The Word (1934).
His analysis accelerated the urgency of understanding how communication affected
contemporary theological reflection and interpreting Scripture. He continued to question
the connection between history and Christian belief, but diverged from the liberal
theology. He famously argued that “theology grounded in an historical Jesus was a
fraud” (Johnson, “The Formation” 11). Interpreters of the New Testament, he
contended, need to attend to the sources of the Gospels within their own understanding.
He extended the practical problems associated with the oral tradition and “the laws
governing the formulation of popular narrative” (FC 32). Bultmann contributed to both
rhetoric and theological reflection by unpacking why we cannot know the theology of the
New Testament without knowing the rhetoric of theology.
Bultmann identified two different types of history recorded in the New Testament.
Form History helps explore how religious communication promotes an enduring
meaningfulness of historic events. The German terms Historie and Geschichte are both
generally translated into English as history, but the distinction Bultmann drew is
important for understanding the significance of communication in his theory. We lose a
little of the rhetorical nuance in Bultmann’s position because each of the terms
etymologically are tied to storytelling and narration. When we talk about the past we can
simply describe facts or we can explain how the events of the past retain significance for
contemporary audiences. Each shows how history is a process of observing facts and
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providing an interpretive framework in a meaningful way to understand the facts. The
terms “differentiate between the history told in traditional myths and the history
reconstructed by the historians” (Congdon, Bultmann 90). Historie refers to simplified
“bare” facts of history and Geschichte roughly refers to how the past remains meaningful.
Liberal theology locates their belief in Jesus as a model for human life on the historie of
the Gospel and Bultmann contended the significance of the Gospel is the in continuous
significance of Geschichte of the Kerygma.
Bultmann’s analysis of the synoptic Gospels helps demonstrate the significance of
rhetorical theory for understanding theology. He stressed that a literal interpretation does
not allow for a full understanding. He did not mitigate the stories as meaningless or
substitute a new text. He problematized the possibility of truth through doubting the
stability of an original text. He pointed to a distinction “between constitutive and
ornamental motifs” (The History 70). He argued that when the oral stories were
eventually put together, the bits and pieces of Jesus’ sayings were embellished by a
Hellenized compiler. Special attention to the use of metaphor, hyperbole, and analogy
show how the form of the story affects the interpretive possibilities (The History 166167). He attended to the language and detailed specific rhetorical devices that affected the
meaning of the stories.
Bultmann continued to update and clarify Form Criticism throughout his career.
In his essay “The Study of the Synoptic Gospels” published nearly two decades after his
first book on the subject, he reviewed the problems with New Testament research that
originate with the dating of the oldest texts and various “source” theories (FC 11-13).
Basic realities of biblical scholarship promoted by historical-critical method suggested
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that we cannot know what the first evangelist actually said; we cannot know when they
first transitioned from oral communication to the written form; we do not have original
texts of the New Testament but copies of copies reporting incidents many generations in
the past. He considered the scholarship concerning the received text (FC 11-16). The
synoptic Gospels “recount the same events and sayings in different form” (FC 12). He
contended that both the similarities and differences point to an editing process. He
brought together inquiries into the sources for the Gospels to help explain why we have
only limited knowledge about Jesus. He claimed that “The Gospels…are not concerned
with Jesus, but with the faith and the preaching of the church with respect to Jesus” (FC
12-16). He examined not simply the received text but the communication strategies that
enabled the texts to survive. “Along what way or in what manner has this preaching
grown up or developed into our Gospel accounts?” (Ribberdos 12). He stressed how the
author of the Gospels edited the sayings for a specific audience that affected context,
conditions, and commands. He examined what we can say and know about Jesus. A
central line of thinking developed that questioned the validity of the historical Jesus and
promotes a textured Kerygma or public proclamation of Christ resurrected.
Bultmann’s extension and revision of Form Criticism points to the role of rhetoric
in theological reflection and his attention to imagination and rhetorical theory magnifies
his theological position. He explained that we are implicated in our experience with
theology. The encounter with the Gospel is personal. Our experience with the “Word” is
not rational nor do we judge it by a philosophical system; “[w]hen we encounter the
words of Jesus in history…they meet us with the question of how we are to interpret our
own existence” (Jesus 11). This personal experience of the Gospel, for Bultmann, was a
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“dialogue with history” that presumed our presuppositions participate in meaning and
“…the problem of our own life is therefore the indispensable condition of our inquiry.” A
personal encounter with history is subjective and highlights the audiences “existential
encounter with history” driven by simply “choosing a viewpoint” (Jesus and the Word
11). The subjective orientation of the audience/interpreter determines limits of the
meaning available. Reading history demands interpreters to stand “within history” and
take “part in history” (Bultmann, History and Eschatology 119). We cannot shed the
fore-structuring role of experience. Meaning takes place not in spite of our perspective
but because of it.
Bultmann’s Form Criticism anticipated the later development of his existential
theology and the new hermeneutic. Self-disclosure and self-understanding are the texture
that binds Bultmann’s perspectives on rhetoric, philosophy, and theology. “Just as selfunderstanding was the pedagogical aim of the teacher Bultmann, so self-understanding
was the sign under which he placed his entire scholarly work” (Gadamer, PA 58). This
section explores how Butlmann’s existential theology announced rhetorical agency by
bringing the self as subject to the center of inquiry.
3.8 Existential Theology and the Communication of Being
Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) is often described as the
“father of existentialism” (Marino 3). He presumed a communicatively embedded self as
a starting point to examine religious communication and experience. He stressed the
limits of meaning, “his entire authorship was from beginning to end taken up with the
question of what it means to have faith” (235). He asked questions that drove the
individual to the center of meaning. Communication grounded much of Kierkegaard’s
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philosophical and theological insight. Kierkegaard’s mastery of rhetorical techniques
exaggerated the ethical implications in theological discussion (Robinson 71-72). His
“rhetorical strategy” presumed a “holistic conception of human nature…that goes hand in
glove with the ethical-religious ideal he promotes” (Robinson 72). For Kierkegaard faith
is a unique and unmediated personal experience that “addresses itself to the whole
person…the presentation or communication of faith must do likewise.” Faith is an
existentially communicative experience. Nicholson (349-370) examined the rhetorical
nature of Kierkegaard and tied his communicative theory to existentialist theories of self
and the divine Word. In religious discourse, the rhetor is tasked “not to merely thrash out
a convincing argument but to lead….to a right personal relationship with the subject of
the discourse” and…the divine (Nicholson 350). His analysis established that culture
affects theological understanding and religious communication. Kierkegaard’s attention
to the individual experience of the word of God initiated a philosophy of existence and
experience that will be extended and reworked by Heidegger and Bultmann.
Kierkegaard’s connection to rhetorical theory helps explore the communicative features
of the existentialism that Bultmann inherited.
Existential philosophy begins inward with the “basic premise is that existence
precedes essence” (Emery 5). We have to consider pre-existing of the individual as a
premise for all interpretation. All questions are driven from self and the “individual’s
existing is antecedent to any other understanding.” Meaning originates “within the
individual and all are unique with the individual” (Emery 5). The choices made in the
process of understanding are defined and contained within the limits of our experience.
Individual experience is always the ground of understanding and explaining.
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Existentialist philosophy did not discount science but found room for faith, hope,
and freedom in the subjective experience “at the level of personal meaning in contrast to
general theory” (Marino 144). The sort of knowledge obtained by scientific methods is
but one of many avenues to find answers and is not “privileged but specialized.” In the
large frame of self in the world, the limits of scientific knowledge are “subordinate to the
fundamental knowledge, which is knowledge of existence” (Macquerrie, An Existentialist
5). Existentialist philosophy centers on the subjective experience of finding meaning in
life.
Bultmann’s first existential move centered on the Greek term σῶμα/soma. Most
scholars translated the term as body, but Bultmann argued that “the whole person” is a
more faithful translation in many passages (Grundy 3-5). Simply put, Bultmann’s
existentialism contended not that we have bodies but we are our bodies; our body/soma
constitutes who we are as a whole person. He employed “existentialist categories” to
interpret Paul and the body (Thiselton 6). Since Bultmann’s promotion of the “holistic”
meaning of σῶμα/soma virtually all contemporary theology shares this view. What began
as Bultmann’s challenge to the tradition grew to become “orthodoxy among New
Testament theologians” (Grundy 5). The position has so effectively replaced the previous
meaning that “virtually all handbooks, dictionaries, and Pauline studies” take the position
for granted with little or no felt need for argumentative justification” (Grundy 5).
Thiselton explained how Bultmann used existentialism to interpret Paul in a way that
speaks to a more authentic connection to the original meaning. This is the first step in the
process for Bultmann to show how the religious communication of the first evangelist
can have meaning to a contemporary audience. The existential interpretation of the New
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Testament provides a way to understand how the meaning can survive and have
significance for all interpreters. As we seek to understand the message not the story the
message is embedded in, we see the Gospel speaks directly to each person. The Gospel
survives because it is significant to each encounter. The turn toward the word as a selfdisclosure between the Word of God mediated through language of the New Testament
allows the proclamation to become a realizable concrete experience for everyone.
Bultmann’s “close association” with Heidegger while he was writing Being and
Time impacted his theological enterprise. He explained that “the hermeneutic principle
which underlies my interpretation of the New Testament arises out of the existential
analysis of man’s being, given by Martin Heidegger in his work Being and
Time”(Bultmann, “Foreword” vii). Palmer’s analysis of Bultmann’s demythologizing
shows how communication and language are central themes in his theology. God
confronts us as “Word, as language” (Palmer 49). The proclamation or “…kerygma as
Word in words speaks to existential self-understanding” (Palmer 50). In language we are
disclosed as part of a tradition and the Word of God speaks to us in existential selfunderstanding. The attention to history and the future-oriented existence of being brings
the transmission of ideas to play. He questioned the “character of historical knowledge”
that have been “delivered by tradition” because each interpretation is “guided by a certain
interest” which is “based on a certain preliminary understanding of the subject” (Palmer
51). Palmer is pointing to the turn toward the self in the experience of Kerygma that
necessarily transcends time. “All interpretation, then, is guided by an interpreters
‘preunderstanding”’ (Palmer 51). The stories from two thousand years ago had different
meaning than they do today. The context of the stories affects the theological import. For
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Bultmann only that Jesus existed, died, and was crucified survives as meaningful.
Bultmann stressed the importance of present state of cultural understanding applied to
ancient texts. Our interpretive ground is limited by the questions that organize our
understanding (New Testament 106). Experience determines interpretive distance,
“Bultmann’s central contention is clear: Objective meaning in history cannot be spoken
of, for history cannot be known except through the subjectivity of the historian…”
(Palmer 52). Bultmann drew out of the interpretive process the subjective experience. We
cannot distance ourselves from history “for a neutral observation of an object.” We are
always subjected by our own place in the transmission of history. We cannot “stand
outside of historical time” and form an objective “historical picture” because the
“historical processes is always conditioned by the individuality of the observer”
(Bultmann, “Problem” 97). Jean Grondin expanded Palmer’s analysis and explained how
this subjectivity plays out in the structure of understanding. Bultmann gave the
“definitive formulation of the “fore-structure of understanding” (Bultmann, “Problem”
97). The rhetorical strategies that ensured the survival of the New Testament are
themselves products of history.
Bultmann’s existential theology added multiple layers of communicative inquiry
to engaging Scripture. Bultmann drew from Heidegger’s hermeneutics an interpretive
framework to understand the New Testament centered on language referred to in German
as Begrifflichkeit (Lonergan and Doran 69). The term does not have a good English
translation but implies jargon or the limits of a somewhat specialized vocabulary.
MacQuarrie explained that it is the “context of ideas expressed in terminology” (13). The
idea is larger than simply the language; it is the entire system of “concepts” and
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“categories” used to navigate experience (MacQuarrie 13). Each individual’s
understanding is limited by the rhetorical framework brought to bear in the text.
Butlmann explained how language affects understanding and research. The
presuppositions that form questions of inquiry are limited by language and “the
fundamental set of terms in which all answers are conceived” (Lonergan and Doran 69).
Each interpretive event begins with the presuppositions of the interpreter. Rhetoric
without presuppositions is impossible.
Demythologizing is a process that protects and promotes religious communication
driven by mutual respect for the text, interpreter, and audience. The hermeneutical
process he described provides a constructive way to contend with ancient texts for
contemporary audiences that acknowledges both historical distance and subject. He
identified rhetorical problems with interpreting history and religious communication. The
existential framework he established is essential for demythologizing because it moves
out of the universal and makes the text relevant.
3.9 The New Hermeneutic: Demythologizing
Bultmann’s hermeneutics began with the assumption that the Gospel’s message is
inaccessible to contemporary audiences. The term hermeneutics demands a moment of
pause as it creates confusion, tension and is in “disfavor in some quarters” (Thiselton 10).
In general, hermeneutics refers to the scholarly conversation and the “formulation of
rules for understanding” and interpreting Scripture or any ancient text (Thiselton 10- 11).
The following chapter provides a more extensive history of hermeneutics that shows a
bridge between Bultmann and Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. The tradition that
Bultmann followed was method centric and sought to identify the proper procedure to
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interpret the correct understanding of Scripture. The key point was the “recognition that a
text was conditioned by a given historical context.” Rules and methods for interpreting
the language, grammar, and historical moment of the text sought to achieve the proper
understanding (Thiselton 11). Bultmann and others extended this approach and added the
experience of the interpreter to the process. The distance between the past and the text is
mutual. Interpreters cannot escape “pre-understanding” (Palmer 24). The “historical
conditioning is two sided: the modern interpreter, no less than the text, stands in a given
historical context and tradition” (Thiselton 11). Bultmann’s hermeneutics expanded the
tradition. He constructed, refined, and explained his hermeneutical method,
demythologizing, throughout the course of his life.
Bultmann’s addition to hermeneutics began by understanding that the Bible ought
to be studied as any other ancient text. In his essay “The problem of hermeneutics”
(1950) he explained that interpreters need to apply the same sort of scientific paradigm to
the Bible as any other artifact. The “conditions of understanding” are no different than
any other literature. The problem of understanding takes the center of his discussion. The
traditional hermeneutic tools need to be employed cognizant of “contemporary
conditions.” The “presupposition of understanding is the bond between the text and the
interpreter, which is established by the interpreter’s prior relation to the subject mediated
by the text” (86). The distance between the text and the interpreter requires awareness of
the questions brought to bear. The text speaks to the interpreter in the context of distance
and preunderstanding. The distance between contemporary audiences and the Gospel
stories are expressed in his key metaphor, demythologizing.
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Demythologizing follows a basic rhetorical pattern of development: problem,
cause, solution. The problem is that contemporary audiences cannot understand the
genuine message of the Gospel. The cause is that the plain text of the New Testament
message is cloaked in mythic language. The solution is to demythologize Scripture to
uncover the message beneath the stories with an awareness of interpretive distance and
the scientific preunderstanding contemporary audiences bring to the text. The
Proclamation or Kerygma of the New Testament is obscured by the mythical stories used
to convey the message. In Bultmann’s essay “New Testament and Mythology” (1941),
he explained the basic problem confronting contemporary interpreters of the Gospel. The
original audience of the Gospel understood existence significantly different than postEnlightenment audiences. The audience of the Gospel understood their world to be a
three tiered existence with God above in heaven, the devil in hell below, and human’s
existence on earth was in the middle. The people during New Testament times
experienced a different relationship with God and nature than contemporary audiences.
They understood that nature was controlled not by laws of physics or science but
Supernatural beings who intervened in nature and “human beings are not their own
masters.” The course of history is “guided by supernatural powers” (Bultmann, “New
Testament and Mythology” 1). Mythic understanding framed the entire experience of
culture. Ideas expressed in historic documents from this period present challenges for
contemporary audiences that demythologizing confronts.
Contemporary audiences experience nature differently. The Enlightenment
replaced tradition and religious authority with reason and scientific objectivity. Scientific
thinking “excludes the working of supernatural powers about which myth speaks”
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(Bultmann, “Problem” 96). The function of myth eroded during the Enlightenment;
mythic rhetoric distorts meaning and makes New Testament stories unbelievable. When
contemporary audiences “find impossible things” in Scripture they tend “to reject the
Bible as untrustworthy” and they do not “grasp the religious truth the biblical account
was attempting to communicate” (Swidler 10). Much of Enlightenment thinking is
effectively a systemic deconstruction of religious communication. “A thorough going
natural science has no need of the “God hypothesis” because it understands the forces
that govern natural processes to be immanent within them” (Laplace 42). The natural
sciences stand over nature, contain it and “eliminates the idea of miracle as an event that
interrupts the causal continuum of the world process” (96). The two significant
interpretive steps necessary for “evangelizing modern” audiences are to “distill the
truth..out of the Bible and state it in modern language” (Swidler 9-11). He pointed to the
central role of language and meaning in “The term demythologizing indicates the
elimination of mythological language, but it unfortunately does not transmit the other
essential factor: the translation into the modern idiom” (Swidler 8-10). Bultmann
attended to context and suggested that mythic language and the stories used to express the
ideas were “widespread” (Jesus Christ and Mythology 292). Demythologizing regains the
meaning embedded beneath the mythic language. The center of the project, then, is how
the substance of the Gospel is communicated. The rhetorical choices of the evangelists
were determined by the presuppositions of the writers and the connection to the historical
moment.
Bultmann directed a corrective to scholars who used his theory to limit the mythic
character of Scripture. Demythologizing is a “hermeneutical procedure that inquires
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about the reality referred to by mythological statements or texts” (“Problem” 96). Mythic
language does not limit the mythic character of the Gospels. Demythologizing is a
common rhetorical practice employed when we try to articulate an unfamiliar concept
through the use of reason. Because contemporary audiences do not understand the world
through a mythic lens and use objectivity and reason to explain and control our
environment, we demythologize (“Problem” 95-99). Demythologizing the Gospels is an
attempt to open the text for contemporary audiences. The stories contained in the New
Testament addressed an audience who understood the world in mythic terms.
Interpretation of any text begins with the interpreter from the most basic level. He
explained that “…every text speaks in the language of its time and of its historical
setting” (Bultmann, Existence and Faith, 291). Bultmann introduced a new way to work
with Christian myths in his important essay “New Testament and Mythology” (1941).
This essay crystalized his ideas that began with his connection to the history of religions
school discussed above (Johnson, “Interpreting” 40). In this essay he outlined his project
to “retain the validity” of the proclamation of the New Testament (9). Demythologizing is
“a task of preservation” (Williams 174). Bultmann’s analysis pointed to the change in
thinking ushered in by the Enlightenment as a barrier to understanding the Gospel. The
“objectifying vision” by which we orient ourselves “by standing over against” the world
frames our interpretive experience (Bultmann, “Problem” 96). The use of mythic
language for a text targeting a scientific oriented language user loses layers of meaning.
Demythologizing does not limit or mute scripture; it enables access to
understanding for contemporary audiences. Bultmann wanted contemporary audiences to
“know once again what Christian faith involves” (Gorgarten 10). Ancient audiences
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understood the world through a mythic lens and the language of myth had a different
connotative meaning that we no longer have direct access to understand. Bultmann
wanted help see the relevance of the New Testament for a contemporary audience.“To
demythologize is to deny that the message of Scripture…is bound to an ancient worldview which is obsolete” (Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology 36). Mythic language is
a type of religious communication that explains a world that is unimaginable from a
scientific understanding of reality. Williams (173) explained that “mythical concepts
require translation into contemporary thought, just as the Greek requires translation into
contemporary language.” Concern for outlining a proper way of engaging the word of
God underlies awareness of the tension between a critique of the word of God and the
proper understanding.
A myth is a larger truth than can be contained in specific events of individuals but
stories of universal truths that have always already presented tense truths. Bultmann’s
elaboration of myth shows how mythic thinking is complimentary to reason. For us to
understand myth embedded narratives we first have to understand the Sitz en laben. The
supernatural-natural world disconnect of the Enlightenment is an incorrect arbiter of
meaning. The starting point for the hearers of Jesus’ message was mythic. The
supernatural and active presence of a God in the world was not a separate category from
reality and science in the same way as it emerges after Kant. In Jesus Christ and
Mythology (1960) he explained that “The whole conception of the world which is
presupposed in the preaching of Jesus as in the New Testament generally is
mythological” (15). The audience of the message understood the stories of the
supernatural differently than we do today. The way people communicated in the day was
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embedded in mythology. The presuppositions of the audience concerns not just attitudes
about the text, but the entire communicative perspective. The New Testament “proclaims
in the language of myth” (Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth 2). The key to the Gospels is not
the method of delivery, but the message, the proclamation. Demythologizing considers
myth as the way the Gospels are communicated, not what is being communicated. It is
not a limit on meaning; it is not substitute. Demythologizing uncovers the infinite and
eternal meaning of the gospels obscured by the limits of human construction of the
message.
3.10 Demythologizing: An Expression of Ludic Rhetoric
Bultmann’s hermeneutic attended to the full texture of communication in the
interpretive event. Interpreting the Gospel for contemporary audiences adds layers of
complications that he brought to light. His attention to presupposition expressed ludic
rhetoric; each layer of the interpretive journey is a subject and given a voice. He turned
away from objectifying the text, interpreter, or audience. Preunderstanding creates access
to the text and cannot be avoided. Rather than minimize the role of the interpreter for the
sake of objectivity, Bultmann embraces subjectivity. His analysis imbues both the text
and the interpreter with agency and promotes the value of subjectivity. The “demand that
interpreter[s]...” must “silence…subjectivity and quench any individuality in order to
achieve objective knowledge could not be more absurd” (New Testament and Mythology
83-85). He explained that the attempt to establish an objective constraint on historic texts
objectifies not only the interpreter but the text itself. “It makes sense and is justified only
insofar as it means that the interpreter must silence his or her personal wishes with
respect to the results of the interpretation” (New Testament and Mythology 85).
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Contemporary audiences and interpreters gain access to the Word by hearing the
proclamation from within the mythic construction (New Testament and Mythology 85)
Bultmann understood the “Word of God” as a universal immutable truth expressed in
human language. For Bultmann myth is a language, a way of thinking, a communication
technology that must be interpreted to understand the meaning of the narratives. The text
is brought into play during the interpretive event. The interplay between interpreter and
text is the condition of understanding.
Problems with the communication and transmission of Gospel ground his two
most significant metaphors. Form Criticism attended to the transmission of the Gospel as
it was initially constituted. Demythologizing attended to the transmission of the Gospel
over time. The word of God is a constant. The salvific truth is immutable; it only
becomes confused in the transmission of the message in language. The truth is embedded
within mythic stories. Bultmann directed his project toward not just academics and
theologians but working evangelist, preachers, and teachers. How the Gospel was first
communicated and how the gospel is being communicated in the present form the center
of his work. He wanted to help uncover the meaning of the original proclamation of the
New Testament that both preserved the integrity of the text and allowed access for
contemporary audiences. He was concerned with the active religious discourse in the
contemporary setting. In Kerygma and Myth (1961) he asked “Can Christian preaching
expect the modern man to accept the mythical worldview as true?” (3). Although his
ideas can be broadly applied by anyone encountering the Gospel, demythologizing was
designed for the working evangelist. He was concerned with how the evangelists
understand their audience in the contemporary world. Preachers of the Gospel need to
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address contemporary audiences in a way that can be understood; to ignore the difference
between contemporary audiences and pre-scientific audiences of the New Testament
distorts the significance of the proclamation. For a preacher to assume a contemporary
audience can understand the meaning of a message explained from a pre-scientific
worldview “would be both senseless and impossible.” He uncovers basic communication
issues at the root of the experience of the Gospel. Contemporary audiences need the text
translated into an understandable language, demythologizing concerns the process of
communicating the Gospel. At a basic level, we can think of demythologizing akin to
translating. Translating the New Testament from the original language to English or
German does not mitigate Gospel. Just as there is nothing inherently Christian in the
original language of the New Testament, “there is nothing specifically Christian in the
mythical view of the world as such.” The mythological framework presented in the New
Testament “is simply the cosmology of a pre-scientific age” (3-4). Bultmann’s advice to
interpreters of the Gospel addressed communication issues for understanding the needs of
the audience, interpreting the text, and professing the text. His contributions to rhetorical
theory move beyond the pulpit.
Bultmann’s two key metaphors contribute to rhetoric multiple levels. Form
Criticism attended to the transmission of the Gospel as it was constituted. Much of Form
Criticism resonates with theories developed in Media Ecology. Where he aligns
significantly is important to consider his work as an addition to the discipline. His
creative insights provide fertile ground for future scholarship. His methods can be applied
to any historic text. Demythologizing promoted a communication centered approach to
explore the humanities. Bultmann’s approach to difference constituted a constructive
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engagement between interpreter, text, and others. Both Form Criticism and
Demythologizing offer the potential for scholars in rhetoric to contribute to the work in
other disciplines and work towards reclaiming the elevated status within the liberal arts.
His attention to communication and philosophy demonstrated his place in the
reconfigured Kantian attention to the public use of reason. His articulation of Kerygma,
the proclamation, embedded his project firmly on communicative ground. The next
chapter continues to attend to the convergence of rhetoric and play in Philosophical
Hermeneutics. Bultmann’s theories add new dimensions to rhetorical theory and adding
him to the history of rhetoric proper increases the potential for new rhetorical theories to
emerge.
Rudolf Bultmann and the Marburg School provide a link between Kant to
Gadamer. He demonstrated ludic rhetoric in his respect for the audience, interpreter, and
text. He hermeneutic is constructive and attempts to open the texts for greater
understanding. He re-positioned the text as a subject that speaks to and with the
interpreter. His biblical scholarship brought attention to the importance of context and
communication strategies. He provided a model to explore why the message of Scripture
is distorted by differences in the rhetorical demands of the historical moment of the
originative text. His existentialist theology attended to the interplay between interpreter
and text that announces hope for religious communication in a multi-religious world.
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Chapter 4:
Gadamer in Play
Hans-Georg Gadamer was a German philosopher that sought to rehabilitate
classical theories of rhetoric in the human sciences. He promoted an understanding of
rhetoric as common human attitude (Gadamer, “Universality” 5-6). In his most influential
book Truth and Method (1960), Gadamer uncovered varieties of authentic truths hidden
by the promotion of methods in the natural sciences. He announced “the significance of
the revelatory character of philosophical hermeneutics in the shaping and understanding
of the humanities” (Arnett, “Hans-Georg” 241). He demonstrated that human sciences
reveal different and meaningful truths that cannot be contained within methods. Gadamer
contended that the “ideal of method” was the “universal claim of the modern era” that
“sought to eliminate any prejudice” or “predetermination of experience from the
standpoint of the observer.” Philosophical hermeneutics confronted this view as both “an
attitude of methodological interpretation in the humanities” and the “basic structure of the
experience of reality” (Gadamer, “Universality” 6). He helped expand the dynamic
process of understanding through an interpretive move by reversing the subject/object
dichotomy that characterized scholarship in the natural sciences. His project looked to the
pre-modern theory of rhetoric as the larger framework in which the human sciences
reside (Arthos, “Hermeneutic” 71). Gadamer problematized the stability of meaning in
communication and provided a constructive approach to interpretation that emphasized a
dialogic process by which understanding grows and forges relationships of meaning in
the moments of expression. Two of Gadamer’s key metaphors, play and conversation,
contribute to ludic rhetoric by promoting cooperative discourse open to difference.
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Gadamer expanded the concept of conversation to include the interpretive experiences
with texts (TM 383). Gadamer’s expansion of conversation loosens the objective hold on
texts and exposes a new relationship between items of experience and interpreters. In
conversation, when “a subject matter is placed before us” we engage a text with respect
and seek to open and learn from it. Language is a meeting place where partners stand
together in conversation. Gadamer’s interpretation of traditional rhetoric contributes to
teaching rhetoric and persuasion as a cooperative venture. Conflict and disagreement
emerge as opportunities for growth rather than barriers to cooperation. Partners in
conversation stand together. Rhetoric and a dialogue of mutual respect uncover new
possibilities for teaching persuasion. Conversation enables us to attend to voices on the
horizon with an attitude of mutual respect and hope.
4. 1 Gadamer and the Horizon of Hermeneutics
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) spanned of three centuries, though he only
stepped briefly in the nineteenth and twenty-first. He was born in Marburg, the German
city where he later encountered some of the great minds of his generation. Gadamer
taught as an unsalaried Privatdocent for the better half of his career (Palmer, “Preface”
viii). He spent the first thirty years of his academic life in relative obscurity. During this
time, he worked out the problems addressed in his most influential work Truth and
Method, published when he was sixty years old. His later work emphasized the
importance of tradition and dialogue.
Gadamer’s childhood studies began in Breslau where the “unrelieved nationalism
and militaristic furor engendered by the war…had taken over all of the schools”
(Grondin, Hans-Georg 43-44). The German education system was transitioning to
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accommodate the social and economic changes brought on by industrialization and “new
needs of the upwardly mobile middle class” (39). He enrolled in The University of
Breslau in 1918, a time of unparalleled intellectual and cultural crisis in Germany; the
failure of modernity and “the narrative of modern science’s success and the civilization
that depended on it” loomed largely in the psyche of the German people. “Modernity. . . ”
and the “unbridled science as pure technology” had failed (Grondin, Hans-Georg 56).
Germans lost faith and optimism in science and progress.
At Breslau, Gadamer discovered new ways to find meaning outside the narrowly
construed walls of science. He was introduced to Neo-Kantianism initially through the
philosopher of language Richard Hönigswald (Gadamer, PA 5). Hönigswald’s lectures on
“The Basic Problems of Epistemology” and “Scientific Philosophy” introduced him to
transcendental philosophy and convinced him to “choose the path of philosophy for his
life” (Grondin, Hans-Georg 62-63). The ideas he developed in his Philosophical
Hermeneutics drew on his experience with Neo-Kantianism and Marburg theologians
(Gadamer PA; Grondin, Hans-Georg 1-11). In the retrospective intellectual
autobiography Philosophical Apprenticeships (1977/1985), Gadamer explained that his
days as a young university student at the University of Breslau led him toward Marburg
(PA 5- 6). Gadamer came of age academically at a time when robust philosophical
conversations filled the halls of Marburg led by some of the most influential academics of
the twentieth century.
While at Marburg, Gadamer worked with both Rudolf Bultmann and Martin
Heidegger as they each completed their most important manuscripts and redefined ways
to appreciate meaning, being, and understanding (PA 45-54; Johnson 4; Grondin, Hans-
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Georg 2). He studied with Bultmann as the questions of language and meaning were
being developed in the project to demythologize the New Testament (55-60). Gadamer
reached into the framework established by Bultmann throughout much of his work.
Although not always explicit, the linguistic ground fertilized in Bultmann’s Form History
and Demythologizing provided ample space for Gadamer’s detailed description of the
process of understanding. In his book Reason in the Age of Science (1981) Gadamer
activated Bultmann’s charge; “[o]nly by the demythologization of science” does our
knowledge lead to “self-mastery” necessary for a freedom. He contended that selfknowledge alone could guard against intellectual oppression and “the domination and
dependence that issue from everything we think we control” (150). Gadamer’s
hermeneutics “share[d] much in common with Bultmann’s demythologizing” (Palmer,
Conversations 3). He took it in new directions; he made it his own. Gadamer found an
intellectually creative home in Marburg, but the rest of Germany during the rise of
fascism was not as welcoming. In an interview with Richard Palmer in 1992, Gadamer
explained how he maneuvered the oppressive intellectual climate during his early years in
academia (Conversations 3). As Hitler rose to power, many German intellectuals
underestimated his appeal and did not see him as a legitimate threat.
Gadamer’s rehabilitation and expansion of rhetoric stood on the shoulders of the
hermeneutic tradition in the Neo-Kantian Marburg School. Gadamer brought his own
perspective and a fertile combination of these ideas to life. He uncovered the task of
“restoration of historical and traditional prejudices to their pivotal position as the
conditions of possibility of whatever understanding we can have” (Sullivan vii).
Gadamer’s attention to classical Greek rhetoric and philosophy appeared in his post-

127

doctoral or habilitation thesis on Plato’s dialectical ethics written under the supervision of
Martin Heidegger (PA 45-50). His work on Plato, Sullivan explained, attended to the
dialogue of philosophy and ethics. Heidegger saw that Gadamer was “giving basic form
to what would become his Philosophical Hermeneutics” (Sullivan x-xvii;Conversation 114; Lectures 1-2). Philosophical hermeneutics owes much to philosophy, but there
remains a linguistic orientation. He attended to the rhetorical and philosophical
frameworks of conversation and unpacked communicative ground embedded in
experience.
Gadamer’s time at Marburg exposed him to the first “true apostles” of
phenomenology. The continuing conversation regarding Husserl’s ideas blossomed in
Marburg. One key introduction to phenomenology came from Max Scheler (1874-1928)
“who had begun a dialogue with the sciences” (Grondin, Hans-Georg 130). Schelers’
“phenomenological probing” had a lasting effect on Gadamer (PA 30). Scheler’s way of
pursuing phenomenological questions tested the “abstract constructions” and “intuitive
insights into essential truths” (Gadamer, PA 30). Scheler advanced a phenomenological
perspective that moved away from method. He explored experience directly. He brought
the phenomena to the center of philosophy. Method centric work stood outside
experience. Phenomenology for Scheler was “in the first place” an “attitude of spiritual
seeing” (Mohr 137). He explained that “attitude” is not “method.” Methods limit
intellectual reach, “a method is a goal directed procedure of thinking about facts.” In
contrast, he conceived phenomenology as “first, of new facts themselves before they have
been fixed” (Scheler 137). Scheler’s break from the methodological approach of Husserl
marks an important rift between the natural sciences and the human sciences.
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Where Husserl worked to align philosophy and science, Scheler ruptured the
bond (Mohr 227-228). Scheler contended that philosophy must be “strict” and “rigorous”
in Husserl’s sense, but insisted that philosophy and science are distinct. He denied that
philosophy “belongs among the sciences” (Mohr 228). Adhering to philosophical
methods presupposes “important preconditions of knowledge which pertain more to the
philosopher… than to the method which the philosopher merely applies” (Mohr 219).
The significance of the new insight added to Husserl’s approach is that the
“[p]henomenological method must be based upon the foundation of a ‘phenomenological
attitude’” (Mohr 219). The openness to the immediate experience is not first bogged by
presupposing questions that the conditions of the experience might answer.
Gadamer’s academic experience brought him into contact with some of the most
influential people of the last century. He was a longtime friend of Pope John Paul II, who
upon hearing of Gadamer’s death sent a letter of condolence to the German Episcopal
Conference. Pope John Paul II, himself a phenomenologist, applauded Gadamer’s
hermeneutics and “sincerity in the search for truth.” The Pontiff commended Gadamer
for his work to ground all understanding in tradition. He appreciated Gadamer’s respect
for others as the ground of civility. He lauded Gadamer for his “acuity of thought” and
“respect for the interlocutor.” He explained that Gadamer helped see the value in the
“roots of tradition” that “enable us to ‘express today original, new thought…,’” (John
Paul II 1). Gadamer’s rehabilitation of tradition and emphasis on respect for the value of
others in dialogue helped elevate his status and appealed to scholars throughout the
academy.
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Gadamer’s study of ethics grew through an attention to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and a
desire to reclaim the heritage of rhetoric in the classical Greek education. Rhetoric in the
classical tradition is not limited to technique or “even primarily a specialized tradition of
trained speakers, but rather a common human attitude” (Gadamer, “Universality” 2).
Gadamer’s turn to language fell within a long tradition and “[p]rofusion of meanings
attached to the idea of the Word in ancient Western history” (Arthos, The Inner Word
31). He drew on the pre-modern conception of the ‘Word’ that expressed an ethereal
connection to others and the divine. Akin to the turn to the ‘Word’ Bultmann’s existential
theology, Gadamer offered a theological connection to language use, “the human
relationship between thought and speech corresponds, despite its imperfections, to the
divine relationship of the Trinity” (TM 421). The Greek and Hebrew tradition imbued
language with divine characteristics. The significance of the language, especially the
spoken word “grew out of a stream of thought that was fed by the Talmud and the New
Testament, the Stoics and the Church Fathers, medieval scholasticism and German
mysticism, Lutheranism and the counter Enlightenment” (Arthos, Inner Word 31).
Language and conversation ground “[w]hat hermeneutics says in its appropriation of the
theology of the word.” Unity emerges “in language.” Language binds us in conversation
to a story already taking place that each is already part of “the world that emerges from a
story” (Arthos Inner Word 31). Gadamer expanded the spoken word as a meeting place
that grounds his theory of play.
4. 2 Gadamer in Communication Studies
Gadamer brought attention to language that grounded rhetoric as an instrument of
experience. This section reviews general lines of thought developed by communication
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scholars attending to philosophical hermeneutics. Scholars sought to develop new ground
from communication research that escaped the limits of social science, research methods,
and frameworks for scholarship.
Hermeneutics first entered the discipline in a 1977 essay by Thomas Seebohm in
Philosophy and Rhetoric. He outlined a brief contemporary history of hermeneutics as it
emerged in philosophy. He pointed to Dilthey’s reconstitution of interpetation as an
initial framework for Gadamer’s philosophical hermenutics. Hermeneutics and the human
sciences that emerged out of Dilthey were an “essential component of the foundation of
the human studies. . .” (Seebohm 182). Deetz (54) suggested that the ideas unpacked in
hermeneutics can add more to communication scholarship than “logic, methodology, and
systematization of the human studies.” Hermeneutics can help expand the field of
meaning and the very “foundation” of rhetorical theory.” Dilthey revolutionized
interpretive research and “saw in hermeneutics a foundation for the human sciences and a
distinctive method for humanistic studies” (Deetz, “Interpretive Research in
Communication” 54). He prepared the way for Gadamer’s critique of method and the
expansion of hermeneutic thinking beyond method to get to the center of meaningfulness.
Walter Ong contributed to the link between hermeneutics and communication.
Toward the end of Ong’s career, he turned to hermeneutics. Zlatic in The Review of
Communication suggested that Ong developed a specific niche on the horizon of
hermeneutics and his work can be a framework for future work. Ong extended and
expanded “oral hermeneutics” (371-373). Ong contended that the hermeneutic approach
“situated within a visualist, textual tradition” ignored multiple avenues of discovery.
Ong’s constructive approach added to the discussion an “an oral hermeneutic” that
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uncovered important ideas by shifting the thrust of interpretation from the text to “voice
and dialogue” (Zlatick 371). Zlatic’s review of Ong pointed to an interesting connection
between Ong and the hermeneutics. Ong’s theory of interpretation helped understand his
outlook on philosophy as not “an academic discipline.” He tied it to his earlier work on
Cicero as “a general approach to existence, philosophia, love of wisdom” (Zlatick 358).
Moving away from disciplinarity and schools of thought, Ong emphasized the “lived
environment” of the interpreter (Zlatic 358). Ong brought attention to the context of the
rhetor/interpreter of a text and “milieu, something in you and around you” (Ong 43).
Zlatic explained that for Ong, milieu is both the “external locale or environment” and
“implies an oral hermeneutic—a communal understanding of what knowledge is, how it
might be approached, and why it matters” (373). Ong attended to the expressive
experience of hermeneutics as it occurred.
A driving concern in the early communication scholars attention to Gadamer was
to “appropriate Gadamer’s notions of play, linguisticality, understanding, and
hermeneutical listening to explain communication phenomena” (Abhik and Starosta 6).
Thomas Sloan’s review of Palmer’s Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (1969) and E. E. Hirsch’s Validity in
Interpretation (1967) brought hermeneutics into the conversation. Sloan (“Hermeneutics”
107) suggested that Palmer’s text ought to be “read widely” and Hirsch has “much to
teach us.” Leonard Hawes considered how communication can be enriched by
phenomenology and hermeneutics. He worked with “communication as human works-inprogress whose ontological properties and status in the world are to be ascertained” (34).
Although Hawes did not review Gadamer, his work with Heidegger opened
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communicative ground to understand the significance of philosophical hermeneutics. It
was not until 1979 that Gadamer’s work specifically was interrogated by communication
scholars.
Gadamer’s work is relevant for communication studies and “simply too important
to be left to professional philosophers” (Campbell 101). John Angus Campbell reviewed
Gadamer’s Truth and Method in the Quarterly Journal of Speech 1979. In the Spring of
the same year, Stanley Deetz in Communication Quarterly sought to use Gadamer’s
hermeneutics to “reconceptualize the process of understanding in communication” (12).
Gadamer “provides a rationale for “human sciences” research grounded in hermeneutic
phenomenology” (Stewart 101). Campbell explained that his review was to
“urge…communication scholar” to “include…Gadamer among our partners as we
explore the nature of our studies and the questions appropriate to them” (101). Hyde and
Smith echoed this call and identified breadth of hermeneutics in a 1979 essay in The
Quarterly Journal of Speech. Hyde and Smith drew connections between philosophical
hermeneutics and multiple categories of rhetorical theory. They highlighted the variety of
epistemic and ontological theories on the rhetorical horizon and the “overlooked
relationship between rhetoric and hermeneutics.” Their work uncovered “ontological”
similarities between rhetoric and hermeneutics (347-349). Rhetorical theory and
hermeneutic theory share a similar concern for unpacking meaning. Gadamer’s
hermeneutics brought a new way to understand and articulate experience from a
communicative perspective. He showed how meaning and interpretation are everyday
experiences “derived…in and through the interpretive understanding of reality” (Hyde
and Smith 348). Communication is a dynamic process where the “primordial function of

133

rhetoric” in the “hermeneutic situation” comes to the foreground (347-348). The
linguistic structure of experience cultivates a fruitful connection between the ontological
framework of hermeneutics and communicative necessity that grounds engagement with
others and texts.
The ideas unpacked in philosophical hermeneutics can help expand theories
developed by rhetorical critics. Philosophical hermeneutics “provides important
directives” that encourage “a change in perspective” by exposing the “hermeneutical
nature” embedded in the “ontological connections between hermeneutics and rhetoric”
(Hyde and Smith 357). Rhetorical criticism allows for accurate and rigorous attention to
the text and the bias critics bring (356-357). Hermeneutical thinking demands selfreflexive awareness and respect for the text. Interpretation occurs within a horizon of
understanding and a specific cultural and hermeneutic situation. A critic is always already
tied to a perspective that guides interpretive work.
Communication scholars point to Gadamer’s shift away from methods to improve
understanding to the broader questions of how understanding occurs. Truth and Method
explored important communicative questions, “how understanding takes place” and
“how…. meaning is passed on” (Campbell 106). Arnett and Holba (88-89) explained that
Gadamer’s “existential understanding of interpretation begins with what is before us, not
pristine abstract truth.” Gadamer’s hermeneutics can help communication scholars avoid
and correct the methodological problems related to the phenomenon of understanding
(Deetz, “Conceptualizing 12, Kinser 11). Arnett and Holba (88) pointed to a key
distinction between meaning and truth. Where the objective methods of natural sciences
seek truth, Gadamer embraced the reality and “messiness of the human condition.” He
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was concerned with meaning “not certainty” or truth. Gadamer’s hermeneutics helped
fortify meaningfulness in everyday encounters with others.
Gadamer’s attention to the experience of language and dialogue yielded a new
way to approach understanding. “Language is the real medium of the human being…the
realm of human being-together, the realm of common understanding” (RB 68). Deetz
drew from Gadamer a rejection of the scientific pursuit of objectivity. He added that
communication scholars generally have “difficulty in productively analyzing everyday
interaction experience” and ignore performative and methodological bias
(“Conceptualizing” 14). Communication scholarship that explores how to “produce
understanding” and avoid misunderstanding “parallel” the problems of science.
Traditional communication scholarship works toward correct or perfect understanding
and promotes a stagnant conception of meaning (Deetz, “Conceptualizing” 17-19).
Gadamer “rejected certainty” and “eschewed authorial intent” (Arnett and Holba 88). He
reframed subjectivity as the natural ground of engagement. Gadamer’s work to explore
how understanding happens offers a constructive alternative that does not negate but
expands subjectivity (Deetz, “Conceptualizing” 17). Understanding grows in the “inbetween” space of understanding and misunderstanding. Deetz showed how Gadamer’s
hermeneutics mitigated the traditional emphasis on correcting misunderstanding by
exposing the “incompleteness of all understanding” (18). Gadamer’s return to the
classical understanding of rhetoric uncovered new possibilities for communication
scholars to open discourse beyond the parameters of perceived certainty.
The new directions for research brought to communication scholarship by
Gadamer’s hermeneutics expanded the communicative foundation in the process
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understanding. Gadamer reconfigured conflict and disagreement as opportunities to stand
together in the pursuit of growth and wisdom. His approach aligned difference and
opposition with opportunity. His move toward wisdom through meeting of opposites is
akin to the revitalized construct of stasis that will be developed in the conclusion of this
dissertation. Difference creates opportunity for mutual growth. When “multiple and
competing traditions” come into conflict, Gadamer’s hermeneutics uncovered a path
toward wisdom (Arnett and Holba 89). Understanding is necessarily “historic, linguistic,
and dialectic” (Deetz, “Conceptualizing18; Palmer 215). Gadamer highlighted our
embeddedness in a particular moment. Understanding is always preceded by our
connection to the historic reality of the event of communication. We bring our prejudice
to bear on all interpretive moments.
Prejudice is an unavoidable variable that opens “our ability to understand”
(Arnett and Holba 86-88; Deetz, “Conceptualizing” 18). Gadamer’s move to bring
prejudice to light represents a “pragmatic recognition of bias that one publically brings to
a given text” (Arnett and Holba 88). Counter to the Enlightenment pursuit of objectivity
by trying to eliminate prejudice, scholars can make bias more visible. Research can
“distinguish between productive and unproductive prejudice” (Deetz, “Conceptualizing”
18). Communication scholars found new space by attending to the role of prejudice and
tradition in understanding. Deetz contended that Gadamer expanded the relationship
constructed in dialogue. By seeking more “complete understanding… of what is said in
such a way that it fuses with the hearers own tradition rather than trying to objectively
reconstruct what the other meant” (Deetz, “Conceptualizing” 19). We cannot escape
prejudice. Our experience with language binds us to others in conversation. Using
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language itself is a step toward communion. “Tradition is gathered and expressed in
language” (Deetz, “Conceptualizing” 18). The linguistic character of understanding
draws from the central role language in being. Our access to understanding others is
grounded in tradition and brought to life in language.
Campbell drew attention to key metaphors that bring Gadamer into our
conversation. He contended that Gadamer’s work addressed basic rhetorical questions
that scholars across the human sciences consider (101-105). Campbell pointed to the
significance of play as a leading factor in the connection to communication studies. He
explained that the “event character of knowledge which is illustrated in play…is essential
to understanding his perspective on the world and his potential significance
for…communication scholars” (104-105). Each of these steps is important to understand
how Gadamer’s theories can explore rhetorical theory. Gadamer’s approach to
understanding and meaning align to central questions communication scholars ask.
Campbell explained that Gadamer’s key insight for communication scholars is that “the
world is already meaningful” and “comes to us in the only way” that it can “through
language” (107). We expeirence and interpret an “already meaningful world” (Campbell
107). Gadamer’s expanded construction of text embues intrepratation with subjectivity.
Our embeddedness in a tradtion forms our possible interpretive choices.
Gadamer’s hermeneutics can help explore religious communication (Kisner 10).
Kisner brought hermeneutics back to its theological home, but with the expanded
philosophical description added by Gadamer. He showed how Gadamer’s enlargement of
hermeneutics helped promote homiletics. He explained that although “preaching and
biblical interpretation are not his primary concerns, Gadamer finds in those tasks models
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for all interpretation theory” (Kinser 10). Importantly, for Kinser, was the extension of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics into homiletic theory. Scholars can tie Gadamer’s hermeneutics
to theology and religious communication in multiple ways. Although he “did not consider
himself a theologian” he worked with “some of the great theological minds of our era”
(Kinser 22). Gadamer explained the significant influence of Marburg Theologians in his
Philosophical Apprenticeships (39). Kinser (22-23), in a footnote, reviewed the growing
legacy of Gadamer in theology from systematic theology and biblical interpretation to
homiletics. Gadamer’s attention to the meaning exposed new and helpful ways to access
biblical texts.
Gadamer’s hermeneutics helps explore the Bible as meaningful conversation. Key
metaphors in Gadamer’s text promote a constructive approach to homiletics. His
description of language as “conversational in character” emphasized a “dialogical” and
“connective logic” that allowed for a basic understanding of how preaching interacts with
audiences. The conversational quality is playful and moves back and forth within a
“series of moves within a larger movement” (Kinser 12). He showed how homiletic
scholar David Buttrick applied Gadamer to the homiletic tradition by bringing his
communal orientation of language to the center of meaning. This “conversationality”
helped demonstrate a “dialogical, connective logic” that promoted hermeneutics and
attended to the event of preaching (Kinser 12-14). The conversation brought together the
preacher and the audience; meaning occurs in the event of the homily.
Communication scholars use Gadamer’s hermeneutics to explore multiple levels
of being in understanding and practical applications. Gadamer tied to communication
scholarship at a meta-level of understanding and his “lifelong struggle opposing methodic
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consciousness” (Chen 183). This is an important concept for communication scholars to
explore. The mindset brought to an interpretive event is a part of the rhetorical landscape
and Gadamer’s work helped bring this to the center of the conversation. “Gadamer
liberate[d] the human sciences from the confinement of methodic consciousness by
displacing it with the priority of "die Sache" (in the process of dialogue) over method”
(Chen 184). Gadamer did not critique or replace methods; he centered not on the methods
themselves, but the premise of the methods. The problematic for communication scholars
is how to “account for the ‘objectives’ of knowledge which are prior to the question of
method” (183-184). Chen lauded the constructive use of Gadamer’s theories in the field
and added a new dimension. Theories of “praxis” are the “basis” of his whole project,
and its subsequent moral/practical/political implication” (Chen 184). He drew from this
argument that “Philosophical Hermeneutics is a moral/practical project.” Chen engaged
Gadamer’s work in play. He contended that communication scholars have overlooked the
praxical dimension of Gadamer’s work. He urged scholars to add to the study of
philosophical hermeneutics a practical conception of meaning and understanding. Arthos
tied this praxical component to Gadamer’s revitalization of classical rhetoric (“Who are
We and Who am I?” 19-21). Gadamer’s hermeneutics is “fundamentally grounded in the
classical tradition of rhetoric” of ancient Greece and “Renaissance humanism.” He
suggested it was a philosophical and practical “movement that took its direction from the
recovery of the rhetorical tradition.” Gadamer’s work to expand hermeneutics beyond
method to a universal approach to reality helped reclaim traditional rhetoric.
The state of knowledge during the Renaissance “was fundamentally social, and
their conception of education linked intellectual activity to praxis” (Arthos, Inner Word
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20). By reconfiguring understanding as an experience that takes place in community,
Arthos contended that Gadamer drew the “Judeo Christian achievement back into the
humanist tradition” (Inner Word 25). Sharing is the event horizon. Sharing is the space
where meeting resides. The event of communication is the urgent moment of
understanding. Arthos suggested that Gadamer reframed understanding as an event and
tied it to practical knowledge and the sensis communis. Chen showed how philosophical
hermeneutics can be read as a way to enhance rhetorical agency. Chen explained that
Gadamer’s “model of dialogue” enabled us to rethink communication. He realigned the
subject/object relation orientation to a subject/subject relation (196). Chen added that
Gadamer’s attention to context “stresses the necessity of historicizing communicative
action in concrete social, cultural, and political context” (196-197). The reversal of the
subject/object relationship promotes engagement. The co-creation of understanding, the
sharing, is the key point to draw from Gadamer’s model. Arthos explained that for
Gadamer “[s]ubjectivity is not the end-all, but only part of a participatory structure in
which destiny plays an equal role” (Inner Word 25). Chen’s contention that praxis is
fundamental to philosophical hermeneutics engaged freedom and communication ethics.
Gadamer’s attention to praxis urged communication scholars to attend to broader
possibilities of engagement. Roy Abhik and William J. Starosta built on Chen’s
explanation of praxis as a way to establish a moral ground in communication scholarship.
They extended the “praxical hermeneutics” unpacked by Chen and pointed to Gadamer’s
distinction between techne and praxis for clarity. The “moral dimension” derived from
Gadamer’s attention to engagement with others is especially important for construing
intercultural communications. Gadamer’s “praxis involves knowledge about human

140

beings, especially human action, and carries a moral dimension to it since individual
action connects researchers with other human beings to open intercultural
communication” (7). Gadamer’s attention to moral implications “offers a method to
interpret other cultures” with awareness of bias (12). Abhik and Oludaja were concerned
with social justice and urged communication scholars to take an active role in social
issues (257). They sought to show how communication scholars might “appropriate”
Gadamer’s theory of praxis “to engage in genuine dialogical relationships that produce
understanding, which, in turn, can be put to good use through appropriate measures of
intervention.” Gadamer’s hermeneutic requires self-understanding combined with
“praxis” that “seeks an understanding” and is open to “experiencing change in one’s
position” (Abhik and Oludaja 259). Gadamer’s attention to the problems of translation
and respect for others can promote openness. Chen described the practical ethical
demands of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a good starting point to begin intercultural
dialogue.
4. 3 Hermeneutics and Rhetoric in Play
Gadamer framed the humanities within a rhetorical sphere. He revitalized the premodern approach to human sciences as an ongoing conversation. Gadamer’s contention
that “[h]ermeneutics is fundamentally grounded in the classical tradition of rhetoric”
helped rehabilitate rhetoric and resurrect a tradition. The philosophical orientation of
hermeneutics began with “Aristotle and Cicero… to Renaissance humanism, a movement
that took its direction from the recovery of the rhetorical tradition” (Arthos, Inner Word
19). Gadamer’s turn from how to understand to the process of understanding highlighted
the connection between rhetoric and play as the ground of his project. Language is the
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medium in which substantive understanding and agreement take place between two
people” (TM 385-386). The play of language in conversation binds the participants to a
tradition and provides access to mutual understanding.
Gadamer exposed prejudice as structural variable in communication. Gadamer’s
insight adds layers to communication theory. Prejudice is a variable that affects
understanding and impacts the experience of communication. Gadamer looked to the
theories of colleagues from Marburg to develop his primary hermeneutical claim.
Prejudice is both inescapable and the key to our own access to understanding history. He
explained that Bultmann’s hermeneutics provided the initial ground for his position.
Exploring history is always already a process of self-disclosure. He explained that
Bultmann “constantly emphasized that “self-understanding refers to a historical decision
and not to something one possesses and controls” (TM 522). Our place within history
affects our possibilities for understanding history and historical texts. Bultmann
constantly emphasized this point. Gadamer explained that Bultmann developed this
“purely hermeneutical concept.” He added “Heidegger’s analysis of the hermeneutic
circle and the general for-structure of human Dasein.” Prejudice allows us to be open to
difference and the possibility of understanding. “It refers to the openness of the horizon
of inquiry within which alone understanding is possible” (TM 522). Prejudice affects the
entirety of communicative interaction and grounds the production of meaning and
understanding. Prejudice opens the possibility of dialogue. Arnett and Holba (89)
explained that “[w]hat makes dialogue or the fusion of horizons possible is not neutrality,
but the prejudice of a given tradition that situates the interpreter and the meaning of a
given.” New insights and cooperation emerge in “interplay of prejudices” (Arnett and
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Holba 89). Gadamer’s extension and expansion of Heidegger’s “for-structure of
understanding” added to our understanding of the self within an already present tradition
of ideas. It is inescapable that Gadamer’s conception brought prejudice to the center of
understanding (TM 277). It is because we have experience within a given tradition that
understanding is possible (Warnke 114-115). Prejudice is inherent in all encounters with
others. The respectful interplay of differences is the ground of cooperation, community,
and hope.
Gadamer showed how rhetoric and hermeneutics share a common history and
intellectual trajectory. Gadamer contended that they nourish each other and “there is a
deep inner convergence with rhetoric and hermeneutics” (Gadamer, “Hermeneutics of
Suspicion” 55). They each fluctuate in public perception. Each term is flexible and
meanings evolve and contract. They are complimentary and cultivate each other in
practice “the rhetorical and hermeneutical aspects of human linguisticality completely
interpenetrate each other” (Gadamer, “Scope and Function” 25). Each are tethered to
understanding, “rhetoric and hermeneutics are joined by their attention to the activity of
overcoming localized disruptions in shared understandings” (Mootz 84-85). Rhetoric and
hermeneutics are beyond mere technique and “the special problematic of understanding
and the attempt to master it as an art concern of hermeneutics—belongs traditionally to
the sphere of grammar and rhetoric” (TM 385-386). Rhetoric includes speaking and
hermeneutics includes interpretation, but each is much more. Hermeneutics and rhetoric
each have practical dimension, but they are not limited to methods or technique.
Philosophical hermeneutics does not a critique the methods of the natural sciences
only to substitute new methods. Gadamer’s approach was much more nuanced. The
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general thrust of his energy was to establish new ways to meet difference in language.
Language is meeting. Gadamer’s was not critical of the methods of the natural sciences,
but the importation of these methods to humanities. The avenues of reasoning that
question the methods in the natural sciences lead toward new means of discovering and
articulating multiple truths. Gadamer reframed hermeneutics beyond methods; it is the
larger set of attitudes and beliefs that make it possible to actualize strategies for
interpretive action in experience. He was wary of merely substituting one method centric
approach for another, “hermeneutics is philosophy and not simply a methodology for
the…human sciences” (“Universality” 2). Hermeneutics is not just another method or
approach to standing over a voice on the horizon. Hermeneutics nourishes the ground of
rhetoric.
4.3 Hermeneutics in the History of Ideas
Hermeneutics first emerged in ancient Greece. The term hermaneia simply meant
“translation and interpretation” and was a tool of rhetoric (Gadamer, Conversation 36).
The term is tied to the Greek god Hermes who gave us the alphabet and interpreted the
messages of the gods for humanity. Early Christian communities aligned hermeneutics
and rhetoric in attempts to make Christian concepts make sense in terms of Greek
philosophy. Augustinian hermeneutics can be understood as translating scripture into
conceptual terms (Gadamer, Conversation 36-40). During the Protestant Reformation
following Luther, hermeneutics emerged as a framework to explore the Bible according
to Aristotle’s “rhetorical principles” (Gadamer, Conversation 37). Martin Luther’s
critique of authority residing in tradition of the Catholic Church and his directive to free
the word of God initiated a new biblical hermeneutics (Gadamer “Universality” 4).
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Contemporary hermeneutics reaches back to the work of Martin Luther Luther’s turn to
the text, accelerated the urgency of understanding, and promoted proper interpretive
methods. “Thus,…hermeneutics began with Luther’s pronouncement that Scripture was
its own interpreter” (Grondin, Gadamer 14). Biblical hermeneutics in contemporary
discourse is a continuation of Luther.
The hermeneutics Gadamer received grew from an intellectual lineage that
included Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, Rudolf Bultmann,
and Martin Heidegger. Scholars acknowledge the initial contributions Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) made to reframe interpretive methods as universal
hermeneutics (Gadamer, Relevance 141; Palmer, Hermeneutics 88; Grondin, Hans-Georg
14; Sims 1). Hermeneutics before Schleiermacher “consisted exclusively of sundry rules
and regulations for interpreting texts” (Grondin, Hans-Georg 14). Biblical scholars
devised and employed methods to draw out a predetermined understanding of the text.
Schleiermacher sought to clarify methods for proper and objective understanding to help
readers “reconstruct the intentions of the authors of the text” (Gadamer, TM 158; Simms
1). He generalized the ground biblical scholars established for interpreting the Bible.
Palmer suggested that Schleiermacher moved away from biblical hermeneutic tradition,
claiming it to be a study of understanding (Philosophical Hermeneutics 88-91).
Expanding the interpretive stance beyond theological reflection provided news ways to
approach scholarship in the humanities and “projected the possibility of a universal
hermeneutics comprehending all interpretive processes” (Grondin, Gadamer 14). He
accounted for difference and moved “us toward multiplicity of interpretation” (Arnett,
“Interplay” 243). This multiplicity not only acknowledged difference, but grounded all
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encounters. The interpretive framework re-visioned by Schleiermacher nurtured the
ground for “meaningful disagreement.” He explained that hermeneutics is not a method
to “eliminate disagreement, nor can it” (Schleiermacher xxvii). He exposed the
significance of language and discourse in the constitution of meaning. Schleiermacher’s
position that in “all understanding is always already interpretation” established a new
way to explore hermeneutics and brought together the “power of understanding” and the
power of interpretation” (Palmer, Hermeneutics 88). Language carries meaning in use.
The experience of language indicates an already present connection between people and
texts.
Following Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) used hermeneutics to
engage new ways to explore human sciences. Dilthey extended and expanded
hermeneutics as the “scientific” and “methodological” foundation of all humanities
scholarship (Grondin, Gadamer14; Palmer, Hermeneutics 97-99; Johnson 11).
“Hermeneutics is, after Dilthey and not before, a general theory of interpretation,
including all fields in which interpretation is necessary” (Seebohm 183). He added to
Schleiermacher’s attention to context. The historical moment of the interpreter plays a
role in the understanding of a text. “Humans understand themselves in terms of a past and
a future…and what they create” (Johnson 12-13). Dilthey’s work to bring history into
interpretation enabled “Gadamer to turn to the traditional understanding…on its head”
(Palmer 122; Simms 26). History is not a stagnant “archive of facts” and experience is
not a “collection of things” that we have done.
Martin Heidegger added an awareness of self to the horizon of hermeneutic
thinking. Heidegger’s hermeneutics extended the German tradition and added self.
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Gadamer explained that an important contribution to his own sense of hermeneutics was
informed by Heidegger. Heidegger’s “decisive step” according to Gadamer, “asserted
that understanding” involved the “understanding of self.” Gadamer extended from
Heidegger’s inclusion of understanding oneself to show the “limits of the scientific
concepts of understanding” (Gadamer, Conversation 37). Understanding transcends
objective standards and methods. Understanding reaches us in a personal experiential
way.
4.4 Play in Play
Play is a metaphor to help articulate the unpredictability of experience in the life
world. Where the scientific method seeks to eliminate unknown variables, Gadamer
used play to articulate how we discuss the chaotic experience of life. In the life world,
play is the fluid ground for ethical choices in the face of others. He challenged the
theories of play he received at a subjective level. For Gadamer, play is not something we
do; it is a mode of being. Gadamer developed his theory of play tied to the experience of
art and it extended into the center of his hermeneutics (Grondin, “Ritual, Festival, Play”
43; Johnson 20). Gadamer used play to explain how we can understand “the dynamic of
human existence” (Johnson 20-12). We meet others in the play of conversation.
His most influential text, Truth and Method, only devotes a small section to play
proper, but this does not diminish the significance of play for his overall project. Play is a
defining concept of Gadamer’s thought (Johnson 20). The lack of attention devoted
explicitly to play does not mitigate it’s breadth in his philosophy of engagement. Jean
Grondin, a student and biographer of Gadamer, explained that play is a “central theme” in
philosophical hermeneutics. Play “has an essential function” in Gadamer’s hermeneutics
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and his extended philosophy of engagement (Spariosu 133). He continued to develop and
extend play and playfulness in his later works. Play “should have been given more
prominence” as an “integrating role” in his earlier work (Lawn 21). Scholars from
multiple disciplines demonstrate the significance of play at the core of his theory of
hermeneutics (Spariosu 133). In his later work, Gadamer enhanced the significance of
play. He explained that “play is so elementary a function of human life that culture is
quite inconceivable without this element” (RB 22). Gadamer used play as a metaphor to
describe the “way in which the truth of Being occurs through hermeneutical activity and
as the groundless…grounding of Gadamer’s own thought” (Spariousu 133). Although
limited in space, play is a significant metaphor in Gadamer’s thought that brings together
his hermeneutics and aesthetics.
Play concepts preceding Gadamer described how we play; Gadamer exposed how
play plays us. In Truth and Method, Gadamer introduced play in the context of
interpreting art in the section titled “Play as the clue of the Ontological Explication.” He
immediately announced a distinction between his “concept of play” and the “subjective
meaning” promoted by Kant and Schiller. The notion of play that “dominates the whole
of modern aesthetics” subordinates playing to the player (TM 102). He explained that
“players are not the subjects of play; instead play merely reaches presentation
(Dartsellung) through the players” (TM 103). Play is not an activity we undertake rather
play undertakes us.
Play is a key metaphor in Gadamer’s attempt to “reclaim and reinvigorate a lost
pre-Enlightenment hermeneutic dimension” in humanities scholarship (Lawn 22). He
described the hermeneutic implication of the “aesthetic situation” and explained “that
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conceiving aesthetic consciousness as something that confronts an object does not do
justice to the real situation” (TM 102). The “striking feature” of play in Gadamer is “it’s
dynamic for constant change” (Lawn 22). The fluid nature engagement underscores
Gadamer’s initial exploration of play. Change is the key. Play changes us yet we do not
change play.
Play is not limited to games and playing but provides a way to understand a
dynamic interchange of ideas. Gadamer unpacked the various uses of the word play. In
Truth and Method, he explained how the term play functions practically to articulate
multiple concepts, “we find talk of the play of light, the play of the waves, the play of
gears or parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats,
even a play on words” (TM 102-103). Importantly, in Gadamer’s description the
common feature of the term in use is tied how we articulate the back and forth flow of
ideas and things in the world but not the ends. “In each case what is intended is to-andfro movement that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end (TM 102-103).
Play has no specific goal other than play; it is purposeless, but not futile.
Play encompasses the full texture of an aesthetic experience. Understanding
thrives in the encounter between interpreter/observer and text/artwork. “Understanding”
emerged as a “dynamic interchange” between and observer and a work of art “not a
subjective response” (Lawn 23). As one observes a work of art they are “interwoven into
an event” out of their control which they “cannot freely dispose… normal horizons of
experience and expectations” (Grondin, “Ritual, Festival, and Play” 43). Play is the
absorbing experience between the “individual consciousnesses” of the observer and the
work of art. Play is not limited to an activity or simply “something a person does.” Thus,
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“as far as language is concerned,” the subject of play is not the player but the play itself
(TM 104). The movement of ideas unpacked in the general sense of the term occurs in
games, but in Gadamer’s description it has important distinctions.
The revelatory experience of play engulfs the players such that participants
belong to the play (RB 26). Play is all consuming. Lawn (22-23) explained that
Gadamer’s emphasis on the “to-and-fro” is not limited to the experience of the players in
the game, but “more pertinently it is the relation between the players and the game
played.” Fundamental to understanding Gadamer’s revolutionary approach to play is not
found in the “individual subjectivity of the players.” The play of the game gathers new
meaning for Gadamer in the “dialectical open future” and the “dynamic oscillation
between the players and the game” (Lawn 23). Play can be understood as movement of
ideas and the to and fro language in conversation.
In his effort to “tease out the meaning of play” Gadamer took experience to task
and looked for “clues within everyday usage” (Lawn 22). Play pushes beyond the limits
of games and playing. His starting point reversed the way play had been understood and
put the subject/object dichotomy in play. He described the hermeneutic implication of the
“aesthetic situation” and “that conceiving aesthetic consciousness as something that
confronts an object does not do justice to the real situation” (TM 102). Play is an
experience of being played.
Gadamer explored play initially in the context of aesthetic consciousness (TM
102-110). He introduced the concept in Truth and Method and it continued to blossom
throughout the rest of his career. Toward the end of Truth and Method he employed
playfulness to describe how the “universality of language makes hermeneutical play a
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dimension of linguistic understanding.” Play for Gadamer is a “central metaphor for
disclosing the ontological structure of language and it becomes a central feature of the
dialogical fusion of horizons and historicity” (Lawn 22). Play functions as a central
metaphor.
Gadamer extended the aesthetic framework outlined by Kant and challenged the
“subjectivization of aesthetics” and “the reduction of art to feeling” (Lawn 21). The move
by Kant to explain aesthetic reflection as “oriented…toward the power of imagination
and the human capacity for image building” is Kant’s “great achievement” (RB 17-18).
Kant brought the experience of art and beauty into the rigor of philosophy. He explored
the experience beauty beyond the limits of subjective taste (RB 18). Gadamer landed on
Kant’s significant communicative claim that the judgement of beauty binds us to others
and universal agreement.
4.7 Play of Art
Gadamer showed how art stands as an exemplar for broader truths that the
methods in the natural sciences lack. “In a work of art there is a statement, a truth that
one can only understand if one allows oneself to be lifted into its play.” Art plays with
us. Although we experience art, art is not an object of our experience. Gadamer
contended that “play is not… the subjective playing with the art, but rather of the
playing of the work with us” (Grondin; “Ritual, Festival, Play” 44). This expansion of
play broadens his initial notion as “the relationship between the individual
consciousness and the artwork claiming that understanding here is a dynamic
interchange not a subjective response” (Lawn 23). Art contains truth not accessible to
scientific methods.
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Gadamer pointed to the unnecessary limits imposed by the “conceptual
knowledge” and the privileging of methods (TM 36). When scholars turn to methods as
the source for understanding, multiple avenues of meaning are ignored. Scientific
methods and conceptual knowledge limit the possible questions and conceptions of
truth. Gadamer argued that meaningful experiences are silenced by the pursuit of
scientific methods. Gadamer explored play through a detailed description of art and the
aesthetic consciousness.
Gadamer construed a co-productive mode of being for art and the audience. A
work of art presents itself to, and is constructed by, the viewer. Meaningfulness of the
experience depends on engagement. In his essay “The Play of Art,” Gadamer explained
how the meaningfulness of art is distinct from the material truths of the natural sciences.
Where the objective methods seek to yield a stable and repeatable meaning, art is coproductive and its meaning requires participation for completion. Art “demands to be
constructed by the viewer to whom it is presented.” The utility of art is not tangible “it is
not something that is, rather something that is not.” The being of the work of art takes
form in the experience of the viewer. It is not a “thing we can use for a particular
purpose” or a “materiel thing from which we might fabricate some other thing.” The
mode of being of a work of art exhibits meaning only when confronted by others, “it is
something that only manifests and displays itself when it is constituted by the viewer”
(Gadamer, “The Play of Art”126). The co-productive unity in the experience of art and
play help ground the ludic rhetoric developed in the final chapter of this dissertation.
Play is a metaphor for the structuring capacity of language and culture. Gadamer
brought immediacy to play as performance. Games precede the players. Gadamer’s key
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metaphor helps develop a ludic rhetoric by exposing how game plays us. Language is not
an empty set of symbols put into use, but an active productive source of understanding
that affects us in our use of it. His analysis brought communication to the center of
meaning and being. Play is not, in Gadamer’s sense, merely the attitude of playing.
Rather players are caught up in the shaped activity of the game itself. “In playing we are
not as much the ones playing as the ones played” (Grondin, “Ritual” 44). In play, we do
not merely express ourselves, but rather the game itself “presents itself” (Weinsheimer
and Marshall xiv). Lawn (23) explained that the “to-and-fro-ness of play, the
subordination of the player to the game, is a process and a structure ceaselessly at work in
our daily encounters with language.” Play is beyond the individuals playing. It is the
structuring and the meeting of self and others.
Play confronts us in experience with others. Placing play at the center of
experience of the process of understanding implies “crucial ethical conditions” necessary
for “genuine dialogic play” (Vilhauer x-xii). In Gadamer’s hermeneutics “authentic
engagement in play with the other[s] is crucial for our education, development, and our
very existence as human beings” (Vilhauer xii). Play is the center of Gadamer’s
alternative to the natural sciences. Vilhauer’s analysis shows that play exposes the “very
process of understanding” (25-29). Play is co-productive.
Gadamer developed the mutuality of the experience of art. Gadamer attended to
the cognitive and existential implications of interacting with art. Art produces a persistent
repetitive echo that, when encountered, forces a cognitive response. Art comes to life and
has meaning in the event of interpretation, it “demands to be constructed” by the
interpreter. The artist and interpreter both are enjoined in the structure of art. A work of
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art is not a thing we use; “it is something that only manifests and displays itself when it is
constituted” by the interpreter (RB 126). He drew a line to the problems of method and
meaning. From a natural science perspective, a piece of art is an object to be interpreted
by the subjective taste of an interpreter. The natural sciences seek to stand over the
objects of experience. Scholars seek new methods to draw conclusions, to subordinate art
to something experienced. Art is something labeled, defined, judged and owned.
Gadamer showed that play is an avenue of truth beyond the limits of science. Gadamer
showed that there are truths in the human sciences that the methods of the natural
sciences are unable to discover.
Gadamer changed the experience of art to the experience with art. He reframed the
encounter with art and challenged the notion that art is a “static object.” He contended
that the experience with art changes the player/interpreter. Play is a mode of being not
something that we do, but something happens to us. He allowed for Kant’s work to
bolster art as a serious medium of communication, but breaks from the subjective
interpretation of art as an aesthetic experience (TM 101-103). Kant brought art toward the
light of truth and he left it in the personal experience as a feeling. Kant’s move helped
clarify art and artist, but he fell short of allowing art to speak for itself. Kant’s aesthetic
consciousness stood over the experience of art as the subject. Gadamer agrees that art is
significant but not as the subject of our experience. Art changes us. Art works.
The work of art demands our attention. Understanding occurs in experience; the
interpreter is affect by art. Art has a voice in the conversation. Art draws us in to it as a
subject. Gadamer showed how the “spectator plays crucial interpretive role” in the
meaning of art. Meaningfulness is only completed in the “back and forth play of
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communication” (Vilhauer 31). Thus, standing over art and objectifying it does not
adequately express the work of art. Both play and art are not subjects of a player or
interpreter; they engulf us as a mode of being. Both play and art structure our experience.
Gadamer explained that “all play is playing something.” Playing means adapting to play,
becoming a player, “A person playing is… someone who comports himself” to the game.
The game affects us and we become players (TM 107). The play itself never ceases. Play
is the mode of being the player experiences. The next section turns to Gadamer’s
expression of play in conversation. What emerges in Gadamer’s reclamation of the
classical tradition of rhetoric is a constructive openness to others grounded in respect.
4. 4 Conversation is Always a Fusion of Horizons
Conversation is a second significant metaphor underlying Gadamer’s
hermeneutics. He explained in a series of interviews that “conversation is the essence of
what I have been working on for the past thirty years” (Conversations 56). Hermeneutics
centers meaning in conversation. Conversation is a meeting place of mutual respect. “Our
willingness to engage the voice of the others, to listen and to speak is a crucial condition
of understanding” (Vilhauer 83). In conversation, “something is placed in the center” of
discourse as a shared concept about which partners exchange ideas. Reaching
understanding is “not merely as matter of putting oneself forward and successfully
asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we
do not remain what we were” (TM 371). Like play, conversation is transformative. We
are changed in and through conversation. The change occurs not by winning points or
reaching agreement; simply by being in conversation changes us. Understanding is not

155

found in consensus, but in the meeting others who share a common concern.
Conversation is always a fusion of horizons.
Conversation and play are connected on multiple levels in Gadamer’s
hermeneutics. Like play, conversation absorbs. For Gadamer both play and conversation
“rest on a common willingness of the participants…to lend themselves to the emergence
of something else.” Only in the freely entered safe place of mutual respect of
conversation does the “subject matter…comes to presence and presentation” (TM xvii).
Gadamer’s metaphor of play unpacked the subjective role of a text. He shifted the subject
object distinction between interpreters of a work of art. Gadamer showed how the work
of art draws in and the text becomes alive; the work of art is active; art works on us.
Philosophical hermeneutics “understands itself not as an absolute position, but as
a way of experience. It insists that there is no higher principle than holding oneself open
in a conversation” (PH 189). Conversation is always “something of living value” (PH,
94). Philosophical hermeneutics frames us communities “together in community is living
together in language and language only exists in conversation” (Gadamer, Conversation
56). Gadamer’s hermeneutics exploded the “universal role of language.” Understanding
does not precede language. Language is not a simple vessel through which meaning
travels. We do not maintain a “linguistic storeroom” of “interpretive concepts” to apply
to “things to be understood.” He explained, “…language does not reach out and take
hold of language; it is carried out within language” (Gadamer, Conversation 37). Using
common language is a community act. Conversation is communal and “something is
expressed that is not only mine or my author's, but common” (TM 390). Conversation is
standing together where individuals open themselves to each other.
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Gadamer’s emphasis on conversation not only attended to speech and language,
but the encounter, the happening of understanding as it takes place. In the introduction to
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics, Gadamer’s contended that the “principal
contribution to hermeneutics” is the shift toward understanding as an “event” (Linge
xxviii). Gadamer moved away from the methodological emphasis of scientific inquiry
which presumed understanding to be “a deliberate product of self-couscous reflection”
and re-worked the process of understanding that “in its very nature is episodic and transsubjective” (Linge xxviii). Understanding that emerges in conversation is not tied to
production of knowledge but to the event, the meeting. The involvement in conversation
is the end. “The keys to understanding are not manipulation…but participation and
openness, not knowledge but experience, not methodology but dialectic” (Palmer 215).
Understanding occurs in conversation as conversation.
In conversation, difference is not an obstacle but an opportunity. Each participant
“truly accepts” the other’s perspective and “transposes himself into the Other to such an
extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says” (TM 385).
Conversation presupposes common ground in language, and participants are “far less
leaders…than led.” Participants do not know ahead what will emerge in conversation.
Gadamer likens understanding in genuine conversation to an “event that happens to us.”
A conversation has a “spirit of its own” (TM 385). United through language, participants
are transformed and something new emerges.
Gadamer’s connection to language brings together the significance of self and
others in conversation. Understanding self plays out in language and “Language is a we”
(Gadamer, Conversation 56). Our use of language embeds us within a tradition and
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brings together the participants in conversation, language is “the communicative
mediation which establishes common ground” (Weisheimer and Marshall xvii).
Conversation is a mode being. From the model of Socrates, Gadamer showed that
engaging in “authentic dialogue means comporting oneself with both openness and
directedness toward the Other” (Vilhauer 101). The co-productive model of dialogue
establishes hope in a divided world.
4.8 Texts in Conversation
Gadamer explained that translation is an interpretive act (TM 388-390). The task
of overcoming difference in language is a model of crucial concepts unpacked in
Philosophical Hermeneutics. How a translator approaches a text will affect the meaning
derived. A translation is not “re-awakening the processes” of the author. A translator
brings experience and prejudice to bear on a text and the translation is always
“necessarily a re-creation of the text” driven by the understanding and predisposition of
the translator (TM 387). All translations will inevitably “lack some of the overtones that
vibrate in the original” (TM 388). Translators must make choices to overcome difference.
The choices are always interpretive and grounded in the experience of the translator.
Gadamer relates the experience of translation to the “effort to come to understanding” in
conversation. As in the exchange of ideas in dialogue, translators consider different
possibilities and the result is always an interpretive choice. A translator must be aware of
the inherent interpretive choices made and “preserve the character of his own language,
the language into which he is translating, while still recognizing the value of the alien,
even antagonistic character of the text and its expression” (TM 388-389). Understanding
is always separated by a “gulf between the two languages.” Authentic conversation opens
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us to the ideas of other but does not require agreement. Each participant seeks to
understand from the others perspective and is changed but a purely subjective self
remains.
Conversation is akin to play. Conversation engulfs us. It is productive in the sense
that each interlocutor has an opportunity to expand their own horizon of understanding,
and new truths emerge. “The otherness of the Other’s horizon serves to enrich one’s own
horizon.” Gadamer’s hermeneutical attitude sees this as an opportunity for growth. He
always tried to “appreciate the otherness of the Other’s horizon of understanding” and
“found common ground” (Dutt 11). In every encounter with others we experience a new
and different horizon of ideas. Conversation brings the context of difference to the fore.
Dutt explained that Gadamer saw engagement as a fusion of difference.
We do not ground the text in our own ideological perspective; we allow the text to
speak to us. Gadamer brought the text to life, “the text is a thou with whom we are
engaged in conversation” (Aylesworth 62-63). Gadamer provided a different way to
understand engagement with texts and others. A text interacts with us as we interact with
it. Like a response, a text stands in an already occurring conversation evoking
understanding driven by what has preceded. As a text speaks to us, we are armed with
preceding experience that enables access to understanding and defuses potential
objectivity. Language functionally brings us together with a text in experience. Rather
than suppose a persuasive stance of domination seeking compliance, Gadamer
emphasized the meeting place. The shared history and culture comes forth in language
and the text “is inalienable from its tradition” and interpreter (Aylesworth 64).
Hermeneutics from this viewpoint carries on the dialogic perspectives of Plato that
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embraces the pursuit of understanding. Aylesworth (63-65) contended that Gadamer
presents a model of engagement between interpreter and text that “does not alienate the
affinity of belonging between the text and the reader, but preserves it from any
objectifying moment.” Engagement with a given text takes place within a given moment
where the text and interpreter meet.
4.9 Conclusion
Gadamer’s lifelong project sought to reclaim the ancient Greek tradition of
rhetoric. The move toward reason and science during the Enlightenment silenced
alternative avenues for seeking truth. In rehabilitating rhetoric, a new open co-operative
communication based on mutual respect and openness emerged. In the play of
conversation, participants embrace change and seek to work with others toward truth. The
long tradition that relegated rhetoric to an agonist method of domination in the pursuit of
a single truth is reframed as playful spirit of caring.
The final chapter of this dissertation draws on Gadamer’s notion of conversation
to help unpack early theories of stasis and explore a co-creative theory of rhetoric in the
classroom. Gadamer’s reconstituted rhetoric grounds a ludic theory of rhetoric where
participants embrace others in a fusion of horizons.
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Chapter 5:
Rhetoric at play
The dissertation advances persuasion as cooperative enterprise with hopeful
prospects for constructive civic engagement. Ludic rhetoric emerges as an appreciative
praxis for the enrichment of others in discourse and encourages cooperation over
consensus. The communicative ground exposed by attending to rhetoric, hermeneutics,
and play in the history of ideas reveals positive possibilities for teaching cooperative
rhetoric and persuasion. A historical account of the intersection of rhetoric and play in the
earliest stories of Greek philosophy and culture brings a new light to the cooperative
nature of rhetoric in its originative form. Before writing, oral communicative action fused
audience and performers in the production and perpetuation of cultural memory. Literacy
and progress led to fragmentation of rhetoric and the intrusion of the methods of the
natural sciences into the humanities during the Enlightenment.
Immanuel Kant was a leading figure of the Enlightenment. The life and work of
Kant can help explore the deeper significance of rhetoric during the Enlightenment
(Kennedy, Classical 274-276; Ercolini, “Pantheisim” 5-7; Frierson and Guyer vii-x).
Attention to Kant’s employment of rhetoric offers new insights into Kant’s corpus.
Kant’s rhetoric of reason uncovers how reason establishes knowledge. Cognition and
judgement are rhetorically framed. Transcendental idealism established the self as a
“knowing subject” actively producing knowledge in experience. Reason imbues us with
ethical demands. Imagination allows reason to move beyond objective or experiential
knowledge to creatively seek new ways to interpret experience. Kant underscored the
ethical implications of engaged rhetorical agents. Kant’s writing revealed a commitment
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to discourse, the public use of reason, and a “deeply rhetorical understanding of public
philosophical examination and communal inquiry” (Ercolini, Kant’s 198). Kant’s work
was revived by Neo-Kantian’s at the Marburg School and reframed by Rudolf Bultmann.
Bultmann’s Hermeneutics and Form Criticism contribute to rhetorical theory in creative
ways that provide fertile ground for future research in both rhetoric and theology. Myth
emerged in Bultmann’s work as communication technology employed for a specific
audience that is no longer accessible to a contemporary audience. Ancient audiences
understood the world through a mythic lens and rhetors used myths to communicate
important ideas. Demythologizing attends to the problems of the Universal and opens
possibilities of understanding for contemporary audiences. Bultmann invited
demythologizing beyond theological reflection and Gadamer’s development of
philosophical hermeneutics echoed, extended, and expanded Bultmann’s insights.
Gadamer’s rehabilitation and enlargement of rhetoric stood on the shoulders of
the hermeneutic tradition of Bultmann and the Neo-Kantian Marburg School. Gadamer’s
theory of play unfolds in conversation. Understanding is achieved not in agreement, but
in the to and fro of ideas with and for others. Gadamer’s attention to the process of
understanding elevates interaction and the event of communication. Gadamer tied play
and persuasion to a subjectivity and respect for the others. This final chapter explores
ludic rhetoric as an approach to teaching persuasion that engages Calvin Schrag’s
communicative praxis and promotes constructive civic engagement.
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how ludic rhetoric may help reclaim the
respectful ground of rhetoric and help educators promote engaged civic discourse by
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applying a new lens to old traditions. Ultimately, play as the ground of argument provides
for productive civic engagement and promotes agency and respect. I begin by discussing
the oppositional nature of persuasion and the absence the canon of memory in
contemporary teaching of rhetoric and public speaking. Next, I review the history of
stasis and memory in the ancient world. I then follow the evolution of memory and show
that is has been virtually eliminated from the canon and classroom. I attempt to uncover
why it has lost is place of privilege in the communication canon. I do this by exploring
the impact of the move from orality to literacy on rhetorical theory. I conclude that ludic
rhetoric may be fruitful for communication education to help students contend with the
postmodern condition by considering rhetoric with and for others. This cooperative
approach may open new spaces for engaged discussion, discovery, and dialogue. Ludic
rhetoric helps explore the to and fro of conversation as equal part of the process.
5.2 Losing Our Memoria
The move from orality to literacy affected the practice and teaching of rhetoric.
Writing drifted into culture and rhetoric became a distinct discipline. As rhetoric
expanded, writing replaced memoria; a new individualistic pragmatism replaced the
traditionally inventive theory of stasis with an oppositional and confrontational view.
Persuasive discourse moved to strategic opposition where refutation is destructive rather
than constructive. These changes in the nature and philosophy of rhetoric invite, as
Schrag (CP 181) suggested, a “dismantling of rhetoric.” The Enlightenment’s privileging
of specialization continued to reify distinctions between academic units. The move
toward “disciplinarity” led to the slow denigration of rhetoric.
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Since the Enlightenment, much of the public and academic use rhetoric has
narrowed to “mere rhetoric” diminishing traditional meaning of the term and role of its
ideas in academic life. Even is contemporary academic circles, a century after the re-birth
of the discipline, some scholars refuse to accept even the existence of rhetoric as a
distinct field of study (Mountiford 32-34). The theories and techniques of rhetoric
continue to flow through academia, but often discussed or applied with different
terminology. Mountiford explained that we “must look for rhetoric where it has not been
found—in many cultural locations” (Octalog II 33). Her discussion pointed to a key
problematic for teachers of rhetoric. Scholars continue to parse the meaning of rhetoric in
contemporary scholarship. Awareness of the tradition of rhetoric has virtually
disappeared in many contemporary universities. The ambiguity of the term in academia
led some scholars to presume that rhetoric is not subject in its own and if it is a subject, it
does not have a history (Mountiford 33). Jeffrey Walker’s The Genuine Teachers of this
Art (2011) outlined four primary “valid” definitions “in wide spread use” and
distinguished between popular use of the term and academic study (1-3). The segregation
of modes of thought leads to illusive biases in academic scholarship. This “cluster of
prejudices” distilled the significance and nature of rhetoric to a mere technique. He
argued that this privileges philosophy and other “core disciplines.” Rhetoric is conceived
as essentially a benign set of skills to be applied when the intellectual work of “validity,
reference, and meaning” is complete (CP 181). Compartmentalization affects how
rhetoric is taught. Rhetorical education follows a long line of interpreting Aristotle’s
definition of rhetoric as “finding all the available means of persuasion” from the speakers
perspective (Burnyeats, 88-90, Crem 240-242). Rhetoric in this construction is a one way

164

movement of ideas intended to move, change, or nullify and audience’s differences. The
contemporary approach to Aristotle’s Rhetoric conflates rhetoric and persuasion. Golden
et al contended that Aristotle’s influence in the history of rhetoric is “so comprehensive
and fundamental” that his Rhetoric “is the single most important work on persuasion ever
written” (67). Rhetoric as a tool of persuasion limits the possibilities for community and
individual growth.
5.3 Rhetoric Standing Over Persuasion
Rhetoric in contemporary discourse is frequently used as a “pejorative” implying
“empty bombastic words with no substance or trivial talk.” This contemporary negative
baggage belies the positive “distinguished” tradition of the discipline (Foss, Foss, and
Trapp 1). Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the most common model for teaching rhetoric in the
contemporary classroom (Foss, et al Readings 7; Kennedy “Introduction” ii; Lucas 5).
“Most teachers of composition, communication, and speech regard it as seminal work
that organizes its subject into essential parts…and illustrates and applies its teachings so
that they can be used in society” (Kennedy, “Introduction” ix). Although Aristotle’s
Rhetoric was written nearly twenty-five hundred years ago, “it has been more studied in
modern times than it ever was in antiquity or the Middle Ages” (Kennedy, “Introduction”
xi) It is “still considered the most important work on the subject” (Lucas 8). Aristotle
tied rhetoric to persuasion as the ability to find what is persuasive in any situation (Rhet.
I.2). Contemporary courses in composition, persuasion, and argumentation that employ
Aristotle’s methodology often construct an “agonistic model of rhetoric” where
“persuasion is a deliberate…attempt on the part of a rhetor to change” the audience’s
mind (Ryan and Natalie 71). Traditional rhetorical scholars, even those attempting to find
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new safer alternatives, presume that rhetoric has always been a persuasive tool (Foss et al
“Invitational Rhetoric” 3-4). Foss et al outlined a history of rhetoric as a site patriarchal
reification and aligned traditional rhetoric with persuasion. The goal of persuasion is it to
find the point of conflict and marshal support to “change people’s beliefs and actions”
and to “get the listeners to agree with you and…act” (Lucas 324). Rhetoric, in this frame,
is a tool of persuasion used to establish control, domination, and change (Fos et al 2-5).
The move toward consensus dominates the contemporary approach to persuasion. The
continued relevance of classical rhetoric is also evident in the texts used in college and
university oral communication courses.
Persuasion and argumentation are essentially interchangeable in the contemporary
discussion of rhetoric (Schrag, CP 181-182; Foss et al “Invitational” 3-4). Schrag
suggested this inclination is embedded in our social practices and “persuasion is
construed as argumentation struggling for agreement and consensus” (CP 182). The
move to build consensus subordinates persuasion to argumentative strategies as
“debating, winning points…with the intention of obliterating the beliefs of the opponent”
(CP 182-183). This emphasis of ‘other’ as opponent in contemporary scholarship is a
reflection of the construal of persuasion as necessarily forensic in nature. The ‘other’ is
not a resource for mutual discovery, but an obstacle. Persuasion seeks not what the
audience can offer to solve the problem or move the discussion forward, but how to
change their way of thinking. The audience, then, is not a subject within the discourse,
but an object to be turned, changed, or manipulated.
The ‘other’ is an obstacle to be forged anew by the speaker’s dazzling persuasive
prowess. The emphasis on consensus, change, and agreement frames stasis as tool to
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promote an individual perspective. The oppositional view of rhetoric is based on the idea
that “stasis grows out the conflict of opposing forces” (Carter 99). This notion of stasis
reverberates throughout the description of persuasive speaking. The goal of persuasion is
it to find the point of conflict and marshal support to “change people’s beliefs and
actions” and prove one point at the expense of the other. Arguers apply rhetorical
techniques as a means to disprove other perspectives and promote a single correct point.
The conclusion precedes the communicative event (324). Lucas described a hierarchy of
mental stasis labeled as “audience analysis” (186). Audience analysis in the
contemporary tradition was introduced in a 1935 collection of essays by H.L.
Hollingsworth, The Psychology of Audience. He explained the necessity of understanding
audiences as a pragmatic move toward effective persuasion. Audiences gather for
multiple reasons “to be entertained, instructed, exhorted; to observe merely, to
participate, or to dominate” (7-9). The audience’s beliefs should be measured in terms of
agreement so the speaker can determine how far to attempt to push the argument. A
hostile audience probably will not be convinced to act, but they may change their mind. If
an audience is predisposed to agree with the speaker, the speaker is encouraged to
advocate action. The text attended to the audience as an object to be moved
(Hollingsworth 141-159). Speakers were encouraged to anticipate and obliterate the
audience’s objections. The speech should be considered from the audience’s view only so
“everywhere you see a hole in your argument, fill it. Leave nothing to chance” (Lucas
328). In a chapter titled “The Psychology of Persuasion” Hollingsworth continued to
establish an adversarial orientation for persuasion based on identifying a point of conflict,
isolating the audience’s “conviction” or weakness regarding this conflict, and how to
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impress change (109-137). The text constructs an oppositional view of persuasion based
on argumentative technique grounded in stasis. Hollingsworth’s reconstruction of stasis
indicated agonistic perspective. In the classical tradition, there was much more nuance in
the theories. Stasis and lines of argument were initially taught as inventive questions to
bring audience and rhetor together.
The contemporary term stasis is related to the Greek staseis meaning ‘set of
questions or issues’ that indicated a broad category of ideas. The lines of reasoning can
be employed to identify disagreement, but this is only one function. Stasis points to a sort
of stillness in conversation and the questions are designed to open possibilities to move
forward. Stasis was inventive. The contemporary tradition resonates more closely with a
limited view of the Roman/Latin status or constititutio which in the Roman tradition was
borrowed from Greek term ‘stand.” Stasis in the contemporary interpretation of the
Roman tradition means to take a stand, but the recollection of the past is missing the full
complement of the term. The implication of the Roman perspective construed stasis as
the “place where two opposing forces come together.” Rather than agonistic then, even
the Roman use was cooperative. Difference meets at the point of stasis and “[t]he term
can be translated as ‘co-standing or ‘standing together’” (Crowley and Hawhee 71-74).
Cicero’s stasis theory presumed an engaged audience not merely a strategy of one rhetor
against another, but rhetors ‘standing together’ in the face of difference. The classical
construction of stasis was not necessarily a one-sided approach to promote the speakers
view in competition with the audience. Stasis, rooted in productive cooperation, “defined
what the rhetor needed to discover, not by his own choice but by virtue of a conflict
between what he already knew and the knowledge of others” (Crowley and Hawhee 159).
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Stasis can be read from the Roman perspective as asking socially relevant questions that
furthers civic discourse for the good of the community, rather than a single minded
approach to outwit the opposition to win an argument. Classical stasis encouraged
students to stand together with audience in conversation.
Reconsidering the pre-modern notion of stasis as standing together in
conversation opens the possibility to teach our students that “there is no higher principle
than holding oneself open in a conversation” which means we “always recognize in
advance the possible correctness, even the superiority of the conversation partner’s
position” (Gadamer, PA 198). Stasis theory can be taught, from the traditional
perspective, as a unifying theory. Difference is met head on and speakers engage the
audience with questions to grow the common ground already established. Stasis connects
the audience and speaker through dialogue grounded in questions. In the classical
tradition, stasis was an appreciative theory designed to generate constructive questions
and stand together with and for others. Courses in rhetoric and rhetorical theory are an
opportunity to teach that dialogue matters and that meaningfulness occurs in conversation
with and for others. Where stasis theory has changed over the centuries, one community
driven concept from traditional rhetoric that has been virtually forgotten is memory.
5.3 Stasis: From Standing together to Falling Apart
Ancient theory at its best emphasized that the possibilities of interaction between
a maker of “spoken rhetoric” and “the interactions actually generated by speaking would
determine the social consequences of the discourse” (Arnold 51). Memory as an art
developed within a period of participatory rhetoric where the heroic great leaders of
legend solved disputes with gentle argument (Theogony 90-92). Stasis was articulated as
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barriers to understanding and was the location of questions for rhetor’s attempt to stand
together with the ‘other’. Rhetoric, persuasion, and argument evolved in the Western
tradition as power struggle, domination, and point counter point; the primary tool of
refutation is to disprove not extend; arguments are shaped to further a predisposed
conclusion (Foss, et al., “Proposal” 2-5). Stasis is a point of conflict where two opposing
views reach a stalemate and the goal of argument is to forge ahead to claim prescribed
notions. This is problematic because the underlying theme in this framework is a goal to
establish consensus. Engagement is not the end, but the beginning of the challenge. These
strategies encourage the rhetor to identify wrongness in others perspective. The premise
of the contemporary conception of stasis then is not only that the rhetor is already correct
but that the others involved in the conversation are wrong and need to be changed. Stasis
serves the larger goal of consensus.
5.4 Memoria in the Classical Tradition
Communication is rooted in memory in two distinct ways. First, our ability to
arrange and access our storehouse of ideas, forms of arguments, and images as described
by Cicero and Quintilian form the root of our inventive process. We rely on our memory
to discern and arrange the information we already know. Communication is not possible
without our ability to recall information. In the classical pre-literate tradition memory had
an elevated role in culture. It brought people together and was the only lasting social
bond. “Memory enables us to live in groups and communities, and living in groups and
communities enables us to build memory” (Assman 110). The pursuit of truth within our
own memory involved discovery and invention. The articulation of the structures of
arguments in Aristotle’s Rhetoric provided groundwork to assemble this knowledge.
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Memory is not an isolated experience of the individual. Memory draws us to a
common meeting place. Communicative action both draws on and builds memories
collectively. Memorization was an important tool for ancient pre-literate cultures.
Memory implied a shared lived experience. Memory was the intellect, the primary tool of
gaining, perpetuating and maintaining society. Memory structures our identity and
“enables us to form an awareness of selfhood…both on the personal and on the collective
level” (Assman 109). Primary oral cultures perpetuated themselves through narratives, as
Connors explained, “all cultural tradition….could only be transmitted by constant
repetition and memorization” (39). The language technologies in the ‘poetic’ evolved
from rhetoric and have become what we now know as poetry. The pre-literate Greek
education established elaborate memorization techniques and centered on reciting the
works of Homer and Hesiod (Augustine 2.24, Connors 38-39, Haveloc 34-37). Ong
added that “formulaic thought patterns were essential for wisdom and administration”
(23). These formulaic thought patterns involved more than committing words to memory;
it involved the comprehension of concepts and the arrangement of ideas, the storing and
recalling of the structures of arguments and the basis of invention (Connnors 44-45,
Hoogestraat 142, Ong 25). Cicero described memory as the “treasure-house of the ideas
supplied by Invention, to the guardian of all the parts of rhetoric” (Rhetorica ad
Herennium 3.16-24). For Cicero, memory reflected the move from orality to what Ong
(1982) refered to as "chirographic" thinking.
Memory in the classical tradition reflected the oral nature of communication. The
concepts of memory developed and expanded during the transitional period between
primary oral culture and chirographic thinking. “The ancients’ concern with their
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rhetorical "canon" memoria and modem talk of "stage fright" and "speech reticence" both
reflect awareness that a unique set of problems affects the making of rhetorical
communications that are oral”(Arnold 53). Rhetorical education and texts provided
strategies to aid and develop memory. One aid that slowly emerged was writing.
References to writing, images, and visual space in the Rhetorica ad Herennium
pointed to a shifting chirographic consciousness that was already dependent on an
external apparatus to store information. The shift also revealed the move from the sound
based acoustic psychology to a visual medium (Ong, The Presence of the Word 33-35).
The author relies on the reader to already know the function of writing. The specificity in
the type of writing points to a deeper meaning. Writing on wax or wet clay was the
earliest way to develop a permanent record. The explanation of how to access images in
the mind’s eye for use while speaking reveals an image-based audience inclining toward
literacy in the ad Herennium. Mnemonic devices, rhythmic word organization, “cunning
verbal and metrical patterns” developed in the poetic were “the only possible verbal
technology available to guarantee the preservation and fixity of transmission. This is the
historical genesis, the moving cause of that phenomenon we still call 'poetry” (Connors
54). The lack of discernment and discussion is what concerned Socrates in the Phraedrus.
He argued that writing like the “offsprings of painting stand there as if they are alive, but
if anyone asks them anything, they remain most solemnly silent” (Plato, Phaedrus 257c–
279c). Passive audience acceptance of ideas troubled Socrates. “The enemy for Socrates
and Plato was the authoritarianism of one-way discourse” (Connors 54). In writing there
is no conversation. There is no to and fro. This attitude toward one-way communication
underscored Socrates’ disdain for writing. Truth, for Socrates, suggested Connors (55)
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was found in a “shared process and nowhere else.” Conversation is an end in itself;
communication is communion. To communicate we enter into a preceding language
culture. Conversation and dialogue bring us together. The strategic use of dialogue
demonstrates the necessity for discussion over recitation.
Our ideas about classical rhetoric are necessarily “biased in a literate direction”
(Connors 41). The essential attribute of speaking has melted over the centuries. As we
glance back to reconsider the broad category of rhetoric and its influence in the GrecoRoman world we can include in our consideration the animating nature imbued with the
power of speech. Speech was derived at the core of our being, the use of reason and its
expression. “Legitimate discourse is discovered by its speaker; it has as its primary goal
self-instruction and its secondary goal the generation of similar discourses in the souls of
others” (Griswold 211). Language use is a defining characteristic of human existence; we
are “living beings having logos” (Shrag 1). Augustine worked in this direction in The
Trinity connecting memory with human intelligence drawn from the parallel between
human condition as Imago Dei and the Trinity (308). Memory also connects us to each
other. The employment of rhetorical techniques often presumes a shared collective
memory.
The networks of ideas marshaled by the use of figural rhetoric begin by attending
to the ‘other’ and presuppose the audience’s ability to recall ideas for completion. The
categories and formulas described by Aristotle in the Rhetoric presumed the capacity of
the audience to draw from the memory to participate in the discussion. The classical
theorists did not limit memory to the basic skill of memorization. Memory is an engaged
process of organizing, storing, and recalling ideas, but memoria included the generative
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inventive function of assimilating the stored ideas and finding new connections and
relationships among ideas. Welch added that ideas led by this type of discourse are easy
to remember and transmit, “[t]he nature of memory made this way of thinking and
communicating especially effective” (23). Memory stores not only images of things, but
the ‘forms’ of things. Concepts like maxims, enthymeme, and examples “deal with the
rhetor’s relation to the audience” (Connors 56). This connection to the audience is bound
by the appeal to memory. An enthymeme relies on the audience to complete the formula
by drawing on their memory.
Cicero and Quintilian articulated the art of memory in the Roman tradition.
Cicero credited the elevation of memory to an art to Simonides. McKeon explained the
role of memory in the Roman tradition. The art of memory, for Simonides, was formed
by images. Here again we see the move away from an oral acoustic way of thinking to a
visual image construction of thought. Simonides discovered this art after a banquet hall
collapsed and killed the guests. He reconstructed the scene to identify the unfortunate
attendees by mentally recreating the image of the order of the guests around the table. In
the process, Simonides recognized that order and arrangement of things in spatial
arrangement to each other aided his memory. He construed that this skill can be enhanced
and an art of memory develops by placing mental images in the “form the constructed
order of his memory” (Kalin and Frith 5-7). In this tradition it is evident that the
chirographic culture is already impacting the development of memory. The exemplar of
memory referenced by Cicero is writing.
Quintilian extended the same narrative of Simonides in The Institutes of Orator,
but as McKeon explained, commingles memory with invention. The act of storing the
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images and then recalling them at the appropriate time in an order different from the
original experience is inventive. Arnold agreed that Quintilian's psychological concept of
memory is co-creative and inventive, “he fastened on one of an oral communicator 's
peculiar conditions of creativity: intellectual, emotional, and overt behavioral processes
must be managed as part of a plan during personal interaction with those on whose
judgments the speaker's own purposes depend” (55) . The art of memory for Quintilian
was experimental. The images we collect in our memory are based on our experience.
The mind is the “seat of the images” saving and construing our interpretations of places
and things so that when we return to a place through the memory of our experience “we
not only recognize the place but also recollect the persons we met there and even the
unuttered thoughts that occurred to us”(730). Augustine continued in this tradition. He
agreed that memory is more than recollection. Memory for Augustine holds images of
material things as well as the ideas of things, “we see with the eyes of the body, and think
about even when absent through their images which we hold in the memory”
(Confessions 343). Quintilian identified the temporal challenges of oral communication.
Speakers need to remember their strategy, what they have already said and what they are
planning. By looking “ahead to what is required in instants to come” and maintain an
“intellectual, personal, and emotional” connection with the audience (Arnold 51-54). The
need to remember diminished with the advent of writing.
5.5 Writing Extends Memory and Silences Memoria
Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus denounced the use of writing to replace intelligence.
When the Egyptians “received letters” it was supposed to make them “wiser and give
them better memories.” Socrates warned that we should be wary of our own inventions.
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The use of writing will allow citizens to stop using their intellect and memory which
“will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls” (257c). Forgetfulness is not the only
problem recognized by this new invention that Socrates warned Phaedrus to consider;
intelligence will deteriorate. Memory, for Socrates, involved more the memorization.
Memory is the use of recall, the intellect the repository of truth. Passive memorization
and reciting words does not further the charge toward truth, writing is not an aid “to
memory, but to reminiscence…you get only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers
of many things and will have learned nothing” (256c). Plato warned against the use of
writing; he feared it will disturb the proper use of memory. He did not necessarily
presume the sort of habituated memory which the Western tradition has remembered
memory. Havelock suggested Plato understood memory as an active inventive process.
Connors (1992) extended Havelock’s ideas and suggested that Plato’s criticism of
rhetoric was at least in part because of the mechanisms of oral persuasion take on a
technical form.
As literacy supplanted orality the techne/art of rhetoric evolved away from the
mutual discovery of question and deliberation. Rationalism turned to individualism and
“gnawed away at the old communality” (Connors 56). Ong reviewed the wealth of
commentary that charted the effects of the transition from orality to literacy and the
cumulative psychological and sociological impacts. He suggested that the transitions are
never total or complete. Sediments of orality travel with literacy, but the inclusion of
literacy in an oral culture had a measurable effect. Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a transitional
work; it balanced on the verge of orality and literacy and was a “mixture of…critical
rationalism and of older terms of art that must have been more meaningful” to his
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audience (55-56). The transition did not end orality, but extend and enhanced it “making
it possible to organize the principles or ‘constituents’ of oratory into a scientific art” (Ong
9). The entire post-Socratic western tradition was constructed by literate minds. Rhetoric
has survived as a discipline “migrated from the oral to the chirographic world” (Ong,
Orality and Literacy 114). During this migration the nuances and concepts have
modernized, tending toward the pragmatic and efficient. The skills of the orator are coopted by the writer. The quagmiric term “rhetoric” implies much more than the speaking.
The slow drift of the classical canons of Greco-Roman rhetoric, “as early as the sixteen
hundreds textbooks commonly omitted…memory which was not applicable to writing”
(Ong, Orality and Literacy 114). The changes Ong suggests were made with little or no
explanation. The gradual elimination of memory from the classical canon is related to the
cultural shift caused by proliferation of writing.
5.6 Memory Loss
Our ideas about classical rhetoric are necessarily “biased in a literate direction”
(Connors 41). The essential attribute of speaking has melted over the centuries. As we
glance back to reconsider the broad category of rhetoric and its influence in the GrecoRoman world we can include in our consideration the animating nature imbued with the
power of speech as derived at the core of being. Reason, for Schrag, is “operative in and
through the transversal play of discourse and action, word and deed, speaking and
writing, hearing and reading” (CP 8-10). Memory has in some cases disappeared entirely
from rhetoric instruction and texts. Training in memory has all but disappeared. The
increasing reliance on writing as an extension of memory slowly began to privilege
writing as a form of rhetoric in its own. This rhetorical discourse that was once oral or
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was intended for oral presentation constitutes troublesome material for literary historians
when all that remains is the printed matter. The distinction between literary and rhetorical
features of communication causes problems for scholars. As Socrates warned, a written
text is missing the conversational quality. There is a long history of studying rhetoric as
an oral act of delivering speeches and the role of the written word blurred the discipline.
As the study of written texts emerged within the discipline, memory continued to be
reframed and relegated to recollections and rote memorization. Scholars began to
approach to the ‘rhetorical’ or ‘persuasive’ as not fundamentally ‘literary’. In the process
the central meanings of memory shifted, rhetoric and persuasion changed. Memory was
forgotten and became a relic of the past; rhetoric had broadened to a point of near
meaninglessness and became linked to persuasion. Persuasion, centered on argument and
opposition, lost it initial cooperative potential and emerged in the twentieth century as an
adversarial method (Arnold 49-54). The shift in consciousness from orality to literacy
impacted the nature of rhetoric and persuasion.
There is an occasional move to appeal the memory in the context of
extemporaneous delivery, but rarely as a separate canon. Ong in the Presence of the Word
(1967) suggested that this loss of memory resulted from a drift away from orality to
chirographic culture. The move was inevitable as writing entered the curriculum; verbal
skills learned from the classical rhetorical tradition began to be applied to various forms
of writing and literature analysis. As writing gradually grew into a larger and larger
extension of our memory, memoria evaporated from the canon. Ong explained that
because of the increased emphasis on writing, memory slowly slipped away from the
canon; rhetoric texts early as early as the sixteenth century omitted memoria entirely
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from the canon (114). At the beginning of the twentieth century memory found its way
back to public speaking texts, but in a severely limited fashion. Wayne Hoogestraat’s
“Memory the lost canon?” suggested that memory appeared with “considerable
frequency” in a random reading of rhetoric texts. In the first few decades of the last
century rhetoric and composition found distinct homes in the academy (145). When
memory was mentioned though, it was not brought back to the elevated status as a canon
proper, but continued to be relegated to the technique of memorization.
The emphasis in the history of rhetoric is generally located on the shift itself, “the
transition from oral modes of communication to writing is assigned the leading part” in
most rhetorical scholarship (Haskins 158). As the narratives of pragmatism and efficiency
dominated the field, memoria diluted to memorization. Bromley Smith in a 1926 essay in
Quarterly Journal of Speech traced the history of memory in the rhetorical tradition. He
examined the earliest handbooks and texts; he reported that memory enjoyed a privileged
status in ancient rhetoric, but by the eighteenth century memory was dropped from the
canon. Smith concluded that memory and “the principles taught by Hippias had vanished
from public speaking” (136). Though we still find the term memory in public speaking
texts, it is the intellectually empty notion feared by Socrates. Memoria in the Greek sense
is lost.
5.7 Memory is Gone but not Forgotten.
Trying to access our memory after such a long and winding road may be a hard
drive. Culture is a social creation and for a culture to thrive a continuous narrative must
evolve from generation to generation. Havelock (46) refered to the necessity of a
“cultural book” to store important information for culture to perpetuate itself. Before
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writing, pre-literate societies used memory as this storehouse of ideas. The great epics of
the ancient world passed down from generation to generation in poems and songs
contained an encyclopedic account of history and knowledge. The events of the stories
were meaningful and public. The generations fed by this type of oral history evolved into
an “oral state of mind” (Havelock, Preface 45-47). The shift from orality to literacy
affected self-awareness and our oral consciousness. Cultural tension percolated as one
class attended to a new way of thinking and the other resists. Akin to how “poetry itself,
as long as it reigned supreme, constituted the chief obstacle to the achievement of
effective prose,” so to did the “poetic state of mind…constitute the chief obstacle to
scientific rationalism” (Havelock, Preface 44). Contemporary culture expresses a similar
disconnect; those with access to new communication technology and those without
experience very different worlds.
Research into the earliest evidence of literacy suggests that writing was a practical
extension of memory and was not widely used as a persuasive force. The emphasis in the
history of rhetoric is generally located on the shift itself, “the transition from oral modes
of communication to writing is assigned the leading part” in most rhetorical scholarship
(Haskins 158). The evolution of rhetoric into a distinct disciple is related to the transition
from orality to literacy in the ancient Greek world. No plan or conspiracy led to the
“written economy” it just developed with technology and mechanization. Writing
introduced the notion of “study” as we know it. The written word added new avenues of
learning. Rhetoric emerged in this “chirographic” (writing) culture, but it did not replace
the spoken word, it “enhanced” it. Writing enabled ordering principles of public speaking
into specific and distinct science (Ong, The Presence114). Writing strategies
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reconfigured the process moving oral communication from a communal event to an
individualistic enterprise. Rationality led toward individualism which in turn privileged
pragmatism and efficiency. The movement towards an individualistic psychology
ultimately affected our communication and new methods of communication affected our
psychology (Arnold 1992; Haveloc 1963; Ong 1967). Thus, the artistry of Aristotelian
rhetoric developed into technique and collections of vacuous skills adapted for efficient
persuasion and manipulation. The technologically progressive paradigm of contemporary
consciousness accelerates the disintegration of the study and promotion of rhetoric.
5.8 Ludic Rhetoric and the Pre-Modern
The liberal arts in contemporary academia are the extension of tradition that dates
to the classical period and refers to “branches of knowledge that initiate the young into a
life of learning” (Joseph 3). In classical education, rhetoric played a significant role
within the Trivium. The seven liberal arts, divided by ties to mind and matter, were
denoted as the Trivuim and Quadrivium. The Trivium is the umbrella term to indicate the
qualitative arts of language and the mind. Rhetoric formed the “foundation of a basic
liberal education” (Foss et al 9). Rhetoric is not limited to oral technique, but is
fundamental to all of the liberal arts. In Joseph’s (6-7) analysis of the classical conception
of rhetoric and communication, rhetoric in the Trivium was a positive constructive
engagement. Her work provides additional ground to revisit a ludic understanding of
rhetoric. She explained that the Trivium consists of the “fundamental arts of education,
teaching” and “being taught.” Key in her discussion is a productive understanding of
rhetoric as both teaching and being taught. Rhetoric is not limited to a one-side notion of
giving information; rather, it describes the constructive character of exchange. In her
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analysis we see the importance of attending to the to and fro of dialogue. A constructive
theory of rhetoric, inherent in classical pedagogy, emerged. Her assessment of the arts of
the Trivium imbued teacher and student, rhetor and audience, with rhetorical agency and
“must be practiced simultaneously by both the teacher and the pupil.” A student is not a
passive receptacle of knowledge but must “cooperate with the teacher” (7). Rhetoric and
communication are historically is rooted in fusing horizons as she explained “the
etymology of the word signifies” communication and only occurs when “something” is
“possessed in common” (7). Her breakdown of the liberal arts and the role of rhetoric
brought a pre-modern understanding to the center of the study; communication takes on a
cooperative spirit. “Communication takes place only when two minds really meet”
(Joseph 7-9). Akin to constructive stasis, communication is standing together in the void
of difference, enriched by the experience, receptive to difference yet not seeking
consensus. Stasis ties to ludic rhetoric by highlighting the dwelling place for constructive
difference.
Ludic rhetoric allows students to become engaged in the event of communication
and creatively question the status quo. Kennedy’s work on rhetorical education during the
classical period addressed playfulness in meaningful ways. Sophistic education playfully
challenged students and encouraged creativity (Classical Rhetoric 38). He explored the
use of games and playful exercises described by the Sophists and showed how educators
used play to help reinforce memory specifically and rhetorical education in general
(Kennedy, “The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks” 169-178). Writing helped students to
learn and memorize Homer’s classic texts and games helped them creatively apply the
ideas to contemporary situations. He explained that a “recurrent theme of sophistic
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rhetoric is a love of paradox and playing with ideas and words” (Classical Rhetoric 3637). The fundamental feature of play in classical education allows teachers to engage
students on their own terms and make course concepts relevant to them. Meaningful play
enriches student engagement and encourages cooperative rhetorical strategies. Sophist
taught that rhetorical skill can be enhanced by engaging “serious subjects” in exaggerated
unrealistic ways. Students respond favorably to topics that interest them. Establishing a
safe place to learn and practice rhetorical techniques allows students to step outside of the
dullness of real life (Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 37). Kennedy’s research concluded that
not only the Sophist but rhetorical education in the Hellenistic and Roman periods
engaged students with “unrealistic” but “exciting themes” (37). Playful approaches to the
status quo allows for students to question cultural norms while learning basic rhetorical
skills. “Playfulness in Sophistry” was often driven by a “disillusion” with self-righteous.
Complacent leaders refused to question “traditional values and practices” (Classical
Rhetoric 37). Kennedy drew a parallel to the use of playfulness to engage contemporary
students. From the classical tradition then we see that play enhanced the rhetorical
education and rhetorical education enhanced the broader liberal arts. Rhetoric is the
conversation of the humanities and it occurs in play.
5.10 Appreciative Rhetoric
Schrag introduced a rhetorical theory that can forge an addition to the
contemporary conception of rhetoric as “argumentative techniques of disputation”
(Schrag, CP 182). If we approach rhetoric as an appreciative process of cooperation we
may be able to take Schrag’s advice and heed the warning of Ricouer that “rhetoric
cannot become an empty and formal technique” (Qtd. In Schrag CP). Schrag pointed
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rhetoric toward an understanding of argument that can help develop skills of civic
engagement and open new possibilities for deliberative rhetoric, advocacy, and debate.
The starting point in rhetoric for Schrag is “the for someone”nature of discourse (CP 111). He decentered the subject and established a reciprocal relationship between the
rhetor and ‘Other’ emphasizing the role of others in the generation of meaning.
Schrag’s “rhetorical turn” in Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity
attended to the “performance of persuasion” and shows “paths of reflection, deliberation
and action” that are “nonargumentative” (183). His approach revealed a cooperative
substance in the event of persuasion that is “made to stand in the service of
understanding” and does not denigrate into a “coercive technique” (183). He explored the
specific instance of communication as defined by originating with the existence and
experience of the other. His restorative hermeneutic attended to the full spectrum of
experiences of meaning generation. Truth seeking for Schrag was an appreciative
process; the discovery of truth through praxis was a communal event. Most importantly
truth seeking is variable. He rejected foundationalism and highlighted the means over the
ends. Truth as a consensus requires “'wrongness” and he rejected this objectification of
others by privileging one truth over another. We must embrace the possibility of being
wrong and be encouraged by the benefit of others in conversation. The intentionality
“being-for-someone is the indelible feature of the creation and preservation of meaning”
(180). He tore down the static notion of truth as something that is advocated for
something, against something, and perpetually reified. Schrag’s rhetorical turn developed
shared reality; communicative praxis incorporated the experience of the other in the
inception of the communicative experience.
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The ‘toward’ someone nature of the rhetorical act forces the ‘other’ to be
incorporated as a subject of the experience. De-centering the subject allows the ‘other’
full capacity in the communication event and blurs the direction of the discussion. This
brings engagement to the center of being. The contemporary construction of stasis as
lines of argument that establishes a presumptive bias toward a particular truth melts away
in Schrag’s turn to the other. Eliminating the privilege of presumption encourages a wider
range of ideas in discourse. A “de-centered subject” challenges the oppositional construal
of stasis. The questions that help guide a conversation are not directed at the deficiencies
of the ‘other’ and promote a “new horizon of subjectivity” (CP 139). Schrag extended
this power of the moment and suggested that “thought is co-present with speech. It is in
the act of speaking that thought is accomplished and approximates completion”
(“Phenomenon” 2-27). For Schrag, discourse is the interplay of communicative praxis
with the other. The connection between the communicative act and audience are central
to meaning; context matters (CP 180-181). Meaning emerges during the interplay
between individuals; communication involves others both intellectually and emotively.
“Communication is a fulfillment of expression” (Schrag, “Thesis” 69). The necessity for
interaction is a key component of the meaning generation process. The experience of
discourse affects the dynamic of the entire rhetorical process; meeting others in
conversation exposes the self in a “personalized relationship with another.” The meeting
affects the “creative and responsive experiences” of both actors involved in conversation
(Arnold 52). The context of meeting matters. The embedded nature of real people in
conversation highlights Schrag’s distinction between practice and praxis.
5.11 Persuasion as Cooperation
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Communicative praxis draws on Aristotle’s practical philosophy. Aristotle’s
praxis directed us toward others and the “achievement and maintenance of the virtuous
life” (CP 20). Schrag’s communicative praxis is an active process that involves the full
texture of the experience with others. Strategies of civic engagement need not be directed
toward a univocal decision. In the postmodern world, rhetoric can be essential to help
articulate and negotiate difference without the implicit need to seek agreement;
“hegemonic force in reason is not measured by my attempt to prove my piece right.” He
suggested that “it is the acceptance that wrongness is valid” (Schrag, CP189-193)
Rhetoric does not have to work toward consensus. Persuasion can be reframed as a
productive shared experience.
The primacy of persuasion as a form of forensic discourse limits rhetoric to
consensus building and change. Aristotle’s Rhetoric in contemporary education functions
essentially as “an arsenal of persuasive means which are external to the rhetors and their
situation” (Haskins 17). Schrag suggested this is one reason why rhetoric has “denigrated
into a coercive technique” (“Thesis” 98). Schrag posed an alternative to negation and
refutation by expanding the “performance of persuasion” highlighted deliberation that is
“nonargumentative” (CP 183). This opens the rhetorical space of persuasion to include
the communicative praxis attending to the ‘Other’ and construes argumentation to work
in service “of understanding and deliberative action” (CP 183). What stood at the fore of
his thought was not necessarily the text of the message proper, but the direction of the
message, the occasion of it, the where the text of the message is going. He provided tools
to consider how the message was construed from the perspective of the audience and
implicated the speaker and audience in a dialogue. The audience is presumed in the
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communicative act (Schrag, CP 180-181). Schrag’s starting point of persuasion, then,
was that the “inaugural moment” of the communicative praxis is “for someone.” This
opens a lens on the creation of meaning in a persuasive context to include the audience at
the “genesis of meaning” (CP 181). The fact that communication is ‘for’ and ‘toward’ an
audience establishes the ‘other’ in the central act of meaning creation. This “for
someone” feature of persuasive rhetoric is “ubiquitously illustrated” in the classical
rhetoric. Rhetoric, for Schrag, was always ‘for’ someone. “A rhetorical consciousness is
stitched onto the very warp and woof of the multiple forms of discourse and action” (CP
180). Ludic rhetoric embraces the meeting place with others that Schrag brought forward
from antiquity.
Schrag’s insight into the possibility of a nonargumentative rhetoric opens the door
for a new vision of a teaching persuasion. Re-situating persuasion and a praxical event
with and for an audience rather to an audience enriches the possibility of establishing
“understanding rather than change as a fundamental rhetorical goal” (Ryan and Natalie
71). Stasis can be reconsidered as an opportunity for questions, a place to stand together
in discourse not in competition, but in respect for ideas. Stasis can be the pivot of
cooperation. Shrag’s theory of communicative praxis can help us encourage an engaged
awareness of the others as we teach persuasion. Persuasion can be resituated as an art that
encourages the openness of difference rather than a hegemonic discourse of competition.
Rhetorical theory is restated as an appreciative praxis for the enrichment of others in
discourse and encourages cooperation over consensus. This ludic rhetoric.
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5.12 Conclusion
The introduction examined convergences of rhetoric, hermeneutics, and play in
the history of ideas. The following three chapters developed further an aesthetic rhetoric
of play that builds from the turn toward the “word” in the hermeneutic tradition. Enriched
communicative ground is exposed by attending to rhetoric, hermeneutics, and play as
they intersect in the public domain. This final chapter considers the implications and
possibilities presented in ludic rhetoric for a constructive rhetorical theory for and with
others in conversation as the ground for teaching rhetoric. The goal of this chapter was to
explore how a ludic rhetoric can help provide an additional voice in contemporary
rhetorical education by promoting respect for the others.
In this chapter I have attempted to open news ways to promote civic engagement
in rhetorical education. Advocates can invite difference and escape the presumption of
‘wrongness’ in persuasion. Civic engagement can be encouraged to acknowledge the
‘other’ as integral to communicative praxis. I explored the development of rhetoric from
the pre-Socratics to the contemporary classroom. Along the way I showed that as literacy
promoted new ways of understanding the world, rhetoric attended to these changes by
eliminating memoria from the canon and skewed persuasion toward a competition and
technique. We have forgotten memory as an inventive process and excluded the ‘other’
from the generative capacity articulated by the classical theorists. Memory reconsidered
repositions the role of the audience in the creative process. Schrag attended to the ‘other’
in the communicative praxis. His rhetorical turn re-negotiates rhetoric. Allowing for
epistemic assumptions of the traditional construction of rhetoric, he established new
rhetorical space by moving away from epistemology toward communicative practice. He
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emphasized ‘the for the other’ quality of discourse. If we begin with the ‘other’ as subject
and construe stasis as opportunity for engagement, rhetoric as negation may foster a more
open engaged classroom.
Gadamer’s efforts to reclaim the traditional heritage of rhetoric helped prepare the
way to consider multiple ways of introducing persuasion in the classroom. Rhetorical
theory is an opportunity for appreciative engagement with others that is both selfaffirming and co-productive. His attention to conversation promoted the understanding
that “one does not try to argue the other person down, but that one really considers the
weight of the other’s opinion” (TM 367). We can offer a way to engage opposition and
difference without seeking to change and underscore meeting and community as the
primary concern.
This dissertation is significant to rhetoric because it underscores the broader
understanding of rhetoric as an engagement with and for others. Repositioning rhetoric
within the full experience of communicative praxis attends to the ‘other’ in the generation
of knowledge. We hope to prepare our students with the necessary skills for productive
civic engagement. The communicative implications of reconsidering the modernist
oppositional construal of rhetoric and persuasion may provide the ground for further
explorations of communication.
The first chapter of this dissertation explored ludic rhetoric in the history of ideas
from the Homeric epics to contemporary communication scholarship. In the Western
tradition rhetoric, hermeneutics, and play converge in key points. Rhetoric in the earliest
texts emerged as a playful exchange of ideas. Rhetorical education used games to
promote cooperation understanding. Chapter two examined the impact of the
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Enlightenment in the history of rhetoric. Although he appeared critical of rhetoric, Kant’s
free play of imagination added rhetorical texture to his critical work. In Kant, ludic
rhetoric emerged as thought seeking understanding and fertilized the ground for future
research into the communicative nature of reason. The coordination of the ideas can be a
helpful way to understand Kant’s free play of imagination in the public domain. The
practical implications of public speech are grounded by his categorical imperative. The
third chapter explored Rudolf Bultmann’s claim that “There is no exegesis without
presupposition” and his New Hermeneutics. Bultmann’s turn to the word brought a new
sense of self in history. Bultmann’s hermeneutics implicated both the self and other in the
event of interpretation. In chapter four I explored how play is unpacked in conversation.
Understanding is achieved not in agreement, but in the to and fro of ideas with others.
Gadamer’s attention to the process of understanding elevated the interaction, the event of
communication. For Gadamer “to understand something is to reach an understanding
with another” and is achieved in the to and fro of a “conversation that sustains the
interplay of question and answer” (Marshal 123). Gadamer tied play and persuasion to a
subjectivity and respect for the ‘other.’ This final chapter brings together ludic rhetoric as
an approach to teaching persuasion that engages Calvin Schrag’s philosophy of
communication and promotes the revelatory nature of conversation.
How we employ play metaphors reveals the significance of ludic imagination in
judgement and engagement. Kant’s ludic theory of imagination helps explore a
collaborative model of communication. Miller contended that when “‘game’ and ‘play’
are…used metaphorically to describe serious nonplay and real-life, nongame events and
situations” makes “an impact.” Using play metaphors affects how we know and engage
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others “not only on everyday thinking and speaking but especially on theory-making in
traditional academic disciplines” (Miller 515-517). Miller attempted to clarify the
function of play. He explained that his book was as an inquiry into “ludic imagination”
(Miller, “Forward” 5). The ludic imagination opens space for collaborative and
constructive encounters between empowered rhetorical agents. In Christine Downing’s
Preludes: Essays on the Ludic Imagination, 1961-1981 (2005) the ludic imagination
expresses a “playful and celebratory aspect” of imagination (xv). Play is a meeting place.
Play concepts reflect a similar sense of space. As Downing’s essays unfold, ludic
theory is akin to what Gadamer refers to as ‘speilraum’ “the space necessary for the
wheel to turn soulfully” (Miller, “Foreword” vii). The in-between nature of play adds
layers to how we discuss encountering others. Downing showed that we are always
already in a state of play “whether we are aware of it or not. We live in this play, this
interplay. We are in-between” (Miller, “Foreword” viii-ix). Huizinga drew attention to
similarities of play in multiple cultures and significant uses of the terms connecting to
play, to life, death, sex and more. Play concepts and metaphors are used variously to
describe war, love and life in all varieties of language. He pointed to the absence of a ‘not
play’ term in any language. From this linguistic lack lays the claim that “the play
concepts must be more important than its’ opposite” (44-45). Play, as Miller explained it,
is a “category lying beyond the dichotomy of serious/nonserious” (608). Terms used to
show nonplay or seriousness, are by their nature aspects of play. Play is a “higher order
than seriousness” Huizinga explains, “For serious seeks to exclude play, whereas play
can very well include seriousness” (45). Play is the extraordinary. The extraordinary
nature of the imagination emerged in Kant.
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Kant’s rhetoric of reason created space to understand how we encode experience.
Both his rhetorical technique and rhetorical theory attended to meaning in a community.
He provided away to examine the process of understanding and established limits about
what we can claim to be universally accepted knowledge. To establish these limits he
framed cognition and judgement within the context of discourse and scholarship. Kant’s
“Transcendental Idealism” explored the production of meaning. His attention to how we
organize experience attended to our experience with others. The “self” emerged as a
“knowing subject” actively producing knowledge and reversing the subject-object
construction of experience. Cognition organizes experience (Bloom 56). Reason is not of
nature. Reason organizes experiences and allows us to make sense of them. Kant
explained how temporal and spatial aspects of cognition frames layer of understanding.
Kant argued that the methods of scholars presuppose reason into the conclusions their
research. The presuppositions limit possible objective outcomes.
The work of Rudolf Bultmann extended Kant and grounded Gadamer. He brought
the text to life. Texts speak to us. Study and interpretation emerged as a discourse
between interpreter and text. Akin to a key point in contemporary Homeric scholarship is
that the received text demonstrates literate thinking. The original stories survived orally
over generations as fragments used for specific purposes for specific occasions. Attention
to the transmission of the story opens up many fruitful avenues of research into the
history of rhetoric and Western culture. A literate bias grounds much of the work
occurring at the same time in biblical hermeneutics. Bultmann’s Form Criticism centered
on the transmission of the Gospel and the consequences of communicative action for the
meaning of New Testament stories for contemporary audiences. His existentialist
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theology attended to the interplay between interpreter and text. In the current age of
metanarrative decline, Bultmann’s existential framework announced hope for religious
communication. Demythologizing becomes possible as his existentialism shifts out of the
Universal and brings meaning to a personal level. Scripture is only accessible to and
through the language of a contemporary audience. His Hermeneutics and Form Criticism
dwell in rhetorical space. His work is ripe for rhetorical scholarship. Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics drew from Bultmann’s well. This chapter continues to
develop the deeply rhetorical philosophies growing from studies in theology.
Teaching rhetoric in the classroom is an opportunity to explore civic engagement.
We have a rich tradition that dates back to the beginning of Western culture that framed
rhetoric as a cooperative enterprise. Ludic rhetoric incorporates the classical perspective
of rhetoric and play as a respectful gathering place. We can incorporate the respectful for
someone nature of rhetoric described by Gadamer and Schrag into traditional rhetorical
education. We can approach the teach rhetorical event from a perspective of respect that
favors discourse over consensus and remain true to the rich tradition we have received.
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